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

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THE
PARTITION OF EUROPE

A TEXTBOOK
OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1715–1815

BY

PHILIP GUEDALLA

SOMETIME EXHIBITIONER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE

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PREFACE

HISTORY is the most interesting part of geography, and European history is particularly dependent upon the conformation of Europe. It is not easy within the limits of a small book on a crowded period to indicate the geographical causes of political events, but I have attempted to employ the broad facts of European geography as a guide to the complex of national interests and policies. Geography is the foundation of all diplomacy and of all strategy, and I have tried to indicate its influence on the direction of policy, the trace of frontiers, and the march of armies. That is why the debt of this book to Pramberger's *Atlas zum Studium der Militär-Geographie von Mittel-Europa* and to the Atlas of the *Cambridge Modern History* is as great as that which it owes to M. Émile Bourgeois' *Manuel historique de politique étrangère* and to Colonel Vial's *Histoire abrégée des campagnes modernes.*

It is not easy to invent a nickname for a century, but if one thread connects the hundred years which separate the Peace of Utrecht from the Peace of Vienna, it is the continuous process of partition. The European states, which had emerged from the Roman Empire, the tribal movements of the Dark Ages, and the diplomacy of the Renaissance, were

engaged during the eighteenth century upon an incessant and varying distribution of European territory; that distribution was embodied in a series of international documents, and it provided the foremost occupation of the great figures of the century.

There are two people without whom this book could never have been written, and I am also indebted to Mr. L. Collier of Balliol College for reading it in proof: it is a large debt, which I hope I shall never repay.

P. G.

London, 1914.

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BOOK I. THE MONARCHIES

CHAPTER I

THE BALANCE OF POWER

§ 1. The year 1715. § 2. The Peace of Utrecht. § 3. The French Regency. § 4. The Hanoverian Succession. § 5. The Russian State. § 6. The Northern War. § 7. The System of Utrecht.

§ 1. The year 1715.

THE situation of Western Europe in 1715 was the result of three factors—the death of Louis XIV, the Peace of Utrecht, and the death of Queen Anne. The first of these, by the removal of the *Grand Monarque*, closed a distinct period of European history and ended with it a phase of French policy; Versailles ceased to be the centre of Europe, and France, relieved from the unwearying military effort of the past fifty years, was permitted to pass after the easy government of the Regency into the gradual decline of the reign of Louis XV. The second factor, by the combined exercise of European diplomacy, terminated the War of the Spanish Succession and produced a settlement which regulated the course of international affairs for a quarter of a century. The third, by the operation of the Act of Settlement, brought the House of Hanover to the English throne. These three elements combined in 1715 to produce a situation which was in reality the starting-point of the eighteenth century; for fourteen years Europe had been busy with problems and quarrels which it had inherited from the seventeenth century: in 1715 the eighteenth century began.

Factors: 1715. Death of Louis XIV.

1713. Peace of Utrecht.

1714. Death of Queen Anne.

§ 2. The Peace of Utrecht.

The diplomatic settlement, which is known generally as the Peace of Utrecht, consists of eleven treaties signed at Utrecht between the years 1713 and 1715,

the Peace of Rastatt, the Peace of Baden, and the Third Barrier Treaty. The signatories of these treaties were on the one side France and Spain, on the other England, Holland, the German Empire, Prussia, Savoy, and Portugal. They terminated the War of the Spanish Succession in favour of Philip V, the French claimant and grandson of Louis XIV, and dealt with a completeness rare in diplomatic history with the problems raised in the course of that protracted conflict.

i. Position of England.

The position of England, as defined by the Peace of Utrecht, was more favourable than that of any other signatory, a result which was natural from the circumstances of the settlement. England in 1713 assumed in European diplomacy the position which had long been her due. Excluded in 1648 by her internal troubles from the European settlement of the Peace of Westphalia, humiliated for thirty years by the degrading and anti-national foreign policy of the restored Stuart monarchy, she stepped in 1713 into a place which had been impossible for her twelve months before the execution of Charles I or under the opportunist and financial policy of Charles II. A second cause forced her into prominence in the settlement of Utrecht: the European resistance to the domination of Louis XIV had been peculiarly the work of England; British policy under William III had formed the Grand Alliance, and British troops under Marlborough had done a considerable proportion of its work. It was only natural that a serious share of the spoils should fall to the power whose military intervention on the Continent had, under the leadership of a soldier of genius, formed so startling and effective a deviation from her recent tradition. The third and most efficient cause of British predominance at Utrecht was the plain fact that the interests

which had been at stake in the War of the Spanish Succession were peculiarly British interests. That war was, in reality, a struggle for the government not of Spain, but of the Spanish empire overseas. When the powers of the Grand Alliance took up arms against the claim of Louis XIV to award the Spanish crown to his grandson, they were concerned not with the tenancy of a throne-room in the Escurial or with the government of Old Castile, but with the control of Central and South America and the rights of traders in the whole of the vast empire which Spain had inherited. That problem was peculiarly interesting to Englishmen; for a century past they had developed their commerce, and they had already laid in North America the foundations of a colonial system; if the transmarine inheritance of Spain was to be disputed, the colonial effort of England must make her a party to that dispute. And on the narrower ground of a struggle for Spain itself the war touched England more closely than any other member of the Grand Alliance. England by 1713 had become a distinctly maritime power, and if it was the aim of the rest of Europe that Louis XIV should not govern in both Paris and Madrid, it was peculiarly the aim of England that the power which controlled the coast from Dunkirk to Bordeaux should not acquire an extended littoral from Bilbao to Finisterre and from Cadiz to Barcelona. If England was brought prominently into the war by the subject-matter of the dispute, she was still more gravely concerned with the manner of its inception. In 1701 Louis XIV had assumed control of the Barrier fortresses; that military frontier consisted of a line of strong places lying along the northern border of France, garrisoned by Dutch and Spanish troops, and excluding the French forces from an easy advance

British interests: *a.* Spanish colonies.

b. Spanish coast.

c. Low Countries.

into the Low Countries. This usurpation, far more powerfully than any other cause, brought England into the War of the Spanish Succession. Englishmen whose apathy was unbroken by the question of Spain became actively alarmed when confronted with the prospect of the French in Flanders. It is essential to British peace of mind that the power that faces England across the English Channel shall not be the power that confronts her in the North Sea; a frontier must separate the mouth of the Seine from the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt, and the government of Boulogne and Havre must not be the government of Antwerp and Rotterdam.

British gains:

It only remains, in estimating the position of England in 1715, to consider the actual gains made by her in the settlement of Utrecht. That settlement, in establishing Philip V on the throne of Spain, constituted an apparent victory for France; it was in fact the first and greatest triumph of England. By Article vi of the Anglo-French treaty and Article ii of the Anglo-Spanish treaty Philip V renounced his rights to the French succession. Louis himself described the renunciation-clause as 'the essential and necessary foundation of the treaties'. It was more; it was the definite acceptance by the Continent of English political theory. By these clauses the common law of Europe was modified in an English sense, and the principle of absolute monarchy, which had found at Versailles its strongest expression, received a blow of immeasurable importance. The renunciation of Philip V recognized that royal relationships must be subjected to international convenience. Its pendant, the recognition by Louis XIV, in Article iv of the Anglo-French treaty, of the Hanoverian Succession, carried the matter a step further and admitted the English doctrine of national sovereignty; the British people had considered itself

a. Spanish renunciations.

b. Acknowledgement of George I.

entitled to eject the House of Stuart and substitute the House of Hanover. Louis XIV was compelled at Utrecht to admit that the nation's claim was justified.

c. Material gains:

But British gains are apt to be more tangible than these triumphs of political theory, and the fruits which England gathered at Utrecht were more concrete than any mere victory of the doctrine of Locke over the doctrine of Bossuet. These gains, which are embodied in the fourteen treaties composing the settlement, were of three sorts: strategic, colonial, and commercial. Roughly, the strategic gains were made in the waters and on the mainland of Europe, the colonial gains were effected in North America, and the commercial advance was principally concerned with the trade of South America. The European advantage of England, as embodied in the treaties of Utrecht, appears to constitute a systematic preparation of European waters for the full exercise of British sea-power. In the Narrow Seas Dunkirk was obliterated, and Antwerp and Rotterdam received a new safeguard; by Article ix of the Anglo-French treaty the fortifications which had been the refuge of the Dunkirk privateers were to be razed, and by the Third Barrier Treaty a line of fortresses extending from the North Sea to the union at Namur of the Sambre and Meuse was to be garrisoned by Dutch troops, supported in case of need by an English force. Thus at one blow England destroyed the port which had been in the last war the base of the French commerce-destroyers, and averted by a strongly defended line the danger of a sudden French offensive against the vital coast-towns of the Low Countries. In the Mediterranean her preparation was even more elaborate and her advantage more considerable. By the Anglo-Spanish treaty England received from Philip V the confirmation

1. Strategic.

Dunkirk.

Barrier fortresses.

Gibraltar. Minorca. of her military successes; Gibraltar, which Rooke had captured in 1707, and Minorca, which Stanhope had captured in 1708, were formally ceded to Great Britain. She did not attempt further to entrench her position in the western Mediterranean by insisting on the demands made at an earlier date by William III for British posts on the North African littoral at Ceuta and Oran, but devoted herself to the arrangement of a chain of friendly ports extending along the Mediterranean towards the Levant. Sardinia was ceded to Austria, and Sicily passed to the friendly government of Savoy. Thus by the provisions of Utrecht an English fleet operating in the Mediterranean might look to find in Gibraltar, Mahon, Cagliari, and Palermo a line of bases where it could rest or refit in the intervals of operating against France or Spain. British diplomacy had learned with surprising thoroughness the naval lessons of a war, which had contained only one action of importance, and was preparing with unconscious foresight the straight road to an Indian empire, which it had not yet won, by the canal that De Lesseps had not yet cut.

Sardinia to Austria. Sicily to Savoy.

2. Colonial. It has been said that the North American acquisitions of England were more strictly colonial. In this region her advantage was not confined to a fortified town or a line of strong places, but the treaties transferred a considerable body of territory. France ceded Newfoundland and confirmed Great Britain in possession of the vast and indeterminate Hudson Bay Territory; finally, Acadie became a British settlement under the name of Nova Scotia. But the importance of these acquisitions was not measurable solely by their geographical area. England already controlled the Atlantic seaboard with her earlier settlements; with the acquisitions of Utrecht she definitely began that movement of surrounding and

Newfoundland. Hudson Bay. Nova Scotia.

compressing French Canada, which was to be the work of the middle eighteenth century. Her establishments were now in position to the south, north, and west of the French colonies. By the retention of Cape Breton Island and the essential fortress of Louisburg France remained in control of the waterway which united the mouth of the St. Lawrence to Europe; but the English advance into Newfoundland and the lack of proper delimitation in the *hinterland* of Nova Scotia endangered even that vital line of communication.

3. Commercial.

The commercial advantage of England was achieved principally in the South American empire of Spain. France renounced any claim to preferential treatment in that region to which Bourbon relationships might entitle her, and England alone of the powers of Europe received privileges from Spain in the empire which she had guarded so jealously. By the terms of the Anglo-Spanish treaty Great Britain and the South Sea Company assumed for thirty years the right of importing black labour into South America. This *Asiento* (or contract) involved the annual importation of 4,800 negroes and the payment of import duties on each slave, and had previously belonged to the French Guinea Company. It was accompanied by the right to send each year one vessel of 500 tons to Panama for the South American trade. This last concession was the occasion of interminable friction between the two governments and finally, amongst other causes, sent them to war in 1739. The vessel was unloaded by day and secretly reloaded at night, with the result that in the morning the master confronted an incredulous and disgusted customs-official with a further instalment of the contents of his miraculous ship. The trade of Brazil was already open to England by her alliance with

Asiento.

Portugal. The commercial provisions of the Peace of Utrecht were completed by two Treaties of Navigation and Commerce between France, England, and Holland. These contained provisions as to the treatment of neutral ships in time of war, which marked to some extent a diminution of the English claim to absolute sovereignty on the high seas; but this rudimentary attempt at a system of maritime law was of little significance at a time when the period of its effective existence would depend entirely on the duration of a sea-captain's temper.

Treaties of Commerce.

Thus at Utrecht the British advance was well planned and considerable. In Europe she paved the way for the triumphs of that sea-power which was to be the *deus ex machina* of the eighteenth century; in North America she fortified her existing colonies with outworks which strengthened them against and extended them towards the surviving possessions of France; and in South America she developed her commerce along the lines which were to lead to her greatest victories. To Cromwell and, to some extent, to William III the British Empire was an ambition; after Utrecht it was a fact.

ii. Position of France.

The position of France after the treaties affords a striking contrast. She emerged bankrupt from a struggle upon which she had entered as the strongest power in Europe. The natural expansion, which had directed the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin in their completion of the French frontiers, had terminated, and a military effort, which had been under their direction the expression of a national aspiration, was based in the War of the Spanish Succession upon an exiguous foundation of family ambition. In the result, the French defeats of Blenheim and Ramillies were repeated in the

diplomatic duels of Utrecht and Baden. The Rhine frontier was retained, but the fortresses, which France had protruded as bridge-heads and sally-ports on the eastern bank of that river, passed back to the Empire; Strasbourg and Landau were retained, but Kehl, Freiburg, and Alt-Breisach were restored. Thus on her eastern frontier France remained in occupation of her defensive position, but lost the facilities for offence which she had been at such pains to prepare. On her northern border she was confronted with the re-erection of the Barrier line, by which she had been confined in 1709 and 1713; from Furnes to Namur her offensive was impeded by strong places garrisoned by the Dutch, paid for in part by the Austrians, and guaranteed by the British. Similar considerations determined the line of her south-eastern frontier; France was compelled to restore to the Duke of Savoy his county of Nice and his duchy of Savoy, with the result that the Alps became the French frontier and constituted on the Italian border a natural counterpart of the Flemish Barrier. But the country against which these obstacles were raised by European diplomacy with such elaborate caution was in no position to break the dams. Her armies had been decimated by interminable campaigning along every road from the Scheldt to the Danube, and her finances were even more war-worn than her troops. Her prestige and her colonies were diminished by cessions to Great Britain, and the navy, which Colbert had so laboured to reconstruct, had become a memory. She had chosen in the middle years of Louis XIV to direct her effort towards the Continent and away from the sea. In the result she was left with a frontier which Europe had united to constrict, and a colonial system which was unequal to its coming trials.

Rhine frontier.

Barrier fortresses.

Alpine frontier.

French exhaustion.

Her naval effort had dwindled to the brilliant but desultory exploits of the Dunkirk privateers, and the random commerce-destroying of Jean Bart and Duguay-Trouin was an inadequate contribution to the more serious struggle for control of the sea. But above all her king was dead; in 1715 by the death of Louis XIV the most centralized government in Europe lost its centre.

iii. Position of Austria.

The confinement of French activity, which was a central object with the diplomatists of Utrecht, found a further expression in the arrangements made in favour of Austria and the Empire. The treaties of Rastatt and Baden, which embody the Germanic side of the settlement, provide for the retrocession to the Empire of the lodgements which France had effected on the eastern bank of the Rhine, but their most striking provisions are those which entrenched Austria in Italy and the Low Countries. In Italy Savoy was established in the passes of the Alps, and by the possession of Sicily this gatekeeper placed an important pledge of good behaviour in the hands of any power in control of the sea. By the territorial establishment given to Savoy Europe contrived to separate France and Austria, whose incessant struggles had found in North Italy an unresisting battlefield.

1. Italy: Sardinia.

Naples. Milan.

But behind Savoy and the line of the Alps, and even, in her new acquisition of Sardinia, on the flank of that line, Austria stood securely in Naples and Milan to resist any French advance through the mountains into Italy. With Austria in second line behind Savoy Italy would form an unattractive region for the exercise of French military activities. A similar office was performed by Austria in the north-east of France. Behind the Barrier fortresses the Catholic country of the Spanish Netherlands passed under Austrian rule. The

2. Low Countries. Austrian Netherlands.

presence of Dutch garrisons placed in effect the Austrian tenure of the Spanish Netherlands under Dutch suzerainty, but the menace to northern France was none the more diminished.

3. Germany. Rise of the Electors.

On the German side the new position of Austria was less satisfactory. Any alteration in the Imperial situation that was effected at Rastatt and Baden was to the advantage not of the Emperor, but of the Electors. The Elector of Hanover was recognized as King of England, the Elector of Brandenburg was recognized as King of Prussia, and the Elector of Cologne was restored to his position in Bavaria. Prussia, in return for a meaningless surrender of obsolete claims on Orange in Provence, received substantial increases of territory in Upper Gelderland and Neuchâtel. The development which was to dethrone Austria from her supremacy in Germany had begun.

Prussian gains.

iv. Position of Holland.

Holland emerged from the war in complete collapse. It had been the fate of that country to sustain a war on both land and sea against Louis XIV, and the effort proved almost fatal. A colonial power, she made no transmarine gains in the settlement, and through a lack of cruisers she had lost to her British allies the monopoly of the world's carrying-trade. Her advantage was confined to a concession of trade privileges in Spain, where there was no trade, and the privilege of garrisoning the Barrier fortresses, where there was no glory. It was a poor reward for the gift to England of William III and the effort which had sustained a war of forty years.

§ 3. The French Regency.

Much of the direction taken by European affairs between the Peace of Utrecht and the War of the Austrian Succession was due to the situation of France. The system of Louis XIV, which had made out of a suburban hunting-box the directing centre of a nation,

collapsed when it was worked by inferior hands. Even under Louis himself it had attracted the censure of independent minds; the thoughtful Fénelon wrote of him, 'You are praised to the skies for having impoverished France, and you have built your throne on the ruin of all classes in the state,' and Vauban, who had surrounded France with the elaborate ramparts of the greatest fortress-engineer in history, saw economic salvation nowhere but in the single tax. Absolute monarchy demands in its agents a higher standard of efficiency than any other form of government. In 1715 Louvois, Colbert, and the king were dead. It remained for the Regent to manipulate the system in the name of the young Louis XV.

Duc d'Orléans.

The Duc d'Orléans, Regent of France, was a cultured and amiable man of forty-two with a taste for magic and a bad reputation; a friend of Saint-Simon, whose memoirs reproduce the atmosphere of Versailles, he modelled his life on Henri IV, and although he could point to a record of military service including Mons, Namur, Steinkirk, Neerwinden, and the Italian campaigns, his tastes lay rather in the direction of chemistry. The problem of France in 1715 was, as always, a double one, the political question as to the form of government, and the economic question as to the form of society. The Regent answered neither of them.

1715.

Assuming office in September 1715, he endeavoured to govern France with a double system, in which nominal authority reposed in a *Conseil de Régence*, whilst real control was exercised by six departmental committees not dissimilar from those Committees of Council from which the English Cabinet was being evolved. He was not completely without subordinates of ability, for Villars presided in the War Committee and

d'Huxelles in the Committee of Foreign Affairs. His sole contribution to internal politics was a struggle with the *Parlement*, in which the Regency was made absolute. 1717–18.

The economic problem was still graver. The French Debt in 1715 amounted to a figure sixteen times as large as the revenue, and annual deficits were only dealt with by a reckless anticipation of future income. After the brief period of Noailles' attempt to restore the balance by punishing speculation the Regent supplied his solution of the problem by involving his country in the French counterpart of the South Sea Bubble, the financial system of John Law of Lauriston. This Scotchman attempted single-handed the financial salvation of France with no better equipment than an obsession as to the value of paper-issues, of which he had learned the theory in London and Amsterdam. In 1716 he founded his bank; in the following year he formed the *Compagnie d'Occident* and purchased the Louisiana concession. His bank became a royal foundation, and a new *Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes* undertook to exploit concessions in China, Senegal, and the East Indies. He was next entrusted with the national functions of striking coin and collecting taxes, and in 1720 became Comptroller-General. In the spring of 1720 the crash came; the enormous issues of paper, with which Law had celebrated every increase of capital, had first plunged France into an orgy of speculation and finally overbalanced his enterprises. At the end of the year he was an exile; Brussels and Venice witnessed the retirement of the man whose miscalculations were the sole contribution of the Regent to the gravest problem of his time. Three years later Louis XV was declared of age; the Duc d'Orléans, the Duc de Bourbon, and Fleury, Cardinal-Bishop of Fréjus, succeeded one another 1719. 1720. 1723.

in office. The king's reign had opened in the air of chaos and intrigue in which fifty years later it was to close.

§4. The Hanoverian Succession.

As in France the succession question was averted by the precarious survival of Louis XV, so in England at the death of Queen Anne its imminence was indefinitely postponed by the fulfilled provisions of the Revolution settlement. In 1714, by the operation of the Act of Settlement, 1701, the Elector of Hanover was proclaimed King of England by the title of George I; that instrument, which completed the work of 1688, passed the crown to the Electress Sophia, a Protestant and granddaughter of James I, and to her descendants. The advent of a Hanoverian king produced an effect on English politics which was to last for half a century, until, in fact, the system of George III reversed in 1760 the tendencies which had become marked under his two predecessors: the Whigs were entrenched securely in office, and the Tories were relegated to the cold shades of opposition or the more exciting regions of Jacobitism and conspiracy. The Tory ministers, who had dismissed Marlborough from his command and concluded the Peace of Utrecht, were removed, and for seven years, from 1714 until 1721, English policy was directed by Stanhope, the captor of Minorca. The Whig position was secured by two measures, the ungentle suppression of Mar's rising in 1715 and the Septennial Act, 1716; the first demonstrated Whig readiness to take extreme measures in defence of the new settlement, the second showed that ministers were prepared to sacrifice to its defence even the provisions of the sacred constitution of 1688. Forty persons of varying distinction were beheaded, the duration of Parliament was prolonged to seven years, and ministers endeavoured to give to their country that repose which was necessary for the proper

1714.

Stanhope.

1715.

1716.

appreciation of the new order. They were sharply interrupted; in 1720 the South Sea Bubble burst. The *Asiento* concession in the trade of Spanish America was principally in the hands of a South Sea Company; this company, like the contemporary enterprise of Law in France, accumulated national functions; its shares became interchangeable with consols and its spare profits were to pay off the National Debt. A fury of speculation resulted in the formation of innumerable bubble companies, a fantastic rise in the value of South Sea shares, and the inevitable collapse. The new régime was discredited by revelations of ministerial corruption, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was sent to the Tower, and Stanhope, the first minister, died in the course of a heated denial of his own complicity in the company's transactions. In the result Sir Robert Walpole, a Norfolk baronet, whose financial ability had attracted attention in the previous reign, was called to office, which he retained for twenty-one years. 1720. 1721.

The government of Walpole shaped the course of English history from 1721 until 1742, three years after the outbreak of the Spanish war. It survived George I, who died in 1727, and it outlived the dangerous period of Jacobitism, whose bankruptcy was demonstrated by the failure of 1745. Conducted without an excess of ideals, it has permitted its single-minded devotion to the Hanoverian settlement to be obscured by its system of parliamentary corruption. It should be said that the period of repose, with which it reconciled England to the House of Hanover, was of inestimable value, and the bribery by which in part it was achieved, had been exceeded in the reign of William III. Walpole restored the balance of finance after the Bubble, and then by a policy of studied inaction he preserved to his country Walpole.

the benefits of the new settlement. He conciliated the landed interest with a reduced land-tax, contented the Church with the retention of the Test Act embodying the shadow of intolerance, and satisfied the Dissenters with a series of Indemnity Acts containing the substance of relief. On the side of finance he instituted a Sinking
1717-27. Fund for the reduction of debt, whose operation was impeded by frequent incursions on the part of the spending departments, and a comprehensive scheme of
1733. excise, which was withdrawn on account of its unpopularity. Walpole's ministry combined with the new king's nationality to further the development of two English institutions. The Cabinet, which had developed rapidly under William III and Anne, made further advances by means of the monarch's ignorance of English; it was useless for the king to preside over deliberations which he could not understand, and in his absence proceedings were naturally directed by the First Lord of the Treasury. The predominance of Walpole, maintained by the successive ejections from the ministry of Carteret, Pulteney, and Townshend, formed a precedent of immense constitutional significance.

§ 5. The Russian State. So far it has been possible to consider the European powers as signatories of the Treaties of Utrecht, but there were problems and powers which were not within the view of those treaties. At Utrecht there was no signatory east of Vienna, but beyond the Vistula and the Carpathians a new power was working out a distinct problem in a world peopled by a different set of characters. The Russian State, which had formed itself in the plains of Eastern Europe, was confronted with a simple
Lines of expansion: problem. Its natural expansion demanded an advance in three directions, and each of those directions corre-

sponded with a distinct national need and brought Russia into contact with a distinct adversary. First, an advance towards the Baltic was inevitable in a state occupying the plains which lie behind the head of that sea; this advance brought Russia into rivalry with the declining military power of Sweden, whose government occupied the coast provinces, and it was the first of the three to be achieved. Second, an advance into Poland was a necessary incident of any improved communication between Russia and Western Europe; this advance was finally registered in the successive partitions of Poland at the price of territorial compensations to Prussia and Austria. Third, it was indispensable to the development of southern Russia that the state should extend its territory to the littoral of the Black Sea; this advance brought Russia into contact with the receding power of Turkey and coincided with the national feeling for a crusade towards the lost imperial city of Constantinople. These three lines of Russian expansion constitute in its simplest form the question of Eastern Europe.

1. To Baltic.

2. To Vistula.

3. To Black Sea.

The state which was faced in 1715 with the need for this expansion was the youngest power in Europe. It had made under the government of Peter the Great, who was still Czar, advances only comparable to those made in the nineteenth century by Japan. While Western Europe was fighting the War of the Spanish Succession, Russia was acquiring its first hospital, its first budget, and its first newspaper. In 1700 Russians were ordered to wear jacket and trousers, in 1704 they were forbidden to murder misshapen children. Peter, who had acquired in his western tours the essentials of war and statesmanship, prosecuted, with a determination which was unimpeded by any acquisition of

Russian progress.

Peter the Great.

western manners, his purpose of educating the Russian people. By an apprenticeship of continual warfare, by the encouragement of foreign immigration, and by the western education of his own nobility, Peter succeeded in providing his country with an efficient governing class, changed profoundly its composition by the insertion of a considerable leaven of occidentalism, and drove in turn straight along each of the roads of Russian expansion.

§ 6. The Northern War.

The movement which took Russia into the Northern War, an involved struggle of twenty years, with which the eighteenth century opened, was the movement which propelled it towards the Baltic. That war had its apparent cause in the feudal troubles of a Livonian squire named Patkul; in reality it derived its origin from two factors of far greater magnitude, the decline of Sweden and the westward movement of Russia. The achievements upon which Sweden based her military reputation were rapidly becoming remote; it was only an old man who could remember in 1700 the days of Gustavus Adolphus when the *Schwed* had been the terror of the Rhine valley. By her possession of the coast provinces, Ingria, Carelia, Esthonia, and Livonia, this declining power commanded the Baltic littoral from Viborg to Riga and excluded Russia from the sea. It remained to be seen whether her military strength, even when directed by the genius of Charles XII, was equal to the defence of her extensive frontier.

Decline of Sweden.

Charles XII.

This king had inherited the Swedish throne at the age of fifteen; by every impulsion of instinct and education he became a soldier. His taste was for action, and he despised diplomacy; his gift for reading cipher was remarkable, and his tastes, like those of Napoleon, lay in the direction of mathematics. Before he had been

on the throne two years his country entered on the final struggle of its greatness.

In 1715 the contest was almost at an end. The war had opened with a series of treaties between Russia, Saxony, Poland, and Denmark for the partition of Swedish territory. Peter, who had no illusions as to the value of strict co-operation between allies, aimed at an objective of purely national value. The campaign of Narva was directed solely to the acquisition of the head of the Gulf of Finland; it failed, and the facility of the Swedish victory doomed Sweden to eventual defeat. If the Russian entrenchments had been more firmly defended at Narva, Sweden might have emerged from the Northern War a power of European significance. In the result, Charles postponed his conquest of Russia to the subjugation of Poland and Saxony, and whilst he was preparing the election to the Polish throne of Stanislas Leszczynski, Peter proceeded deliberately with the absorption of Ingria. In 1703, whilst Charles was in Poland, Peter built in the marshes of the Neva a village which he called St. Petersburg: Russia had found its outlet on the Baltic. When at length Charles led his 'blue boys' against the Russians, he made, in 1708, in the disastrous campaign of Poltawa many of the discoveries which Napoleon was to make a century later. For five years he was an exile in Turkey; and, by a brilliant exercise of the diplomacy which he despised, his hosts were induced to attack Russia. In the Peace of the Pruth and the Peace of Adrianople, Russia purchased the withdrawal of Turkey; Peter was willing to buy liberty to proceed with his Baltic expansion at the price of curtailing his advance to the Black Sea; his left wing was refused in order to assist the progress of his right. Charles was ejected from Turkey, and the

1698.

1700 Narva.

1703.

1708. Poltawa.

1711.

1713.

war of partition proceeded. Within two years Sweden was at bay; the Prussians were in Pomerania, the Elector of Hanover held Bremen, and the Russians were in undisputed control of the Baltic. Turkey, which had postponed the Swedish collapse by her intervention in 1711, could not repeat this timely interruption; in the
1716–18. campaign of Peterwardein and Belgrade, Prince Eugène with an Austrian army provided adequate occupation for the Turkish forces, and was proceeding diligently with that clearing of the Danube valley which was eventually to make the Austrian power a Danubian and not a Germanic force. Relief came to Sweden from the diplomacy of Europe; Russian troops appeared at the
1716. siege of Wismar, and George I took fright. The prospect of a Muscovite outpost in Mecklenburg was unattractive to the Elector of Hanover, because Wismar was only fifty miles east of the Elbe, and to the King of England, because the balance of the Baltic trade had already been sufficiently upset. His alarm was seconded by France; the Anglophil diplomacy of the Regency refused an offer of the Russian alliance, and Peter was left to fight his battle alone. Charles ungratefully involved himself in Jacobite projects for a descent on the Scottish coast, but the task of Swedish diplomacy was immensely simplified by his death in the trenches
1718. before Friedrichshall. Görz, who had elaborated his system behind his master's back, put it at last into practice in the Peace of Nystad. By the treaties of Nystad and Stockholm Russia obtained her Baltic littoral, and Sweden was reduced to the level of a secondary power, whose outlook was towards the North
1721. Peace of Nystad. Sea. In the partition of Sweden, which was now accomplished, Russia obtained Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, Carelia, and southern Finland, Prussia acquired

Stettin and a part of Pomerania, Denmark extended her frontier southward to include Schleswig, and the Anglo-Hanoverian position was strengthened by the acquisition of Bremen and Verden and the opening of the Sound. By her arrival on the Baltic Russia had completed the first and easiest of the roads of her expansion.

§ 7. The System of Utrecht.

The political system established in western Europe by the Peace of Utrecht had by the reduction of France redressed the balance of European power. That balance was maintained, in so far as no new or preponderant power emerged, until the system of Utrecht was revised a quarter of a century later in a general war and in the settlement which followed it. At first it appeared as though the temper of the Whigs, who were unfriendly to the Tory treaties of Utrecht, and the persistence of Louis XIV, who had learned few of the lessons of the war, might rekindle the European conflagration. The affair of Mardyck, where Louis was 1715. endeavouring to reconstitute almost in a suburb of Dunkirk the naval base of which the treaties had then deprived him, caused England to revert to the diplomatic system of William III. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and the Empire was revived, and 1716. pressure was put upon France by the resulting isolation. This coercion was entirely successful, and the two countries were left free to enter upon that friendship which was to be characteristic of the next twenty years.

i. Diplomacy of Stanhope and Dubois.

The reconciliation of France and England was a natural development; both countries needed peace, the Regent was anxious for English support in the eventual prosecution of his claim to the French throne, and George I saw in France his most useful ally against the exiled Stuarts. A series of conversations between Stanhope

and Dubois resulted in the Treaty of Hanover; the Regent agreed to demolish Mardyck, support the Protestant succession in England, and acquiesce in the extension of Hanover at the expense of Sweden. Stanhope had made peace between France and England; it remained for him to impose that peace on Europe. In 1717. the following year Holland was added to the signatories, and eighteen months later the accession of Austria converted the system of Stanhope into a Quadruple 1718. Alliance. With this instrument, which he had constructed at the price of transferring Sicily from Savoy to Austria in exchange for Sardinia, Stanhope endeavoured to maintain the peace of Europe. There were two factors of disturbance, the Northern War and the

1. The Northern settlement. revival of Spain. By his control of French policy Stanhope had been able to secure at Versailles the rejection of the Russian alliance; he now put forward the Regent as mediator, and it was under the pressure of French diplomacy that Sweden agreed to the sacrifices which she made in the final settlement. By the treaties 1721. of Nystad and Stockholm Stanhope not only extinguished a dangerous conflagration, he even secured a prize of considerable value to England. The acquisition of Bremen and Verden possessed, besides a distinctly Hanoverian significance, the value for England of a great port on the Weser.

2. The Spanish diversion. The repression of Spain required a more active effort. That country, by the combined efforts of Elisabeth Farnese of Parma, the second wife of Philip V, and Cardinal Alberoni, his minister and son of an Italian gardener, was committed to an Italian policy, whose Alberoni. aim was to reverse the settlement of Utrecht. Alberoni required five years for the reorganization of Spain; after two, with his reforms unfinished and his fortresses

half built, he threw a Spanish force into Sardinia, at this time Austrian territory, and defied Europe. Eleven months later he followed the challenge with an invasion of Sicily. The Quadruple Alliance, which possessed the invaluable weapon of British sea-power, was not slow in its reply; within six weeks the invaders of Sicily were cut off by the destruction of their fleet by a British squadron off Cape Passaro. A Jacobite expedition was wrecked off Finisterre, the French crossed the Pyrenees, the works of Vigo and Ferrol were destroyed, and Corunna was blockaded. The effort of Alberoni had failed, and he passed into exile. He left behind him nothing but that revived energy in colonial trade which twenty years later was to take Spain into a new war with England.

1717. 1718. 1719.

ii. Diplomacy of Walpole and Fleury.

The diplomatic situation which Walpole inherited on his accession to power was almost as chaotic as the finances which he was called upon to reorganize. The Regent was beginning to repent of his recent sacrifice of Spain, which was valuable only to England and formed a startling breach of his family tradition; accordingly he formed with the Bourbons of Madrid an alliance directed against the Hapsburgs of Vienna. At the same time Austria had attracted the displeasure of England. The formation of companies at Fiume and Trieste with valuable concessions in the Levant had not disturbed English opinion; but the organization of an Ostend Company for the East Indian trade was an unpleasant reminder of possible rivalry in the East and of the presence of Austria in the Low Countries. Walpole, who was willing to make an exception to his peace policy in favour of such a menace to English commerce, organized an alliance and prepared for war. Spain under the government of Ripperda, a Dutchman with

1. The Austrian diversion.

1722.

1726. a Spanish dukedom, prepared to support the Emperor. Walpole employed British sea-power in a series of judicious naval demonstrations; one force was sent to the Baltic to calm the Russians, another to the Spanish coast, and a third to Porto Bello on the Spanish Main with orders to blockade that port and contain the bullion fleet. These measures were successful; Fleury, who was now the minister of Louis XV, induced Philip V to recall the Spanish troops from before Gibraltar, and
1727. the Emperor agreed to suspend the offending company. Four years later the Ostend Company was entirely suppressed.

2. The Polish diversion. A second interruption to the pacific system of Walpole and Fleury came from Eastern Europe; the death of Augustus II in 1733 revived French interest in the Polish succession. The war-party, which was growing at Versailles, was determined to place Stanislas, the king's father-in-law, on the throne of Poland, and under the leadership of Chauvelin they bore down the opposition of Fleury. As he could not prevent the war, he determined to canalize it; from the unprofitable plains of Poland he diverted it to more fruitful ground in
1733. Italy and Lorraine. That duchy was occupied, the capture of Kehl provided Strasbourg with an invaluable bridge-head, and Villars fought brilliantly in Italy against the Austrians. The Treaty of Vienna, by which
1738. the War of the Polish Succession was ended, contained matters of more value to France than relationship with a precarious royalty in Warsaw: Lorraine definitely became French territory, and Fleury had gloriously continued the tradition of the Cardinal-ministers by completing the French frontier. Twelve months later England was at war with Spain, and the system of Utrecht had finally broken down.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

§ 1. The Position of Prussia. § 2. The Position of Austria. § 3. The Colonial War. § 4. First Silesian War. § 5. Second Silesian War. § 6. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

§ 1. The Position of Prussia.

Two states in Eastern Europe came during the eighteenth century into a new prominence. The rise of Russia is attractive because it was sudden and unforeseen, that of Prussia was gradual and inevitable. No one in Europe except the Czar Peter could have prophesied in 1700 the extent of the Russian advance, whilst the growing strength of the Prussian position had been manifest for thirty years. The Prussian State was composed of two elements, the Mark of Brandenburg, a frontier territory between the rivers Elbe and Oder settled by Henry the Fowler as an outwork of Teutonic civilization against the Slavs, and the duchy of Prussia, situated still farther to the east and colonized by the Teutonic Order. The government of the first passed ultimately to the Hohenzollern, a South German family, which received at the same time the electoral dignity; that of the second, after becoming hereditary, passed to the Hohenzollern of Brandenburg on the failure of the Prussian line. During the Thirty Years' War this composite state played an inconsistent and unimpressive part, but eight years before the termination of that war its government fell into the hands of Frederick William, the Great Elector. An appreciation of the commanding position occupied by Prussia on the direct line between Sweden and Central Europe enabled him to make at

1. Brandenburg.

928.

2. Prussia.

1415.

1618.

1640.

The Great Elector.

1648. the Peace of Westphalia considerable territorial gains. That done, he devoted himself to the maintenance of a standing army and the organization of his country.
1675. The victory of Fehrbellin, won by Prussian cavalry over a strong Swedish force, showed that North Germany was indisposed for the future to be treated as a passive battlefield, and when the Great Elector died after a reign of forty-eight years he left to his successor a country whose finances were firmly based upon a reasonable excise, its waste lands diminished by a
1685. system of canals, and its population wisely strengthened by the welcome extended to the exiled French Protestants. The Elector Frederick, who succeeded him,
1700. continued the aggrandizement of Prussia by assuming the title of king. Thirteen years later, in the year of the first treaties of Utrecht, Frederick William I
1713. became King of Prussia and resumed the interrupted work of the Great Elector.

Frederick William I. The increase in power of the German Electors, which is characteristic of that settlement, was evident in the territorial gains there made by the new kingdom, but Frederick William was not the man to continue that development to its logical conclusion in the expulsion of Austria from Germany or the assumption by Prussia with Austria of a dual control. He was content at every point to subordinate his diplomacy to that of Vienna, being actuated by an almost religious veneration for the Empire that was to appear again in Frederick William IV, and to perfect the instrument with which a less reverent hand might achieve its sacrilegious purpose. The Prussian army was the creation of Frederick William I. That force numbered on his accession 38,000 men; at his death, twenty-seven years later, it had been more than doubled, amounting almost

to a strength of 84,000. It was the most significant fact in Central Europe. His ridiculous passion for tall grenadiers and the tortuous methods of his recruiting agents have sufficed to obscure the national character which he gave to his troops at a time when every European army was a mercenary force; to every regiment was assigned a recruiting district in Prussia, and from that district two-thirds of its establishment was drawn.

Frederick the Great.

The military temper of Frederick William, combined with a coarse taste for evenings spent in his Tobacco Parliament, embittered the life of his son Frederick. The Crown Prince, by a natural reaction against the boorishness and discipline of his father, became first a mutineer and then a dilettante. His attempted flight 1730. was easily dealt with by the imprisonment of the Prince and the execution of his accomplice. His tastes were less tractable, and his father was finally persuaded to 1736. allow Frederick at Reinsberg a house where he could entertain his literary friends. Here he was at liberty in an atmosphere of French culture to correspond with Voltaire and to play the flute. But although he appeared to have devoted his life to the composition of French Alexandrine verse, although the motto above his gate was *Friderico tranquillitatem colenti*, and the guests who passed under it were chiefly foreigners, Frederick, with unsuspected and steady work, was mastering the arts of politics and war. His military capacity was the least-known quantity in Europe. When his father's death brought him, in 1740, to the Prussian throne, he sum- 1740. moned a French mathematician to the presidency of a German university, and abolished torture and the censorship with the liberalism of a *philosophe*. In the autumn he continued in the character of a dilettante

by the publication of *Anti-Machiavel*, a polite refutation of Machiavelli, in which conquest and aggression were very properly denounced. In October the Emperor Charles VI died, and within twenty-seven days of his death Frederick had invaded Austrian territory.

§ 2. The Position of Austria.

Austria was in no condition to confront the offensive of an organized and efficient state. The Emperor Charles VI, who had reigned in Vienna since 1711, had not made adequate use of the advantages of Utrecht. Having pursued at first a judicious Anglophil policy, 1718. by which he secured Sicily in exchange for the inhospitable island of Sardinia, he lost by the aberration of his commercial projects much of the ground that he had gained. The affair of the Ostend Company, which exasperated England and inaugurated his government of the Netherlands with the humiliation of his new subjects, resulted in nothing but loss. Within Germany he was content to adopt a wise policy of diverting the growing electorates towards the north; he encouraged the advance of Hanover to Bremen and of Brandenburg to Stettin, hoping that these rising powers would exercise on the North Sea and the Baltic the energy which, if utilized within the Empire, might so seriously derange matters on the Danube.

The Austrian Succession.

But before his policy had time to develop, his lack of a male heir had created the problem of the Austrian Succession and provided his diplomacy with an obsession that kept it busy for twenty years. In the year

Pragmatic Sanction.

1718 the Emperor, in a document known as the Pragmatic Sanction, declared Maria Theresa, his eldest daughter, the heiress of his hereditary dominions. It now became the central object of his policy to secure for this document the guarantees of the powers of Europe. This hunt for guarantees became the motive

for all his diplomacy and the excuse for many sacrifices. It had been his foremost ambition to establish the Austrian power in Italy by the addition of Parma and Tuscany to his existing establishments. His hopes of 1725. Tuscany were sacrificed to secure the guarantee of Spain. Prussia was induced to guarantee the sanction 1726. by a promise of the Rhenish duchies of Jülich and Berg, and in the same year Russia signed. Five years later Charles purchased the English and Dutch guarantees by the total suppression of the Ostend Company. Finally, after the War of the Polish Succession, France 1731. was induced by the cession of Lorraine to complete the signatures. Charles VI had secured the documentary 1738. support of Europe, and it may be supposed that he was satisfied.

It had been the ambition of Prince Eugène to convert Austria into a Danubian power; the reconquest of Hungary and the steady expulsion of the Turks from the Danube valley gave a solid foundation for this project. Against it Charles balanced the policy of Bartenstein, which looked westwards; that policy gave to Austria nothing beyond the Netherlands, Sicily, and some ambitions in Italy. It was founded on an implicit trust in the friendship of France, the traditional enemy of Austria, and it was accepted by the Emperor. He was prepared to transmit his rich inheritance to a young princess, trusting not in the power of his armed forces to protect that inheritance, but in the efficacy of the guarantees which he had obtained so laboriously. Sheltered behind this bulwark of diplomacy Maria Theresa was to confront her envious neighbours. The Austrian Government was the most mediaeval in Europe, and it was to face the modern states of Prussia to the north and Russia to the north-east with an armoury

of diplomatic signatures. The country was heavily taxed and badly administered, the revenue stood at half of its nominal figure, and the army had recently emerged from a series of damaging defeats in Italy and on the Rhine. For economy it had been necessary to billet the cavalry with so much subdivision that its reunion for drill was almost impossible, and of a nominal establishment of 160,000 men little more than 80,000 could be mobilized. Such was the power that confronted Prussia on the accession of Frederick the Great.

§ 3. The Colonial War.

But before these factors could transform Germany in the War of the Austrian Succession, the situation was materially affected by the outbreak of war between Spain and England. This conflict had been for many years inevitable by reason chiefly of the revival of Spain. That power, after the failure of Alberoni to obtain Sicily and Sardinia, had extended its position in the western
1732. Mediterranean by the unobtrusive acquisition of Oran, which formed with Ceuta an adequate counterpoise to the English naval bases of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. But its revived energy was exercised principally in a more productive exploitation and a more jealous protection of the trade of South America. This led inevitably to a series of irritating incidents between English merchants, who found the limits imposed by the Peace of Utrecht too narrow, and Spanish Customs officials, who resented any foreign intrusion even when conducted strictly within the letter of the *Asiento*. Tales of Spanish atrocities inflamed English opinion and
1738. culminated in the appearance of a Captain Jenkins, who produced a box alleged to contain his ear severed by a brutal Spanish coastguard. 'No search' became a patriotic watchword, and the country clamoured for war. This tendency was accentuated by the course of

politics in France and England. The Opposition, whose nucleus was the Tory party, steadily received additions as Walpole ejected insubordinate ministers from the Cabinet, and this body, organized under the name of Patriots, together with a group known to Walpole as the Boys, pressed incessantly for a forward policy in South America. At Versailles the situation was strangely similar; the aged Cardinal Fleury, with increasing difficulty, resisted the growing strength of a war-party. This group, which had been led at the time of the Polish war by Chauvelin, was now directed by Belleisle, whose influence with the king was becoming rapidly stronger. Its programme consisted in the execution against England of the terms of the Family Compact 1733. entered into by Louis XV and Philip V, that 'all earlier treaties made between France and Spain, and between their majesties and other Powers shall no longer have effect between France and Spain'. That agreement terminated the effective existence of the system of Utrecht and the peace policy of Walpole. At present, however, Fleury was strong enough to exclude his country from the Anglo-Spanish conflict, and that war, which began in 1739, was confined to disputes in issue between the two belligerents, the Spanish right of search in South America, an English privilege of cutting log-wood in Campeachy Bay, and the alleged encroachments of the new colony of Georgia on the Spanish territory of Florida.

i. Anglo-Spanish phase.

The declaration of war was followed three years later by the resignation of Walpole. He was succeeded by an administration formed by the Duke of Newcastle and Carteret, whose political ambitions were chiefly continental. The operations of the Colonial War, which preceded the entry of France into that struggle, are of

secondary interest, although the exploit of Admiral
1739. Anson has a spectacular value. In the first year Vernon achieved the considerable feat of capturing Porto Bello on the Isthmus of Panama, but the attempt to follow this victory by combined operations against Cartagena and Santiago was completely unsuccessful. The climate and the inability of the two English services to co-operate produced a series of irritating failures, for which Anson's
1740. capture of a galleon, destruction of a Peruvian port, and voyage round the world provided an inadequate compensation. In the Mediterranean theatre of operations nothing more notable took place than the exercise of sea-power by which Great Britain coerced the
1742. Bourbon king of Naples. A fleet under Commodore Martin anchored off that port; and its commander, in negotiating with the king, pulled out his watch and gave him an hour in which to accept the English terms. The king agreed, and the movement of a single division of British warships had reduced the Spanish army operating in northern Italy by the Neapolitan contingent of 20,000 men.

ii. Anglo-French phase. With the entry of France in 1744 the war acquired a wider significance, as the opening stage of that duel between France and England for the transmarine empires of India and North America which was to fill the middle years of the century. It was the misfortune of France throughout the eighteenth century to attempt an impossible combination of colonial and continental policy. Where a sound statesmanship would have revived the tradition of Colbert and concentrated on a colonial and maritime effort, a facile misinterpretation of the tradition of Richelieu wasted the national strength on the Continent, where France had nothing more to gain, and diverted the military energy, which might have

conquered new worlds and new markets, into an interminable series of meaningless wars in the Low Countries, in Italy, and on the Rhine. With this handicap France confronted England in the struggle for expansion.

The commercial revival, which had followed the chaos of the Regency, left France in a tolerably strong position; her ports were prosperous and provided her with a fleet of three hundred privateers, her textile manufactures had increased the national wealth, and her colonies were growing. In America, Canada and Louisiana were developing rapidly, whilst the occupation of the line of the Mississippi and Ohio provided adequately for their future expansion; in India she was entrenched in the approaches to Bengal and the Carnatic. In European waters the French endeavoured to assist the landing of 1745. Charles Edward Stuart on the Scottish coast; the British effort in the same year was directed to the far more important objective of Louisburg. That fortress, situated on the east coast of Cape Breton Island, commanded the approach to Canada from Europe by the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the possession of so vital a gate would speedily ensure the fall of the citadel. A considerable part in its capture was played by the colonial forces of New England.

A more active prelude to the struggle of the Seven Years' War was played in the Indian sphere. In India the French were directed by Dupleix, in the Mauritius, so valuable for the control of Indian waters, by La Bourdonnais. The system of Dupleix, whose aim was to Dupleix. secure for his country the inheritance of the Mogul Empire, provided France with native allies and a respectable armed force; that of La Bourdonnais supplied a strong naval base and a powerful fleet. In 1745 the English prepared to attack Pondicherry, the

chief French position on the Coromandel coast; but a naval defeat inflicted by La Bourdonnais deprived them at once of control of the sea and of the offensive. Madras now lay open to the French attack and was captured, but a quarrel between the French commanders resulted in the departure of La Bourdonnais and the continued existence of the English settlements in India. Dupleix, deprived of that control of the sea which is necessary for the successful occupation of India, was
1747. powerless. He besieged Fort St. David, but raised the siege at the approach of an English fleet, and in the following year he was in turn reduced to the defensive by the appearance in Indian waters of the greatest
1748. European fleet that had ever rounded the Cape. Admiral Boscawen, who was in command of it, proceeded to attack Pondicherry, but he was interrupted by the general peace.

§ 4. First Silesian War.

The War of the Austrian Succession was begun by one of the few German princes who had no claim to the throne of Vienna. Frederick of Prussia invaded Silesia not, as Charles Albert of Bavaria or Frederick Augustus of Saxony might have done, to claim it for himself as the legitimate ruler of Austria, but in order to annex it to his own kingdom of Prussia. He justified his action to the people of Silesia by a proclamation professing that his motive was to protect them from violent claimants to the Austrian throne, and to Maria Theresa by the dispatch of Baron Götter to Vienna with an offer of armed support against her enemies in return for the cession of Silesia. The case which he made before Europe was larger still; he pleaded that his father had only guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction in return for a similar guarantee by Charles VI of Jülich and Berg, of which duchies the Emperor had in fact

already made a grant to the Elector Palatine. This might be held to constitute a release from the agreement, and in addition to it he preferred quite seriously the Silesian claims. These claims were twofold: that to the duchies of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau depended on an agreement entered into by Joachim II of Brandenburg and the Silesian duke that on the extinction of either family its possessions should pass to the other. Against this contract the Emperor entered an invalid protest, but on the extinction of the Silesian house the Empire was strong enough to remain in effective occupation of the duchies against the Brandenburg claimant. The legality of the claim was acknowledged by the Empire, when some years later it offered the Circle of Schwiebus to the Great Elector in full discharge; this territory was transferred to Brandenburg but retroceded by the next Elector. The second claim was to the duchy of Jägerndorf, which the Emperor Ferdinand II had most unwarrantably confiscated to punish its ruler for joining the anti-Imperial side in the Thirty Years' War. The duchy had properly belonged to the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg and was inalienable without their consent.

The Silesian claims.

1537. 1675. 1686. 1623.

The Emperor Charles VI died in October 1740, and in the following month Frederick invaded Silesia with a force which had been quickly concentrated on the Austrian frontier. Against the Prussian strength of 28,000 the Austrian garrisons could muster only a nominal establishment of 13,000, and an actual effective of little more than 7,000 men. They were reduced accordingly to an inactive defensive behind the walls of the Silesian fortresses, Glogau and Brieg, which held the line of the Oder, and Neisse guarding the road into Moravia, whilst Frederick was at liberty to occupy the country and the open towns.

1740.

1741 Early in the following year the Prussians held the whole of Silesia, including the capital, Breslau, and Glogau, which had been successfully stormed, with the sole exceptions of Neisse and Brieg. A desperate effort at Vienna had resulted in the mobilization of a considerable field-army under Neipperg; this force, which contained a nucleus of 25,000 regular troops and a large body of Croatian partisans, was numerically more than a match for the Prussians, who were scattered over the province. Frederick hastily retired on the line of the Oder, but the Austrians outmarched him and established themselves at Mollwitz near Brieg, between the Prussian army and the river which formed the most practicable line of retreat to its own country. An unsuccessful attack by his cavalry convinced Frederick that the battle was lost, and he left the field. But the Prussian infantry commanded by Schwerin, manœuvring with a precision acquired on the drill-grounds of Potsdam and reloading with a rapidity due to their iron ramrods, broke the Austrian defensive, and Mollwitz was converted into a Prussian victory. The result of this battle crystallized the European hostility to Austria; of the various claimants Augustus of Saxony desired Moravia, Charles Albert of Bavaria coveted Bohemia, and Philip V of Spain and Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia were eager to share the Italian establishments of the Austrian dynasty. The war-party at Versailles seized the control of French policy, and Belleisle, with the title of Marshal of France, was sent to Germany to organize an alliance. At Nymphenburg in Bavaria he concluded an agreement with the various claimants to occupy and distribute Upper Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and the Italian possessions; also a convention with Prussia, in which France guaranteed the annexation of Silesia in return

for Frederick's promise to support the Bavarian candidate in the Imperial election and to renounce his claim to the Rhenish duchies.

Frederick's military problem was now infinitely simplified. Austrian attention was diverted from the Prussian offensive in the north to the more serious Franco-Bavarian attack which was contemplated from the west. A French army of 40,000 men, commanded by Belleisle, moved across the Rhine and joined its allies in Bavaria; this combined force then moved down the Danube, passed the defile of that river at Passau, and encamped in the early autumn at Linz, three days' march west of Vienna. That city and the Austrian fortresses were saved by two surprising factors, the loyalty of Hungary and the diplomacy of Prussia. Maria Theresa, who had taken refuge in Buda-Pest, was able, by a spectacular appeal and considerable concessions, to procure from the Hungarians a valuable, if loosely organized, military force, which moved up the Danube to cover Vienna. Frederick, who had no concern in the war beyond the acquisition of Silesia, concluded with Austria at Klein Schnellendorf an agreement for the surrender of Neisse after a formal siege and the preliminaries of a definitive treaty of peace on the basis of the cession of Silesia. The Austrians were now at liberty to meet the French offensive.

Belleisle moved northwards into Bohemia, leaving the road into Bavaria by the Danube valley open to the Hungarian levies. The French occupied Prague, and 1742.
Charles Albert was elected Emperor at Frankfort, but real success was on the other side; the Austrians were in Munich, and the French in Prague were hard pressed by their adversaries. At this point Frederick made a surprising return to the war; as a reminder to Austria

that the promises made at Klein Schnellendorf must not be submerged in the tide of new successes, he crossed the Moravian frontier with a combined force of Prussians and Saxons. Retreating into Bohemia after the defection of the Saxons, he defeated an Austrian army at Chotusitz, which procured for him four weeks later, in the Peace of Breslau, the cession of Silesia and Glatz.

Peace of Breslau.

The French force in Prague was now isolated and in considerable difficulty; Belleisle, leaving a small rear-guard to defend the fortress and achieve an honourable capitulation, broke out and conducted a winter retreat to the Bavarian frontier, in which his troops proved an exception to the rule that French armies retreat badly. The fall of Walpole and the accession of Carteret provided France with another adversary; Carteret sympathized with the Germanic aspirations of George II, and the king, as Elector of Hanover, deeply resented the French attack on Imperial territory. Accordingly in 1743 a mixed force of English and German troops, commanded by the king himself and known as the Pragmatic Army, operated in western Germany with the intention of joining the Austrians on the Main. It encountered a French army at Dettingen and defeated it after an action in which George II displayed considerable personal courage. It was in protest against this Hanoverian policy of Carteret that William Pitt first made his voice heard in English politics; the young member was vigorous in his denunciations of the 'despicable electorate' and the unsatisfactory system of subsidies, and it is undeniable that Carteret's projects, although his point of view was European, were vaguely combined and irresponsibly executed. England was still nominally at peace with France, and her troops served only as auxiliaries of Maria Theresa, but in the following

1743.

year the situation was regularized by a declaration of war.

§ 5. Second Silesian War.

The first general war since the Peace of Utrecht opened naturally with an attempt by France to break the bounds which that settlement had set to her expansion. A force of 80,000 men led by Louis XV entered Flanders and in four weeks captured five Barrier fortresses. The fall of these strong places opened a breach thirty miles wide in the defences of the Low Countries, and for a moment French ambitions looked for a completion of the work of Louis XIV. Their offensive, however, was arrested by the Austrian invasion of eastern France; a considerable army passed the Rhine below Strasbourg and for a few weeks controlled the plain of Alsace. Louis, with half of his army of invasion, moved rapidly from the Low Countries to Metz, ready to defend from that fortress the line of the Moselle. But in its turn the Austrian offensive was arrested by news from home; the Prussians had invaded Bohemia. The sudden operation by three columns of a converging march on Prague put that city in Frederick's possession, and the Austrians drew off from their attack on Alsace. The French, who should have hindered their passage of the Rhine and delayed their retreat, busied themselves with the occupation of the Black Forest; and the Austrians, admirably led by Traun, were at liberty to force Frederick over his frontier into Silesia.

1744.

In the following year the Emperor Charles VII, for whose candidature the war had been undertaken, died in his capital, Munich, to which he had twice returned after expulsion by hostile armies. Bavaria had no further interest in continuing hostilities, and Austria was anxious for complete liberty to deal with Prussia. Peace was accordingly concluded between the two powers

1745.

Peace of Füssen.

at Füssen. The war was now simplified into a pair of distinct duels, one between France and England, the other between Prussia and Austria. Only a confused series of operations in Italy, conducted by Franco-Spanish armies against the forces of Austria, Sardinia, and Great Britain, and the French attack on the Austrian Netherlands remained to remind Europe that this was a general war. The French offensive against England in 1745 was in two branches: a legitimist expedition of Charles Edward Stuart, and the attack on the Low Countries. The Young Pretender landed in Scotland, seized Edinburgh, and marched as far south as Derby. His dwindling strength and the unresponsive reception which he found in England imposed a retreat; and the hasty recall of regular troops from the Low Countries ensured his eventual defeat at Culloden. The French advance on the Low Countries was unchecked by an Anglo-Dutch defensive at Fontenoy, and forcing at Tournai the gate of the Scheldt entered the Netherlands by the line of that river.

Austria now constructed a league against Prussia; by the Treaty of Warsaw she acquired the alliance of Saxony and Poland, thus enclosing Frederick on two flanks, and it was even possible that the Polish Government would call in Russian assistance. Silesia was now invaded by the Austrians, but a defeat at Hohenfriedberg sent them back into Bohemia with Frederick in pursuit. At Frankfort the husband of Maria Theresa was elected emperor as Francis I, and at Sohr, in Bohemia, Frederick again beat the Austrians. The Saxons now threatened to invade Brandenburg, but the Prussians beat them twice in three weeks, and Frederick entered Dresden to dictate peace. On Christmas Day the Peace of Dresden was signed; the Peace of Breslau

Peace of Dresden.

was repeated, Silesia was ceded to Prussia, and Frederick acknowledged the election of Francis.

The duel of England and France now continued alone; the most significant passages of it were enacted in India and America and belong to the Colonial War. In the Low Countries France extended rapidly the area of an occupation which Europe would never permit her to maintain; Brussels, Antwerp, Mons, and Namur were all held for Louis XV, but France and Europe had lost all interest in the war. Holland was invaded, and the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom was captured by the French, but the war was dying of inanition. France felt that, whilst she was capturing Dutch strongholds, she was losing colonies; and England saw that against the solid advantages of a colonial war she must set an increasing and unproductive expenditure in European subsidies. It was with feelings of universal relief that Europe received the news that England had opened direct negotiations with France. 1746. 1747. 1748.

§ 6. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The immediate cause of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was significant; England was dissatisfied with a refusal of her Dutch allies to contribute to a Russian subsidy. The powers of Western Europe were deliberately introducing the armed forces of Russia as a decisive factor in their own conflicts. A Russian army had even appeared in western Germany before the dispute as to its remuneration precipitated the peace and deprived it of a mission.

Failure of France.

The note of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. This result was above all a defeat of France. That power had made a triple effort to reverse the settlement of Utrecht; at each point the conditions of that settlement were restored. First, she had endeavoured in the extension of her

own frontiers to break the bounds within which European diplomacy had confined her. At Aix-la-Chapelle she was compelled to recede from her encroachments on the Austrian Netherlands, the Alpine territory of Savoy, and the eastern bank of the Rhine. Secondly, in the Colonial War, and especially in the Indian sphere, she had endeavoured to arrest the growth of England's transmarine establishments; the retrocession of Madras, although it was counterbalanced by the English restoration of Cape Breton Island, terminated her effort in this direction. Finally, she had seriously endeavoured to substitute the Stuarts for the Hanoverians on the English throne; she was now compelled to expel the exiled family from France. The apparent victories of Louis XV in the War of the Austrian Succession were as unsatisfying in their results as his defeats in the Seven Years' War.

There were two exceptions to this restoration of the *status quo*. Savoy was rewarded for keeping against France the gate of the Alps by a considerable increase of territory at the expense of the Austrian Milanese, and Prussia received Silesia. The War of the Austrian Succession so far settled the problem of the Hapsburg inheritance that Maria Theresa was Empress-Queen and her husband Francis Emperor, but its value was that it decided a question of more than Austrian significance. In the course of that war it became clear to Europe that the military kingdom of Prussia was a power of the first order. The attempt of the Bavarian and Saxon dynasties to keep pace with the rise of the Hohenzollern failed utterly. The Silesian Wars gave Prussia a position of predominance in Central Europe comparable to that which Russia had established in Eastern Europe by the Northern War.

Rise of Prussia.

CHAPTER III

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

§ 1. The Reversal of Alliances. § 2. The Colonial Effort. § 3. The European Phase. § 4. The Indian Phase. § 5. The American Phase. § 6. The Treaties.

THE situation which was to produce the Seven Years' War was composed of three rivalries. The rivalry of France and England in the colonial sphere was an obvious and constant factor, whose causes lay deep in the history of European expansion. The rivalry of Prussia and Austria in Central Europe was a logical result of the political conformation of that region. The War of the Austrian Succession produced a third rivalry, that between France and Prussia, who had been allies in that conflict. In the last war France, in the matter of her northern and eastern frontiers, had endeavoured to reverse a European settlement and had failed; Prussia, in the matter of Silesia, had endeavoured to reverse a European settlement and had succeeded. In the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Europe had authorized the Prussian innovation and declined to authorize the French; it became, therefore, the French interest to amend that settlement and the Prussian interest to maintain it unaltered. Besides this cleavage of interests the rivalry of France and Prussia had a more obvious cause. France had been the foremost military power in Europe; the country whose military efforts had imposed upon the Continent the system of Louis XIV could not, without abdicating its position, regard with favour the apparition of a new military kingdom.

§ 1. The Reversal of Alliances. The three rivalries: 1. France and England. 2. Prussia and Austria. 3. France and Prussia.

Sooner or later France was bound to try the strength of Prussia, and the Prussian attitude was not likely to postpone the contest. Frederick's partiality for a French alliance did not extend by a fraction beyond its utility; he had shown himself in the negotiations of Klein Schnellendorf willing to sacrifice that combination to the exigencies of the German situation, and he even liked to think of himself as 'a good and faithful German patriot'. The rivalry of France and Prussia was as real as that of France and England or of Prussia and Austria.

The facts of this situation were not represented by the diplomatic surface of Europe; in 1748 France was the ally of Prussia, and England was the ally of Austria. It remained for diplomacy to repair its mistake and to bring diplomatic relations into a more exact correspondence with European rivalries. This change of partners constituted the political preparation of the Seven Years' War.

i. Junction of France and Austria.

The first manœuvre was the union of France and Austria; this was effected by three forces, the governing passion of Maria Theresa to recover Silesia, the realization by Kaunitz that France and Austria had in Prussia a common enemy, and the influence of Madame de Pompadour. Kaunitz had represented Austria in the conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle, and his hostility to Prussia won for him the confidence of the Empress-Queen. Two years after the peace he was sent as Austrian ambassador to Paris and returned from that post to assume in Vienna the supreme office of State Chancellor, which he continued to occupy until his generation had passed away and the French Revolution provided Europe with a set of problems with which he was unfamiliar. His anxiety to recover for Austria the lost province inclined him to the French alliance,

Kaunitz.

1750.

1753.

and a defensive treaty between Spain and Austria paved the way for the reconciliation of Hapsburgs and Bourbons. A difference as to the garrisons of the 1755. Barrier fortresses and certain commercial restrictions imposed on the Netherlands served to separate Austria from England, and the Austrian ambassador in Paris was instructed to cultivate the French alliance. The most important negotiations were conducted at a country house of Madame de Pompadour with her favourite, the Abbé de Bernis. It was the common interest of Austria and France to reverse the settlement of Aix-la-Chapelle, for Austria in Silesia and for France in the Low Countries. At this point news was received of 1756. the union of England and Prussia in the Treaty of Westminster, and the defensive Treaty of Versailles was immediately signed by the governments of France and Austria.

Treaty of Versailles.

ii. Junction of England and Prussia.

The junction of England and Prussia was, like most operations of English policy, an unpremeditated movement. It was a national interest of England to exclude the French from the Low Countries; it was a personal anxiety of George II to exclude an invasion from Hanover. Both of these objects required a considerable continental army, and in the last war the Austrian power had been shown unequal to the task. English diplomacy now addressed itself to the work of procuring on the Continent an army capable of defending British interests. The poverty of Russia, combined with her impressive intervention in the final campaign of the last war, suggested an application to St. Petersburg, and a treaty was concluded by which the 1755. Russian Government contracted to supply an army of 80,000 men for service against the enemies of England. At this time considerable friction had arisen between

England and Austria as to the Barrier garrisons, and it came as an original idea to increase the British forces on the Continent by the enlistment of Austria's rival. The Prussian alliance appealed strongly to George II by reason of the convenient proximity of that kingdom to Hanover; and the English alliance found favour with Frederick because it appeared to carry with it the friendship of Russia. The prospect of a war against France and Austria was not alarming to the King of Prussia, because the wide separation of his two adversaries would impede their effective co-operation; but he was anxious to avoid all possibility of an intervention in his rear by Russia, which has always been so disturbing to Prussian strategy. The reports which he received of the rapid development of the policy of Kaunitz combined with his distaste for the majestic attitude of French diplomacy to impose on him the English alliance, and the Treaty of Westminster embodied the new combination. The Reversal of Alliances was complete, the powers of Europe had changed partners, and England stood with Prussia against France and Austria. It might be possible upon a misconstruction of the temper of the eighteenth century to see in the union of Hapsburg and Bourbon against the two northern powers a resumption of the duel between Roman Catholic and Protestant. That motive, which had been omnipotent in the previous century, was entirely absent. The combinations of European diplomacy were now based, not upon a religious mission or a dynastic difference, but upon a larger foundation of national interest. The Seven Years' War was fought to decide two questions, whether the powers of the Continent would submit to the new prominence of Prussia, and whether the transmarine empire of Great Britain

1756. Treaty of Westminster.

would grow at the expense of that of France. Both questions were answered in favour of the allies of Westminster.

§ 2. The Colonial Effort.

Whilst Europe was busy with the diplomatic preparation of the Seven Years' War, men overseas were occupied with a more active prelude to its colonial struggle. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had produced no solution of the problem of English and French expansion; it had even left undecided the Anglo-Spanish differences which had been the occasion of the Colonial War. But it was not between Spain and England or in the region of South America that the conflict was to be renewed. This time a direct trial of strength between Great Britain and France was to decide finally the control of India and North America.

i. India.

In India, as in Europe, the peace imposed a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, Madras was restored to the East India Company, and Pondicherry was relieved from Boscawen's attack. But the death in the same year of the Subadar of the Deccan provided a notable triumph for the diplomacy of Dupleix; that ruler had governed a vast territory in Central India with a population of 35,000,000. The succession was disputed, and Dupleix succeeded in imposing his own candidates as Subadar of the Deccan and Nabob of the Carnatic. By his control of the latter he became virtual governor of the Carnatic itself; and whilst the Governor of Pondicherry was installed as virtual master of 600 miles of Indian coast-line and a considerable *hinterland*, the English settlement of Madras was excluded from all hope of expansion. The sole obstacles that remained in the path of French dominion in central and southern India were the encircled territory of Madras and the besieged fortress of Trichinopoly, where an unsuccessful

1748.

1750.

claimant to the Carnatic still held out. An English attempt to relieve the town was unsuccessful, and
1751. Dupleix threatened Madras itself. The course of events
Clive. was reversed by an unexpected intervention. Robert Clive, a clerk in the Company's service, had enlisted during the last war in its army and gained experience at the siege of Pondicherry; he was now twenty-five and suggested to the Governor of Madras that an attack on the capital of the Carnatic would constitute an effective diversion. With 500 men and 8 officers he moved suddenly to the attack of Arcot, which he captured principally through the simultaneous occurrence of a thunderstorm. Dupleix, humiliated by the expulsion of his nominee from the capital, sent a force of 10,000 native allies to recapture the town. Clive maintained a desperate defence through a siege of seven weeks, and was finally relieved by a Mahratta force, which he called in. He followed the retreat of the besieging force, and defeated it in two engagements.

1752. Clive now prepared to destroy French influence in south-western India. In the Carnatic he was completely successful; Trichinopoly was relieved, and the English candidate was substituted for the French as Nabob. Dupleix, at enormous expense and by the exercise of unwearying diplomacy, constructed a new
1753. alliance, which was steadily defeated. Clive returned to England broken in health, but with the consciousness that the Company was at liberty to make Madras
1754. a centre of British expansion. Shortly afterwards Dupleix was himself recalled; the obsession of the Continent had at a critical moment of the colonial duel distracted French attention from India.

ii. America. The settlement of Aix-la-Chapelle had attempted no solution of the problem of North America; it had

restored to France and England their previous possessions, and by the omission to delimit the frontier of Nova Scotia it had even provided a productive source of future disagreement. The character of those possessions was in itself an important factor in the situation. In the French settlement of Canada a scanty population of soldiers and hunters lived under a centralized government. Of this society a feudal system, a strong element of clericalism, and the policy of the government combined to form a single political unit. Opposed to it was the diverse and disorganized body of the English colonies. These had grown up unassisted by any systematic colonial policy; but the history of each of them had run an almost identical course from the original settlement by a trading company to the eventual supersession of private control by the royal government. A premature and unsuccessful attempt had been made by James II to secure administrative unity; but under the superficial divisions of an uncorrelated system of separate democracies a distinct development had substituted for the original chain of trading-stations an American empire. The English colonies were of heavier calibre than Canada; the population of Canada was 50,000 in 1744 and 82,000 in 1759, when that of the colonies stood at 1,200,000. Canadian exports stood in 1753 at less than one-thirtieth of the exports of the English colonies, and the latter imported almost five times as much as their northern rivals. This disparity served to render the coming struggle even more unequal.

The Mississippi Plan.

The military government of Canada proposed to check British expansion by a surprising and brilliant application of strategy. The littoral occupied by the English colonies was confined between the Alleghany Mountains and the sea; behind those mountains lay the rich

hinterland of eastern America, watered by the river-system of the Mississippi. The French proposed, by a military occupation of points on that river and on its eastern tributaries, to enclose the colonies between the Alleghanies and the sea and to exclude them absolutely from the interior of the continent. Operating from a northern base in Canada and a southern base in Louisiana, they proceeded rapidly with the construction of an encircling system of forts. Crown Point, Niagara, and Detroit guarded the line of the Great Lakes as a northern barrier against the British effort, whilst a corresponding line of works was thrown up along the Mississippi to serve as its western limit. The
1749. British reply was the hasty formation in Virginia of an Ohio Company to settle the Ohio valley with Englishmen. The French dispatched an armed and unauthorized boundary commission, which claimed the watershed of
1754. the Alleghanies as the French frontier. A small British force was sent to construct a fort at the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers; it was driven off by a body of French, who substituted a work of their own named Fort Duquesne. A handful of Virginian troops, commanded by George Washington, was defeated, and the British Government decided to
1755. dispute the new frontier. In the following year two regiments were sent from England, commanded by General Braddock; these marched on the French fort, but were ambushed by French and Indians and destroyed. The Seven Years' War in America had commenced.

§ 3. The European Phase.

1756. The Franco-Austrian alliance opened hostilities in Europe with a diplomatic victory; Russia was detached from the Anglo-Prussian system and proposed to sacrifice even the British subsidies to the partition of Prussia. The bait of Russian neutrality, which had attracted

Frederick towards England, was suddenly withdrawn, and Prussia was confronted with a prospect of war on three frontiers. Against the dual alliance of Great Britain and Prussia were ranked France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Saxony, and Poland.

1. Campaign in Saxony.

Frederick had been well served by his secret service and was familiar with the projects of partition which had passed in correspondence between Vienna, Dresden, and St. Petersburg. As a considerable army was concentrating behind the Austrian frontier, he decided to take the offensive and in the late summer invaded Saxony. The Saxon army abandoned Dresden and retired up the Elbe to Pirna, a position of great natural strength between the capital and the Austrian frontier, where Frederick blockaded it. The Austrian attempt to relieve the allied force was frustrated at Lobositz, and the Saxons were forced to capitulate. Frederick occupied Saxony and embodied the captured regiments in his own army; further, by the publication of the Saxon diplomatic correspondence, which he seized, he was able to justify to Europe his sudden and successful offensive.

2. Minorca.

Great Britain was at this time under the haphazard government of the Duke of Newcastle, who had succeeded his brother, Henry Pelham, on the latter's death in 1754. This Whig magnate governed the country with no more reputable colleague than Henry Fox, and England was insufficiently prepared for war. A French attack on Minorca was completely successful; Port Mahon was surprised, and an inadequate fleet under Admiral Byng drew off after an evenly fought action. English patriotism was indignant and alarmed, and public opinion demanded the sacrifice of the admiral. His execution was followed by the fall of the

Government, and William Pitt, who was popularly identified with the victorious passages of the last war, during which he had been Paymaster of the Forces, became Secretary of State in a government of which he was the master-spirit, and the Duke of Devonshire the nominal head. The war ministry of Pitt became the foremost feature of England's part in the Seven Years' War; and although his sprawling strategy sometimes wasted the British effort on unsuccessful continental expeditions, his realization of his country's supreme concern in the colonial war, and his capacity for selecting men for high command and for inspiring their exercise of it, sufficed to secure for England the greatest prizes of her history.

1757. The Prussian operations in the following year fall into four parts, an offensive campaign in Bohemia, a defensive period in Saxony, a Thuringian campaign, and a campaign in Silesia. In the spring Frederick invaded Bohemia; an Austrian attempt to cover the capital of that province was severely defeated at the battle of Prague, and that city was invested. The siege continued through the early summer, until a relieving army moved up from Moravia. Frederick met it with an inadequate force at Kollin; the Prussians in violation of their oblique order engaged all along the line and were defeated. Frederick retreated into Saxony.

1. Bohemian campaign.

Whilst the king was waiting for an Austrian attack in the Saxon hills, a Russian force was in occupation of East Prussia, the Swedes were disembarking in Pomerania, and a combined army of French and Imperial troops was moving slowly eastward through Thuringia. In the late autumn, after brushing an Austrian raid away from Berlin, Frederick turned to meet the enemy in Thuringia. The French under Soubise fell back from

2. Saxon defensive.

3. Thuringian campaign.

Leipzig across the Saale. At Rossbach Frederick took his enemy in flank, as Soubise was himself endeavouring to outflank the Prussians. The French army was utterly routed, and the new military kingdom had broken a force of the first soldiers in Europe. Eight days later Frederick turned east again to expel the Austrians from Silesia; eight weeks after the battle of Rossbach the oblique order was once more victorious at Leuthen, and Silesia was recovered.

4. Silesian campaign.

In north-western Germany a Hanoverian force under the Duke of Cumberland had been defeated in the battle of Hastenbeck by the French invaders of the electorate, and after retreating almost to the North Sea had secured its safety and suspended its military activity by the Convention of Kloster-Seven. In England an attempt to dispense with Pitt had failed completely, and he was now reinstated in office in conjunction with Newcastle, who directed the congenial department of patronage.

5. Operations in Hanover.

Frederick opened the next year with an attack on Olmütz, the chief fortress of Moravia; this operation he was compelled to suspend by a successful attack on his communications and the rapid progress of a Russian invasion of East Prussia. When the Russians reached Brandenburg, he transferred himself to the Oder and won at Zorndorf a battle which drove the Russians into Poland. It was a Prussian victory, but the savage fighting of the Russian troops was a revelation to the King of Prussia; the inexhaustible population of Russia might provide a force against which even the brilliant fencing of his ubiquitous defensive would prove unavailing.

1758.

1. Moravian campaign.

2. Campaign in Brandenburg.

Once again Frederick faced about and moved south-west to cover Silesia from a new Austrian offensive

3. Saxon campaign.

based on Thuringia. At Hochkirch he was surprised and beaten; on the same day his favourite sister died, and Frederick was almost submerged in his misfortunes.

1759. In the following year the Russian offensive assumed a more serious form; the capture of Frankfort-on-

1. Prussian operations. Oder was followed by a junction with the Austrians. Frederick attacked the Russian camp at Kunersdorf; the Prussians were completely defeated and drew off in utter confusion. The King resigned the command and contemplated suicide. An attempt to relieve Dresden from the French and Austrians failed; but the Russians, who might have entered Berlin almost without opposition, made no move. A Prussian force was surrounded and forced to capitulate at Maxen, and Saxony was controlled by the Austrians.

2. Hanoverian operations. Only in north-western Germany were the two allies successful; Ferdinand of Brunswick, who had taken the Duke of Cumberland's command, moved down from the mouth of the Elbe, and in 1758 drove the French across the Rhine and defeated them at Crefeld. With a considerable reinforcement of British troops he took post in Westphalia. In the following year the French crossed the Rhine in force; they occupied Frankfort-on-Main and defeated Ferdinand at Bergen. To cover Hanover he retreated to the line of the Weser and completely defeated a French attack at Minden.

1760. For two years longer Ferdinand opposed the French in western Germany, whilst Frederick in the south-east continued his desperate and precarious defensive, moving hastily across eastern Saxony and western Silesia to face Russians and Austrians in turn. A Prussian force was annihilated at Landshut, and the fall of Glatz exposed Upper Silesia to an Austrian offensive; but the Austrians were defeated at Liegnitz and Torgau. Berlin

was occupied by an Austro-Russian force, and Swedes and Russians were forcing the Baltic sea-board from Prussian control. In Silesia the Austrians were gaining 1761.
ground, and Prussia was almost exhausted; her field army was reduced to a strength of 60,000, and its discipline was breaking up.

Relief came by the removal of Russian pressure, 1762.
which had restricted Frederick to the defensive since the campaign of Zorndorf. The death of the Czarina Elizabeth placed Peter III on the Russian throne; almost his sole idea was an admiration for Frederick, and peace between Prussia and Russia was followed by an alliance. The diplomacy of Bute, who had succeeded Pitt on the accession of George III, reduced in Frederick's eyes the value of the English alliance, and he prepared to arrange his own settlement of the war. A final campaign in Silesia closed with the Prussian victory of Burkersdorf, Peter was removed from the Russian throne, and six months after its last pitched battle the Seven Years' War was at an end.

Naval operations.

The Continental war was unaffected by the naval struggle between France and England. The least satisfactory aspect of Pitt's strategy appears in a number of combined expeditions which he directed against the French coast. In the year following the loss of Minorca 1757.
10,000 men, who might have reversed in Hanover the campaign of Hastenbeck, effected in the Bay of Biscay the destruction of Rochefort. The failure of two 1758.
attempts on the coast of Brittany encouraged the French to assume the offensive, and a considerable force was concentrated at Dunkirk for the invasion of England. The battle-fleets, which were to convoy the transports across the Channel, were blockaded in their harbours by the English. A division escaped from 1759.

Toulon, passed Gibraltar, and ran for the Channel; Admiral Boscawen brought it to action off the Portuguese coast at Lagos and destroyed it. A second fleet eluded the blockade of Admiral Hawke and got out of Brest; it was pursued among the rocks and shallows of Quiberon Bay and annihilated. By the destruction of the escorting squadrons England had averted all danger of invasion. During the rest of the war British sea-power, which had in European waters paralysed the French offensive and established a complete blockade of the coast from the Straits of Dover to the Mediterranean, was directed to the establishment overseas of a new empire.

§ 4. The Indian Phase.

In the Indian theatre of war, England was not at the outset confronted by a French effort. The recall of Dupleix had been followed by a treaty, in which the French Company renounced its political ambitions and in effect abandoned the Carnatic to British influence. The English now transferred their attention northwards to Bengal; in the valley of the Ganges and its tributaries the French and Dutch possessed stations, but the most numerous and powerful group of posts, including

1755. Calcutta, belonged to the British Company. Defensive works, which were in course of execution at Calcutta in anticipation of a war with France, excited the suspicion of Surajah Dowlah, the Subadar of Bengal. He attacked the town, surprised it, and captured 146 white prisoners; these were confined during the night in the Black Hole, a room measuring eighteen feet by fourteen, with the result that only twenty-three survived. Clive, who had returned to Madras as Governor of Fort St. David, conducted a punitive expedition into Bengal

1756. and recovered Calcutta. He then attacked and captured the French station of Chandernagore. From this

diversion he returned to the conquest of Bengal from its native rulers; having won the chief officer of Surajah Dowlah into a promise of treachery, Clive moved up the Hooghly to attack the native forces. At Plassey he defeated an army of nearly 70,000 men with a force of 900 Englishmen and 2,000 sepoys. The Subadar's capital was occupied, and the conquest of Bengal was almost complete. 1757.

In the following year the French developed their attack on the British positions in southern India. Lally, the new Governor, arrived at Pondicherry with an army of 1,200 men and a fleet commanded by D'Aché. Fort St. David was attacked, and the failure of the British fleet to break the French blockade condemned this post to capture. Other stations in the region of Madras fell before the French attack, and in an inconclusive series of fleet actions Pocock failed to drive D'Aché from his controlling position on the sea. The control of India, which depends absolutely upon the exercise of sea-power, was lost to France by the gross improvidence of its marine administration; the Mauritius, which was the sole French naval base in Indian waters, was utterly unprovided with supplies for the fleet. When D'Aché required the materials for repairs, he was informed in the islands that the presence of his crews would exhaust the food-supply, and several ships were even sent to the Cape of Good Hope to refit. After a final action, which was as indecisive as its predecessors, D'Aché abandoned Indian waters, and Lally's efforts were doomed by this retirement to failure. Without sea-power he could not hope to capture the English coast towns by a one-sided investment, which left their sea-fronts open; and he could not venture to oppose with his dwindling field army the British forces, to which 1758. 1759.

1760. every transport brought reinforcements. At Wandewash he was defeated by Eyre Coote, and the British commander followed up his victory by the recovery
1761. of almost all the Carnatic outside Pondicherry. Pondicherry was itself besieged, and its capitulation completed the British triumph. The chief regions of eastern India were in British control, the French settlements were in British occupation. If the treaties restored those towns to their original owners, that restoration would be deprived of all significance for the future of India. Their military value was destroyed by the prohibition to fortify them, and their political meaning was annihilated by the unchallenged supremacy of British influence in the surrounding territory. By the Seven Years' War the Indian empire of France was reduced to a commercial *enclave*.

§5. The American Phase. Hostilities in the North American sphere had begun before the declaration of war. Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela was an event of considerably more importance than the mere destruction of two regiments of the English line. The adaptability of the French and their effective employment of Indian tactics and allies contrasted favourably with the drill-ground precision of the British troops and promised a protracted and painful conflict. By their secure possession of Fort Duquesne the French not only made a material advance towards the completion of the Mississippi Plan, but they even controlled for a time the western region of the English colonies. Indian bands roamed the Atlantic slope of the Alleghanies, and it seemed as though the English might be driven into the sea.

1756. The British forces, oblivious of the serious menace on their western border, attempted to force a way through the northern barrier of the French enclosure. They

were victorious at Crown Point, but wasted the strategical results of their victory by permitting the French to fortify Ticonderoga, which filled the breach. At the same time the loss of Oswego, which fell before a French attack, advanced the French frontier from the northern to the southern shore of Lake Ontario. In the following 1757.
year the capture of Fort William Henry extended the region of French control to the south of Ticonderoga; and an unsuccessful British attempt on Louisburg failed to provide compensation for the series of English reverses.

The temper of Pitt had by this time completely 1758.
permeated the British administration, and a serious effort was made to secure the control of North America; 20,000 colonial troops and 25,000 British regulars were sent against the French positions. An assault on Ticonderoga was unsuccessful, but a combined expedition led by Amherst and Boscawen captured Louisburg, which commanded the western approach to Canada. In the same year the English effort began to break through the barrier opposed to it by the Mississippi Plan; Fort Frontenac in the northern line and Fort Duquesne in the western line were captured from the French, and the forces which France had hoped to enclose in a system of fortified positions began to turn to the conquest of Canada.

In the following year the English prepared an 1759.
elaborate offensive; an attack by three armies was to converge on Quebec by way of the River St. Lawrence, the gap of Ticonderoga, and the gap of Niagara. The two forces whose routes lay overland succeeded in forcing the positions which guarded the gaps, but failed to advance farther into Canada. The maritime expedition, commanded by General Wolfe, sailed up the St. Lawrence, surprised the position of the Heights of

Abraham above Quebec, and on that ground defeated the French under Montcalm in an action in which both commanders fell. Quebec surrendered, and the loss of the capital paralysed the resistance of the centralized
1760. French government of Canada. An unsuccessful attempt to recapture it was followed by the fall of Montreal, and the whole of Canada passed under British control. The effort of Choiseul to revive French activity came too late, and Pitt imposed the British solution upon the questions of America and India.

At this point the course of the war was affected by two new factors, the accession of George III and the intervention of Spain, which combined eventually to
System of George III. expel Pitt from office and to impose peace. The political education of George III had been in the hands of his mother, whose constant refrain was, 'George, be a king,' and of Lord Bute, whose text-book was Bolingbroke's *Idea of a Patriot King*; the monarch 'must begin to govern as soon as he begins to reign', he must 'call into the administration such men as he can assure himself will serve on the same principles on which he intends to govern', and he is to 'espouse no party . . . but govern like the common father of his people', 'the most popular man in his country and a patriot king at the head of a united people.' This ideal was in grave conflict with the situation which George III found on his accession; an omnipotent minister was conducting a war in three continents as the executive officer of the Whig families; Pitt's control of war and policy was as objectionable to George III as Newcastle's less dignified empire over the realms of patronage. In a speech of his own composition, the King alluded to a 'bloody and expensive war' and only altered the expression into 'an expensive but just and necessary

war for publication under strong pressure. He expressed hopes of an 'honourable and lasting peace' and undermined Pitt's position by inserting Bute in the Cabinet as Secretary of State. Pitt's reply was to 1761.
demand an extension of the conflict by an attack on Spain; it was within his knowledge that a family compact had been concluded between France and Spain. By the terms of that agreement Spain was to declare war on England in the following year, and to supply France with 12,000 men and 12 ships; her unfriendly intentions were apparent from the dispatch of warships to escort the bullion fleet on its passage from South America. Unfortunately, Pitt made the demand in an oracular tone, which irritated his colleagues, and omitted to accompany it with an adequate statement of his reasons. He failed to convince the Cabinet and resigned; his resignation was a fact of more than domestic importance and reacted upon the course of events in each of the three theatres of war.

Fall of Pitt.

It was now clear that hostilities would soon be ended, 1762.
although interest was temporarily revived by the declaration of war against Spain, which became necessary in accordance with Pitt's predictions. A British force was sent to Portugal and succeeded in covering that country against a Franco-Spanish offensive. A British expedition to Cuba, which resulted in the storm of the Moro and the surrender of Havana, was completely successful, the French islands in the West Indies fell rapidly under British control, and in the Pacific the Philippine Islands were lost to Spain by the bombardment of Manila. The destruction of Spanish commerce was complete, and the acquisition by Great Britain of a second transmarine empire was only interrupted by the conclusion of peace.

War with Spain.

§ 6. The Treaties. The Seven Years' War was terminated by two treaties; the one, concluded at Paris between France, Spain, and England, contained a colonial settlement; the other, concluded at Hubertsburg between Austria, Saxony, 1763. and Prussia, contained a European settlement. By the Peace of Paris the British Empire was immensely increased, by the Peace of Hubertsburg the position of Prussia was honourably maintained.

1. Peace of Paris. In the Peace of Paris an important group of articles regulated the position of Spain. By the pacific diplomacy of Bute that power was relieved almost entirely from the consequences of its rash participation in the

1. Spanish possessions. duel of France and England. Cuba and the Philippine Islands were restored to Spanish control by an article of the preliminaries signed in 1762, when the capture of Havana and Manila was imminent, by which conquests unknown in Europe at the signature of peace were annulled. A worthless claim by Spain to fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland was abandoned, and the English privilege of cutting logwood in Honduras was finally admitted, although Great Britain gave up a valuable position in the Caribbean Sea by demolishing the fortifications of Honduras. The sole territorial transfer of importance was the cession to England, in exchange for Cuba, of the peninsula of Florida; this constituted an amplification of the new colony of Georgia and completed in the south the British control of the eastern sea-board of North America; compensation was found for Spain in the surrender by France of Louisiana.

2. French possessions. Between France and England the settlement of accounts was conducted in a different spirit; here the British gains were large and concrete, and the victories of Pitt's administration were permitted to bear proper

fruit. The North American empire of France was reduced to some fishing rights off Newfoundland. The cession of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton Island terminated French control north of the Great Lakes, whilst the desperate attempt to encircle the English colonies was finally frustrated by the article which made the Mississippi the western frontier of British territory. New Orleans, which remained part of Louisiana, was the sole exception to this frontier, and Louisiana was itself transferred to Spain. In American waters France retained Guadeloupe and Martinique, whilst Grenada and the Grenadines, Tobago, Dominica, and St. Vincent were ceded to Great Britain. *a.* North America.

The revolution effected in North America by the settlement was equalled in Asia. The Indian establishments of France were restored to French control; but, whereas ten years before the Governor of Pondicherry had aspired to the reversion of the Mogul Empire, France was now left with five open towns, each surrounded by territory in which British influence was supreme. These unfortified and unorganized trading stations were all that remained of the ambitious system of Dupleix, a dismal reminder of the omnipotence of sea-power in the Indian sphere. *b.* India.

African territory was not yet of sufficient value to cause wars or to complicate the settlement; on the south-west coast the station of Senegal was retained by England, whilst Goree was recovered by France. In European waters Great Britain restored the Breton island of Belle Isle in return for the important position of Minorca; the consequences of Byng's failure were obliterated, and the Peace of Paris restored Port Mahon to England's line of naval bases. *c.* Africa. *d.* Europe.

ii. Peace of Hubertsburg.

The greater part of the European settlement was,

however, contained in the Peace of Hubertsburg, which was signed between the belligerents in Central Europe after France and England had left the war. By that settlement Prussia and Austria returned in every detail to the position of 1756; the Austrians restored Glatz to the Prussian government of Silesia, and the Prussians evacuated Saxony. This negative result is characteristic of the Prussian phase of the Seven Years' War. In that conflict a European combination had attempted to suppress the rise of Prussia; if Prussia could succeed merely in maintaining her existence against attack, this defensive would amount to a complete Prussian victory and would impose upon the belligerents the Prussian solution. In effect the war led to this conclusion: Prussia had been able to defend herself successfully, although her territory had been occupied and her capital had been raided; and Maria Theresa, who had formed the coalition against Frederick, was bound by the result to admit that Prussia must be recognized, that recognition involved the surrender of Austrian claims to the province of Silesia, and that a system of dual control must be substituted in Central Europe for the former supremacy of Austria.

The diplomatic combination which had secured these results was not a lasting one; the diplomacy of Bute destroyed the Anglo-Prussian alliance. Frederick, who had been dissatisfied with the constant British refusal to send a fleet to the Baltic, regarded the non-payment of his subsidy in 1762 as treachery, and the conclusion of a separate peace with France as a desertion in face of the enemy. England emerged from the Seven Years' War everywhere victorious; she was in occupation of a new colonial empire in two continents, and she was possessed of the invincible weapon of sea-power. But

Results of the war: *a.* British gains.

by her European diplomacy she had left herself without an ally; she had defeated France too thoroughly and abandoned Prussia too easily to hope for a friendly reception in Paris or Berlin. The prospect of isolation was especially alarming in the event of a French attempt to reconquer the lost empire. By the settlement of 1763 England was triumphant but isolated.

b. Prussian survival.

The Seven Years' War decided the European question, whether Prussia should survive as a power in Central Europe, and the colonial question, whether Great Britain should acquire the empire of France. Of the three rivalries from which it sprang, the colonial rivalry between France and England was decided in favour of England, the political rivalry between Prussia and Austria was decided in favour of Prussia, and the military rivalry between Prussia and France was decided against France. It was a not inadequate result of seven years of fighting.

c. French failure.

CHAPTER IV

THE EASTERN QUESTION

§ 1. The Problem of Russia. § 2. The Problem of Turkey. § 3. The Problem of Poland. § 4. The Reign of Catharine II. § 5. The First Partition of Poland. § 6. The War of Kutchuk-Kainardji.

§ 1. The Problem of Russia.

THE problems which in the eighteenth century composed the Eastern Question were not yet so numerous or so far-reaching as they afterwards became. The question of the Far East, which depends upon the contact in Eastern Asia of European expansion and oriental states, was unknown to a generation which encountered the Chinese only as a picturesque embellishment of travellers' tales; and the Persian problems of the Middle East, which are founded entirely on the British dominion in India, hardly troubled the century which saw the bare inauguration of that dominion. The Eastern Question was confined in the eighteenth century to the Near East; the territory which gave rise to it consisted of Eastern Europe and the land lying round the eastern waters of the Mediterranean.

The Near East.

In the nineteenth century the question of Eastern Europe came to be restricted to the problems raised by the presence of Turkey in Europe, and especially by the Christian population of Turkey. In the eighteenth century it was a more extensive question, covering a larger territory than the Balkan Peninsula, which came to be almost exclusively the area of its later urgency, because it was less the problem of the reduction of Turkey than the problem of the expansion of Russia.

The Expansion of Russia.

The lines of that expansion, which were dictated by the geographical position of Russia, have already been considered. The advance along those lines, which was an historical necessity, gave to the Russian effort a striking continuity and impressed Russian policy with that appearance of a consistent tradition which is its most original feature. Of the three advances, that towards the Baltic required to be made at the expense of Sweden, that towards the Black Sea required to be made at the expense of Turkey, and that towards the Vistula required to be made at the expense of Poland. Thus Russian soldiers and diplomatists inherited their problems ready-made.

Lines of expansion: 1. To Baltic. 2. To Black Sea. 3. To Vistula.

The effort of Peter the Great had completed in the Northern War the advance to the Baltic; in the closing years of his reign he turned south-east towards the Caspian, and in a campaign against Persia anticipated the advance of his successors into the Middle East; Persia surrendered the southern littoral of the Caspian, and the first Russian ambassador was sent to Pekin. When the Czar died, as 'Father of the Fatherland, Peter the Great, and Emperor of All Russia', the inheritance of his growing kingdom passed by an unprecedented arrangement to the peasant woman who had been his wife.

Peter the Great. 1722–3. 1725.

With the reign of Catharine I Russia entered upon a century of Empresses; for sixty-seven out of the next seventy years the government of women enabled Russian destinies to be controlled by ministers, whose realization of national needs kept the direction of policy within the lines of Peter's prevision. Internal politics became a duel between the new school of national politicians and the nobility, who regarded with disgust the system of Peter, as involving a series of subversive reforms, the government of *parvenu* ministers, the maintenance of

Catharine I.

an expensive army, and a distasteful exile from Moscow to the mushroom capital on the Neva. Under Catharine I Menshikoff, a pupil of Peter, who had sold pies in the streets of Moscow, retained the control of Russian policy with Osterman, a German diplomatist. On her death she was succeeded by her son, Peter II, a boy of eleven. The Czar escaped from his ministers into the hands of the aristocrats, and Russia passed under the control of the reactionaries. But the brief duration of his reign precluded any serious interruption of national development. Two years after his coronation Peter II died on the morning of the day when he was to have married a bride chosen from the triumphant nobility. A singular attempt was now made to substitute for the efficient autocracy, that had hitherto governed Russia, a blend of the limited monarchy of Western Europe and the chaotic aristocracy of Poland. The Council elected to the throne Anna Ivanovna, Duchess of Courland and niece of Peter the Great, and imposed on her a renunciation of the entire royal prerogative. Wisely the Empress accepted her election and signed the requisite articles; ten days after her arrival in Moscow she cancelled the Articles of Mittau and returned without encountering opposition to the traditional absolutism of the Russian monarchy.

Peter II. 1727. 1730. Anna.

Under Anne and her successor, Elizabeth, Russia returned to the roads of her expansion; and although much of the domestic history has not a European value, it is possible to gather from its course the character of the machine which Russian statesmanship drove towards the Black Sea and the Vistula. A feature of the new reign was the excessive prominence of foreigners; Münnich was the most distinguished soldier, Osterman the most active diplomat, and Biren, Anne's favourite,

the most conspicuous figure of the Russian Court, and all were Germans. Government was in the hands of a council, which served merely to conceal the supremacy of Osterman; and although the forward policy which was prosecuted against Turkey and Poland was the logical expression of national aspirations, it possessed for contemporary Russians an almost foreign flavour by reason of the fact that it was inspired by the diplomacy of Osterman and executed by the generalship of Münnich.

Ivan VI.

The brief reign of the infant, Ivan VI, contained nothing more than a violent dispute between the German advisers of the Russian monarchy. Münnich and the Czar's mother, Anna Leopoldovna, ruled as Regents in rapid succession; a declaration of war by Sweden, which was the result of French diplomacy, paralysed Russian intervention in the First Silesian War; and fourteen months after the death of Anne, the Empress Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, continued by a brilliant *coup d'État* the line of Russian empresses. The Germans were expelled, and Bestuzheff, a pupil of Peter the Great, who at the age of nineteen had represented his country at the Congress of Utrecht, became Vice-Chancellor. In the north-west the war against Sweden was vigorously prosecuted; and by the acquisition of a considerable tract of southern Finland the daughter of Peter the Great was able to increase the Baltic outlet, which her father had made. The Russian army was maintained, and the surprising success of Frederick II imposed hostility to the new kingdom as a central principle of her policy. The conclusion between Prussia and England of the alliance, which preceded the Seven Years' War, sufficed to drive Elizabeth into the diplomatic system of Kaunitz, and the military power of Russia became the

1740.

1741.

Elizabeth.

1743.

1756.

most valuable asset of the Franco-Austrian alliance. Whilst her nephew Peter was aping the mannerisms of Frederick and the Prussian drill, Elizabeth's armies, in spite of bad leading and divided counsels, were the most serious factor in Central Europe; their impact sufficed
1758. after a single campaign to check the Prussian offensive and reduced Frederick to a desperate struggle to preserve his own possessions. Governing a country whose resources were the worst organized in Europe, and residing in a court whose sole function appeared to be to provide the Empress with a rapid succession of favourites, Elizabeth was able to make the weight of
1762. Russia felt in the affairs of the Continent; and when
Peter III. on her death her successor in the sole act of his brief reign retired from the war, the withdrawal of Russia precipitated the collapse of the anti-Prussian league and the termination of the Seven Years' War.

§ 2. The Problem of Turkey. In its narrowest form the Eastern Question was created by the existence of Turkey in Europe. The problem presented by that power was of a kind perfectly familiar to Europe, because it was the last of a series which had its origin in the destruction of the Roman frontier. That military barrier, which was drawn from the North Sea to the Black Sea in a line that followed the Rhine and the Danube, had protected by a brilliant combination of geography and fortification Western Europe and the Mediterranean basin. When once it had been forced, the Continent was exposed to a continual series of eastern aggressions, as each convulsion of Asia dislodged a population which moved inevitably westward upon Europe. Franks, Germans, Czechs, and Magyars had each in turn guarded the eastern boundary of European power against a westward offensive. The early history of the Eastern Question is contained in a succession of

efforts made by a western group to defend or to recover ground from an eastern group.

The latest and most lasting of these invasions was provided by the arrival in Eastern Europe of the Turks. Europe, which was busy with the discovery of new worlds, receded before the Turkish offensive and diverted westward the energy which might have made a new crusade. Asia Minor was wholly Turkish, the Black Sea was a Turkish lake, and a steady advance, which absorbed the Balkan Peninsula and the lower and middle valley of the Danube, brought the Turkish power in its last offensive return upon Europe to the gates of Vienna. Turkey in Europe. 1453. 1683.

In face of this destructive and military people, which implanted no new culture, but merely encamped upon the territory which it occupied, two solutions were possible; and at the beginning of the eighteenth century the moment had come when Europe must choose between those solutions. The Peace of Carlowitz had definitely arrested the Turkish advance; that power had now become stationary behind a line traced along the Carpathians and the River Maros. The western powers were at liberty to choose whether they would acquiesce in the continued existence of Turkey behind that frontier, or whether they would proceed to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. Their choice lay between the French and the Russian solutions. 1699.

The French solution, which had its apparent origin in the alliance of Francis I and Solyman the Magnificent against the Hapsburg power of Charles V, was founded in reality upon an appreciation of the value of the Levantine trade. The Franco-Turkish alliance did not aim at the destruction of the eastern defences of Christendom by a combination of the Grand Turk and the Most Christian King, but beneath the apparent i. The French solution.

cynicism of its diplomacy it presented a logical solution of the Turkish problem. Encouraged by the friendship of a western power, the Turkish Government made valuable concessions to European commerce; sheltered behind the traditional union of France and Turkey and privileged by the Capitulations of 1604 and 1673, a host of European merchants, consuls, and missionaries descended upon the Turkish coast from Alexandria to the Sea of Azoff. The French ambassador at Constantinople became the governor of an elaborate system of European colonies on Turkish territory and directed the progress of the French solution. That solution aimed first at the consolidation of the Turkish power by the development of external commerce and internal reforms, then at the civilization of Turkey by the influence of the privileged foreign residents. The Turkish advance was to be arrested by the systematic location of French consuls and commercial colonies in the heart of Turkey, as the movement of a sand-dune is checked by the regular implantation of trees. Thus the action of Louis XIV, when he returned to the Turkish policy of Francis I, was less cynical than a mere search for a Levantine ally and more statesmanlike than a bare exploitation of the Levantine trade.

ii. The Russian solution.

The other solution, which was presented to the choice of Europe, was the policy of expulsion. This alternative, which is consistent with the crusading tradition of the Continent, commended itself naturally to those states which were adjacent to Turkey; the constant menace of the Turkish armies imposed upon the powers of Eastern Europe a solution by which the Turk was to be definitely expelled into Asia. The execution of this solution lay at first with Poland and Austria, but on the collapse of the Polish power and the failure of the Austrian advance

it was inherited by Russia. Three causes in the eighteenth century imposed upon that power the policy of Turkish expulsion, with which it later became entirely identified. First, the natural expansion of Russia towards the Black Sea, encroaching inevitably upon the Turkish possessions of Crimea, Bessarabia, and Moldavia, brought the two powers into hostile contact. Second, in the decline of Poland Russia absorbed the interests and responsibilities of that power, and the tradition of John Sobieski, who had saved Vienna from the Turks, was transferred from Warsaw to St. Petersburg. Third, the religious temper of the Russian people was well suited for the conduct of a Greek crusade having for its object the recovery of Constantinople. But before the execution of this policy was transferred to Russia, the Austrian advance had reached the limits of its progress.

iii. The Austrian advance.

The settlement of Carlowitz had restored to Austria the Hungarian plain and the region of Transylvania; a natural frontier, which was formed by the Carpathians and the course of the Danube from Belgrade to Orsova, had been reconstituted with the single exception of the Banat of Temesvar. An irrational compromise preserved that region to Turkey, and by the course of the River Maros provided the Ottoman armies with a convenient salient into Hungarian territory. It was clear that the settlement could not be final, and by the organization of the Military Frontier from the Iron Gates of Orsova to the Bosnian hills Prince Eugène prepared for a resumption of the conflict.

1699. Treaty of Carlowitz.

At this point the fatal distraction of Austrian interests, which explains the failure of the Danubian effort, became strikingly apparent. It had been the ambition of Prince Eugène to convert his country into a Danubian power, and by a concentration of effort his purpose might have

been achieved. But the interests of Austria were Rhenish as well as Danubian, and the Low Countries now proved a more attractive theatre of war than the
1716. Banat. When Prince Eugène returned from the War of the Spanish Succession, he proceeded immediately to clear the Danube valley; Peterwardein was forced and
1718. Belgrade was captured. In the Treaty of Passarowitz
Treaty of Passarowitz. the Turkish Government conceded a revised frontier, which marks the farthest limit of the Austrian advance. Its trace followed the watershed of the Carpathians as far south as the Rothenthurm Pass, joined the Danube by the line of the River Aluta, and provided an additional protection on the south of the Danube by transferring to Austria almost the whole territory of Servia.

The eastward trend of Austrian expansion, which had been so brilliantly expressed by Prince Eugène, was now violently checked. The interest of Charles VI was distracted far from the Danube by the affair of the Ostend Company and the hunt for European guarantees
1736. of the Pragmatic Sanction; and when Austria, as mediator in a Russo-Turkish dispute, demanded a further increase of territory in the Balkan Peninsula and sent an army
1737. across the Turkish frontier against the fortress of Nisch, Austrian policy had outrun the capacity of Austrian resources. In the war which ensued, the Turkish troops, trained and led by French officers, swept the Austrians out of Bosnia and northern Bulgaria, which they had invaded. The directors of Austrian policy, who had demanded by their ultimatum the fortresses which control the region of Bosnia, were to see their frontier recede behind the line of 1718 almost to the limits of
1738. 1699. In an offensive campaign the Turks moved westwards up the Danube and forced the position of Orsova. The territory which had been surrendered by the

Treaty of Passarowitz was reoccupied, and Belgrade was besieged. Before the siege ended, Austrian diplomacy realized its fatal error; concessions were hastily made, and by the Treaty of Belgrade the Austrian advance was finally checked. The Turkish frontier became the line of the Carpathians from Bukovina to the Danube at Orsova, the line of the Danube from Orsova to Belgrade, and the line of the Save from Belgrade to Croatia. The fortifications of Belgrade, which had been the chief military achievement of the reign of Charles VI, were destroyed by the Austrian engineers; and Turkey resumed in Servia, Wallachia, and Bosnia the position of which the effort of Prince Eugène had almost deprived her. The Austrian advance was arrested, its power became stationary, and the line of the south-eastern frontier of 1739 was retained almost unaltered for a century and a half.

1739. Treaty of Belgrade.

The movement of the Russian advance was more gradual. The intervention of Turkey in the Northern War had induced Peter the Great to sacrifice his southern to his northern ambitions. In the Peace of the Pruth he purchased liberty to pursue the advance of Russia to the Baltic and receded from the Black Sea. He was content to reduce the Russian action in the south to a defensive, and projected the lines of the Ukraine as a protection for his existing southern frontier. This work, a line of fortified positions three hundred miles in length from the Dnieper to the Donetz, formed at once a resting-place of the Russian advance and the base of its future movement.

iv. The Russian advance.

1711. Peace of the Pruth.

The Russian frontier on the accession of Catharine I followed, without touching it at any point, the northern coast of the Black Sea from the Bug to the Caucasus; even the limited outlet of the Sea of Azoff was denied

1725.

to Russia. But no advance was made in the reign of Catharine I or in that of her successor, Peter II. Under
1731. the Empress Anne the Lines of the Ukraine were rapidly constructed, and served as a base for the invading armies of Münnich and Lacy. An alleged violation of
1735. the Russian frontier by Tartar subjects of Turkey served as a pretext for war, and in the first campaign
1736. the Crimea was successfully invaded and the fortress of Azoff was captured. The Austrians joined in the war after a pretence of mediation; and whilst the Turks were
1737. gaining ground on the Danube, a desperate Russian offensive succeeded in capturing the fortress of Ochakoff on the northern coast of the Black Sea. An attack on the lower Danube failed, but Münnich had passed the
1739. Pruth and entered the Moldavian town of Jassy when
Treaty of Constantinople. the diplomatic collapse of Austria in the Treaty of Belgrade left Russia without an ally. The mediation of France was accepted, and by the Treaty of Constantinople Russia returned to the frontier of 1725, with the exception of an insignificant rectification of the Ukraine frontier and the port and region of Azoff. That town, under the guise of neutralization, was transferred to Russia; but clauses of the treaty by which Turkey retained the right to fortify the banks of the Don above Azoff, whilst the defences of Azoff were demolished, rendered the new position extremely precarious. The present extent of the Russian outlet on the Black Sea was an open town on a Turkish lake.

v. The French victory. The settlement contained in the Treaties of Belgrade and Constantinople constituted a serious check to the crusading solution of the Turkish problem. In the last war Russia and Austria had each attempted to expel the Turkish power from Europe, and whilst one crusader had gained a treaty port, the other had lost three

provinces. It was a triumph of the French solution, and French diplomacy, which had been active throughout the war in the construction of a Turco-Swedish alliance, and in the settlement which ended it, received its reward in the new Capitulations. The military training of Bonneval and the mediation of Villeneuve and Fleury were repaid by the renewal in an extended form of the commercial privileges of French merchants. The settlement of 1740 was the greatest French victory of the eighteenth century, and it is significant of its barrenness that by it not an inch was added to French territory and not a subject to the French monarchy. Such triumphs might satisfy the languid diplomacy of Louis XV, but they were strangely outclassed in a century which saw the growth of Russia, the rise of Prussia, and the expansion of England. 1740.

§ 3. The Problem of Poland.

An easier field for the exercise of Russian energies was provided by the Republic of Poland. That state, which occupied an ill-concentrated territory between the frontiers of Russia and Prussia, was condemned by circumstances to an early and irremediable decadence. Its government was in the hands of a picturesque but irresponsible nobility, who completed a disjointed edifice by the crowning absurdity of the *liberum veto*; this supreme effort of individualist theory enabled a single voter to defeat any proposal and made unanimity a condition of progress. In place of a system of imperative statutes, law was embodied in a series of bilateral contracts between state and subject, called *pacta conventa*. It is not surprising that the anarchy of Polish government had become proverbial as early as the seventeenth century.

Factors: 1. *Liberum veto.*

2. *Pacta conventa.*

The development of a national unit was not assisted by the geographical structure of Poland. Containing

3. Polish geography.

the alien *enclave* of East Prussia and divided naturally into three distinct regions, the territory of Poland was ill fitted to inspire its populations with a national spirit. Its southern region formed the *glacis* of the Carpathians and was structurally the complement of northern Hungary, its eastern region formed part of the North German sea-plain, and its eastern or Lithuanian territory was continuous with the structure of western Russia. It was clear that the distributive conformation of Poland hindered national cohesion, and that its artificial frontiers could not for long protect national existence.

Against these factors of division the developments of Polish history had provided no counterbalancing force.

4. Elective monarchy. Its monarchy, which might by a rigid succession have engendered a national tradition, was elective, and its

5. Aristocracy. aristocracy of Catholic crusaders was unaffected by any sentiment of nationality. Poland had no infantry and worse than no Constitution, but, above all, it had no geographical unity.

The collapse of Poland was precipitated by the

1697. Northern War. Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, who had become King of Poland at the expense of a French

1700. prince, involved his adoptive country in war with Sweden for no better object than to obtain a pretext for quartering his troops in Poland; the conquest of Livonia provided an incidental and superfluous attraction. The assistance of Russia was procured, and the Russian defeat at Narva exposed Poland to a degradation which followed it through the century. The Republic was occupied as a Swedish province and a nominee of Charles XII was imposed as king. The lesson was not lost on the directors of Russian policy.

1733. On the death of the Elector of Saxony Russia intervened actively in the royal election; it was convenient

for the expansion of Russia that the centre of Polish policy should be transferred from Warsaw to Dresden, and the Empress Anne moved twenty-eight regiments to the Polish frontier in support of the candidature of Augustus III, Elector of Saxony. Stanislas Leszczynski, the father-in-law of Louis XV, was elected by the Polish Diet, whilst a Russian army imposed Augustus III upon a factious minority. The Russians crossed Poland to the Vistula, and Stanislas was besieged in Danzig. French diplomacy endeavoured in vain to alarm Sweden 1734.
and Turkey against the Russian advance, but the war became general and the European complication engaged France against Austria in Italy and on the Rhine. In the result Russia was left alone with Poland, and to maintain this situation became the constant object of Russian policy. Danzig fell, and the Polish effort was reduced to a cavalry foray in the Ukraine and a manifesto of Stanislas, now an exile on Prussian territory. Stanislas 1736.
abdicated, Augustus III was successfully imposed, and Poland ceded to Russia the suzerainty of Courland, of which Russia had long been in effective occupation, as the intangible but significant first-fruits of the partition of Poland.

Russian influence was now supreme in the Republic. The government of Augustus III encouraged by its passivity the new development: Poland became an apathetic protectorate of the Russian monarchy, and Russia skilfully employed the differences of the western powers as pretexts for the extension of her own power. The march of Russian troops to take part in the final campaign of the War of the Austrian Succession was 1748.
made the excuse for an occupation of Poland, and the first act of Russia in the Seven Years' War was to invade 1751.
the Republic, ravage its territory with Cossack raids,

and organize a systematic occupation of Poland. The languid co-operation of Apraxin in the general war contrasted boldly with the activity displayed by Russian enterprise in Poland, the occupation of which provided a national objective. Frederick was enabled to confront France and Austria with complete success; and it was not until the victories of Rossbach and Leuthen had impressed Russian opinion with the menace of the rising power of Prussia that the Russian armies attempted
1758. a serious intervention in Central Europe. It now became necessary to substitute the defeat of Prussia for the subjection of Poland as an object of Russian activity, and the absorbing interest of the campaigns which followed arrested the prosecution of the Polish project. Charles XII. in the Northern War, had demonstrated that Poland could be successfully occupied, and that its occupation by a hostile power constituted a menace to western Russia. The course of Russian policy showed that the lesson had been thoroughly learned; Russian influence was extended over Poland by the exercise of pressure in the royal election and by a military occupation; and Russian suspicion of the rising power of Prussia was actuated mainly by a fear that Prussia might be substituted for Sweden as a hostile tenant of the Republic. The advance of Russia towards the Vistula became a pronounced and constant tendency of Russian policy.

§ 4. The Reign of Catharine II.

The reign of Peter III. was terminated by a military rising headed by his wife. A spectacular *coup d'État*, which appeared to western observers to complete the series of Muscovite palace revolutions and to portend the return of Russia to barbarous insignificance, marked the beginning of a reign which added 200,000 square miles to the territory and 7,000,000 souls to the subjects

of the Russian monarchy. Catharine II, who as Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst had married the nephew of the Empress Elizabeth, was the last and greatest of the Russian empresses: a German, she contrived to identify herself with the national ambitions of Russia, and a woman, she yet merited the masculine title of *Catherine le Grand*.

On her husband's accession Catharine was faced with a prospect of divorce in favour of his mistress, and the removal of the Czar became the only solution of her problem. Skilfully she united the interests which the ill-considered reforms of Peter were alienating. His attempt to impose the Prussian drill upon the Guards added those invaluable Praetorians to her faction, and when she presented herself in their barracks, the effect was immediate. Catharine was proclaimed Autocrat, and the Guards marched on Peterhof. Peter abdicated and was murdered within ten days of his retirement; the murderers were not punished: directness of purpose was the mark of the reign, as well in its beginning as in its later policy.

1762. The *coup d'État*.

A singular feature of the reign of Catharine II was the character of her collaborators. The remarkable body of men, who directed for more than a quarter of a century the successful course of Russian war and policy, was divided into those who were merely the ministers of the Empress and those who were also her lovers. In the first class the most distinguished was the diplomatist Panin, in the second the most conspicuous were the gigantic brothers Orloff and the victorious Potemkin, whilst their numerous successors wielded an influence that was too often disproportionate to their abilities.

The favourites.

The Empress hersolf, like all intellectuals of the eighteenth century, was strongly impressed with French influences: like Frederick the Great, she corresponded

The Empress as *philosophe*.

with Voltaire; Buffon received furs from her, and Diderot a library. She was a prolific journalist, and composed or translated a considerable body of historical and political writings. As an historian she made herself responsible for a remarkable theory that Europe had originally a Slav population, and as a dramatist she wrote tragedies, comedies, and even comic opera for the Russian stage.

The Legislative Commission. 1767.

At first it appeared as though the philosophic liberalism of the Empress might transform the Russian autocracy. A Legislative Commission, consisting of 564 elected members, was summoned to Moscow; medals were distributed to the deputies bearing the words, 'the happiness of each and all,' a singularly Benthamite superscription for the image of a Russian empress, and Catharine herself composed a highly progressive Instruction for the guidance of the new assembly. Its deliberations were seriously interrupted by the outbreak of war against Turkey, and the Commission was prorogued to survive only in the form of a few committees. These were apparently forgotten by the Empress, who had so freely quoted Montesquieu for their benefit, and Russia was undisturbed by any premature experiment in constitutionalism. Her organization of the empire into forty-four civil governments increased the efficiency of the monarchy, whilst the institution of provincial Estates on the German model of the Baltic provinces and the construction of a municipal system did nothing to transfer actual control from the central government and its officials.

1768.

Local government. 1775.

1785.

The serfs.

The support of an aristocracy was too necessary to Catharine to permit her to abolish Russian serfdom; the system of forced agricultural labour survived her reign, which even saw its extension to Little Russia; 5,000

strokes remained the penalty for burglarious entry by a serf, and the innumerable grants of land and souls made to her favourites vastly increased the total number of unfree labourers. The reign of Catharine II was far more efficient than liberal; and when the Empress died, 1796. seven years after the fall of the Bastille, the mediaevalism of Russian society was the greatest anomaly in Europe. It was an anomaly which she had made little effort to remove.

§ 5. The First Partition of Poland.

On the accession of Catharine II Russia was allied by the act of her husband to Prussia. The Empress dissolved the alliance, but retained the peace, and the Seven Years' War was brought to an end, leaving Prussia firmly established as a power of European significance. Seven months after the Peace of Hubertsburg Augustus III, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, died at Dresden, and the Polish question was once more set for solution. The exclusion of an Austrian candidate from the throne of Warsaw provided Frederick and Catharine with a common interest. When it became clear in St. Petersburg that the new king must not be an enemy of Russian influence, and in Berlin that he must not use Poland as a hostile position outflanking Prussia in the interests of French or Austrian strategy, the interests of Russia and Prussia coalesced. Frederick and Catharine united in the desire to impose on Poland an innocuous king. A treaty was concluded by which 1764. Frederick agreed to concentrate a Prussian army on the Polish frontier; and in the familiar atmosphere of Russian coercion, at the dictation of the Russian ambassador, the Polish Diet elected Stanislas Poniatowski.

Phase i. The Election. 1763.

Stanislas Poniatowski.

The new king, a patriotic Pole, was not disposed to take the attitude of complete inaction which had satisfied the electors of Saxony. Thirty years too late

he attempted the reformation of Poland. The *liberum veto* was to be abolished, a national system of finance established, and the army organized on Prussian lines. The programme scandalized his Russian and Prussian supporters; the revival of Poland by a return to stable conditions was not convenient to its acquisitive neighbours. The waters, in which Prussia hoped to fish, must be troubled, and the fruit, for whose fall Russia had waited so long, must be rotten-ripe.

Frederick and Catharine now united to impose upon Poland a *condominium* of anarchy; a reformed Poland could not be easily partitioned, and the *liberum veto* afforded an invaluable opening for foreign intervention.

1766. Confederation of Radom. Conservative opposition was organized in the Confederation of Radom, and Frederick protested against any amendment of the constitution. The Russian ambassador prohibited the reform movement, and the Polish reactionaries were supported by Russian troops. Warsaw was occupied by a Russian army, and under the encouraging influence of the foreign garrison the Polish Diet abolished the reforms and voted a perpetual alliance with Russia, receiving in return a guarantee of the unreformed constitution.

1768.

Phase ii. The War. To this first phase of diplomatic action, in which troops had been employed only to emphasize the points of Russian diplomacy, there succeeded a period of actual war. French policy, which had been unable to arrest the Russo-Prussian advance, was now able to oppose to it the material obstacles of Polish resistance and a Turkish war. Polish patriots, who had been startled by the movement of reform, were scandalized by a constitution, however orthodox, when it was imposed by Russian bayonets. The Confederation of Bar rose from 300 men to 8,000, and in a few weeks the

Confederation of Bar.

Russians were confronted by a national effort. The Russian ambassador was almost carried off in Warsaw, where he had ruled as in a capital, French officers directed Polish bands, and the subservience of Stanislas and his Diet was apparently disowned by an entire people. Methodically the Russians approached the problem of suppression. An Orthodox crusade was thrown into Ukraine, Bar was besieged and stormed, and Cracow was recovered from the confederates. The Polish national effort was confronted with the irresistible impact of Russia, and its eventual annihilation was only briefly postponed by the intervention of Turkey.

Turkish War.

It was the obvious resource of French policy to throw Turkey on the Russian flank; Turkey, Poland, and Sweden had composed the traditional combination which French diplomacy opposed to Russian expansion. Russia had paralysed Sweden and was subduing Poland, when for the last time a French minister pressed Turkey into war in order to preserve the balance of Eastern Europe. Choiseul's work was completed by a Russian colonel, who in the course of a confused pursuit violated Turkish territory at Balta. In the war which followed the Turkish forces failed to create more than a slight diversion in favour of Poland. The series of Russian victories in the Turkish War was even more discouraging to the confederates than the dwindling numbers of the Polish bands. The certainty of their eventual defeat robbed the operations in Poland of all significance, and the scattered national resistance became merely heroic. Less than 20,000 Poles were under arms, French officers flitted about Poland in disguise, and a picturesque but unsuccessful attempt to kidnap the King diversified the series of sieges and surrenders. When the final capitulations were signed, the effort to save the Republic

1769.

1771.

1772.

by armed force had long failed. The fate of Poland had been decided by the less disinterested tribunal of European diplomacy.

Phase iii. The Triple Alliance.

The idea of a partition of Poland came with nothing of a shock to the powers of Eastern and Central Europe. It had been suggested by Charles X of Sweden to the Great Elector a century earlier, it had been contemplated three times during the Northern War, and on two occasions the Saxon King of Poland had himself discussed a partition of his own dominions. Partition did not form part of the Russian programme, which aimed more simply at the complete absorption of Poland. It was the business of Prussian diplomacy to reduce the Russian demands.

The successful advance of Russia in the Turkish War had alarmed the Government of Austria; that power saw its eastern expansion definitely arrested and its position on the Danube turned by the establishment of Russia in the Danubian Principalities. It therefore became the aim of Austrian policy to provide Russia with compensations for a withdrawal from the mouth of the Danube. Frederick employed Austrian alarm as a counterpoise to the Russian successes. Austrian troops
1770. occupied the Polish territory of Zips; and in the same month Frederick, after mobilizing an army on his eastern frontier, suggested a project of partition to the Russian ambassador, attributing it quaintly to a Danish diplomat. The Turkish War continued, and Frederick deftly reduced Slav ambitions by a display of Germanic unity. Two interviews between Frederick and Joseph II at Neisse and Neustadt sufficed to confront Catharine with the spectre of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern una-
1771. nimity. Kaunitz threatened Russia with an Austro-Turkish alliance, and the principle of partition was

accepted. Austria had averted the danger of a Russian Moldavia, Prussia had gained a considerable territory, and Russia had surrendered the fruits of a successful war in exchange for the cession of a province, where she had hoped to inherit a kingdom.

By the First Partition Treaty Poland lost one-third of its territory and population. The Prussian annexation of the lower Vistula, except Thorn and Danzig, gave a logical continuity to Prussian territory between Königsberg and Berlin; Russia advanced to the line of the Dwina and the Dnieper; and Austria moved into East Galicia. The settlement need not have been fatal to the existence of Poland, although it left an illogical salient protruding into Prussian territory as a stimulus to further Prussian ambitions. But the circumstances of the partition were unpromising for the future; an aggressive combination of three powers had imposed a series of cessions upon a European state. It was an obvious corollary that the reconstitution of the league might be followed in the future by similar and more satisfying acquisitions in the same quarter.

1772. Partition Treaty.

§ 6. The War of Kutchuk-Kainardji.

The Turkish War was a consequence of the situation in Poland, and in it Catharine II gave to Russian arms the greatest task on whch they had yet embarked. It had been customary in earlier campaigns to concentrate on an attack on the lines of Perekop, which protected the Crimea; under Catharine the theatre of war extended from Podolia to the Caucasus, and in the first campaign a defensive line 800 miles long was held by five Russian armies. In the following year the advance began, and the Russian armies moved forward from the Dniester to the Pruth, and from the Pruth to the Danube. The Russians occupied the Principalities outside the walls of the Turkish fortresses, and a government was

1769.

1770.

organized at Jassy and Bucharest. In the same year, by a piece of boldly conceived strategy, the Russian fleet left the Baltic, passed Dover and Gibraltar, and entered the Levant. A Greek rising in the Russian interest was disappointing in its results and ended in the vindictive return of Turkish government. But the fleet, commanded by Alexis Orloff, defeated the Turks off Scio
1771. and destroyed their naval forces at Tchesmé.

The Crimea was attacked and conquered, and whilst Turkey negotiated for peace and Austria was alarmed into alternate threats of war and offers of compensation
1773. in Poland, the Russians proceeded to reduce the Turkish fortresses of Bulgaria. The acquiescence of Catharine II in the Austrian demand that Russia should retire from the Principalities in exchange for a share of Poland made further conquests from Turkey useless.

1774. In the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji the Turkish Government granted in seven hours the largest concessions which it had ever made. By the terms of that treaty the Russian advance to the Black Sea made material progress. The annexation of Azoff, Kertch, and Yenikale secured for Russia control of the Sea of Azoff; the annexation of Kinburn and the neighbouring littoral gave a commanding position on the western Euxine; and the separation of the Crimean Tartars from Turkish suzerainty promised their eventual subjection to Russia and the resulting control of the Black Sea from that central position. The Black Sea itself was opened to Russian navigation, and the annexation of Kuban carried the Russian frontier towards the western Caucasus.

Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji.

1. Black Sea.

2. Turkey. The second portion of the settlement opened a way for Russia into the remaining dominions of Turkey. Russian consuls were admitted to Turkish towns, and

Russian subjects were granted the free exercise of their religion and access to the holy places of Palestine. The generous interpretation of two ambiguous clauses even pointed to the creation of a frequent right of intervention in Turkish affairs by the apparent grant of a Russian protectorate over the Orthodox subjects of the Porte.

The Compensations:

This triumph of the Russian solution was followed by a demand of Russia's partners for compensation; Austria annexed the Turkish region of Bukovina, which extended her trans-Carpathian territory towards the upper waters of the Pruth, and Prussia, by a rectification of the Polish frontier, added two hundred villages to her dominions.

1. Bukovina.

2. Polish frontier.

The central problem of the Eastern Question was the expansion of Russia. In the contact of that expansion with Turkey the Turkish power had begun to recede, and the French solution of the Turkish problem had been definitely rejected. In its contact with Poland it had been less successful; the Russian solution of annexation had been rejected in favour of the Austro-Prussian solution of partition. The Germans, in order to impose their solution of the Polish problem, had brought the Russians into Central Europe; it was a grave responsibility.



CHAPTER V

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

§ 1. The French Monarchy. § 2. The English Monarchy. § 3. The Colonial Problem. § 4. The War of Independence. § 5. The Peace of Versailles.

§ 1. The French Monarchy.

THE reign of Louis XV corresponds in its course with a steady decline of French influence. The power which, under Louis XIV, had founded upon military preponderance the control of European affairs was reduced under his successor to acquiescence in the rise of Prussia and the substantial cession to Great Britain of its transmarine empire. The causes of this collapse were not confined to the greater strength of the English and Prussian efforts, but they lay to a considerable extent in the condition and government of France itself.

Louis XV.

The king, whose government succeeded that of the Regency, was in every way unequal to the strain imposed upon the monarch by the centralized system of Louis XIV; he was an admirable dancer. As a child he had known neither his father nor his mother. Servants became his habitual companions, and although his education was conducted by a bishop and a duke, he mastered little beyond the science of etiquette. A distinguished appearance procured his popularity, but the crowds that acclaimed *Louis le Bien-aimé* were unfamiliar with his bitter tongue and his furtive temper.

i. The Ministries. French policy.

The breakdown of French policy was due to a series of clear causes. It attempted upon a facile misconstruction of the tradition of Richelieu to effect an impossible blend of European and colonial ambitions. It

failed to follow in the conduct of European affairs such a consistent tradition of aims and methods as that which unified the developments of Russian policy. It was put into execution by a series of feeble and changing ministries; and those ministries were impeded in such efforts as they made by the constant presence of a secret policy of the king himself. To these results the character of Louis XV largely contributed. His furtive temper, which riddled the palace of Versailles with secret staircases, reduced the king to the position of an intriguer in his own court. His ministries were short-lived, because he enjoyed nothing better than the subterranean operation of undermining them; and their policy was ineffective, because his ineradicable taste for secret policies and private diplomacy confronted every minister with the *Secret du roi*. Every court in Europe was bewildered by the spectacle of an official and an unofficial diplomacy of France.

To the patriotic policy of Cardinal Fleury Louis opposed a subterranean system elaborated by Chauvelin and Belleisle. Against Fleury's wise limitation of hostilities to an area which might be profitable to France the king manipulated an intrigue by the Duc de Noailles to carry the war into Flanders, because a veteran of the wars of Louis XIV was anxious to return to battlefields with which he was familiar. The king's mistress was eager to see him in the character of a conqueror, and he set out to receive the easy capitulations of Dutch fortresses in order to strike an attitude before Madame de Châteauroux. French policy now passed under the brilliant but uncertain control of D'Argenson; his projects of German and Italian unity have an interest as anticipations of the European aims of the Revolution, but he failed completely to solve the problems of

1740. Intrigue against Fleury. 1742. 1745.

his own time. The *Secret du roi* turned against him the familiar instrument of the Duc de Noailles, and he was
1747. succeeded by Puysieux, who had no idea except hostility to Austria. The colonies were controlled by Machault,
1752. who abandoned Dupleix because he preferred commerce to conquest.

The Polish obsession. The most fatal contribution made to French policy by the king was the obsession of Poland. It had its origin in the family ambitions of the Conti; and when once Louis XV had endorsed their designs on the Polish throne, this obsession was permitted to distract French policy at every moment of importance. When the result of the colonial duel with Great Britain
1746. demanded a concentration of effort, Louis XV involved his country with the insignificant affairs of a remote and chaotic state; and when the result of the Seven Years' War might have been reversed by the detach-
1760. ment of Russia, Louis XV declined to repurchase Canada and India with the sacrifice of Poland. The effort of Choiseul, when it came, was made too late. France was in a decline, and the chief cause of its ruin was the *Secret du roi*.

ii. The Mistresses. Louis XV humiliated his country because he weakened its ministers. He degraded the monarchy because he neglected his queen. It was the result of his education that, although he acquired the inevitable good manners of his century, his morals went the way of his industry. The queen, Marie Leszczynska, retained his affection for eleven years; for the remaining thirty-eight her place was occupied by a rapid succession of women of
1736. varying worth. For nine years he was under the influence of three sisters. Madame de Mailly, Madame de Vintimille, and Madame de Châteauroux were at least members of the nobility, and their influence was

not notably bad. The king's affections then strayed to the Marquise de Pompadour, a woman of the middle class, whose name was Poisson. For twenty years she reigned as queen. Kaunitz, through his envoy, negotiated the Treaty of Versailles with her subordinate, Bernis, Maria Theresa condescended to communicate with her, and she succeeded in imposing Choiseul upon the king. Whilst she spent vast sums on elaborate entertainment and ornamental architecture, it is her foremost merit that she kept the king amused and left Choiseul free. When she died, the king was grieved. It was raining when her funeral left Versailles, and he observed frigidly: 'Madame will have wretched weather for her drive.'

1745. Pompadour.

Pompadour was succeeded by du Barry, a woman of no recorded antecedents, who avoided politics. Her execution in the Revolution has made her a symbol of the decadent monarchy; but her influence was merely social, and she did less harm than many of her competitors. The mistresses of Louis XV, by their reign at Versailles, degraded the French monarchy. Patronage lay in their hands, policy depended upon their approval of the minister, and they sold royal audiences in open market. The degradation of their reign was reflected in the simultaneous decline of France. They were not the cause of that decline, but it was exactly coincident with their domination. By the system of Louis XIV the government of France had been concentrated in Versailles. If that centre was touched with decadence, it followed irresistibly that French diplomacy was ineffective on the Vistula and French armies unsuccessful on the St. Lawrence.

1768. du Barry.

§ 2. The English Monarchy.

The middle years of the eighteenth century were pre-eminently the time of the European monarchies. The

chief factor in each country was a single ruler. Prussia had been raised to power and preserved from destruction by the system of Frederick II, France had been betrayed into unwisdom and bewildered into defeat by the system of Louis XV; Austrian policy depended on the predilections of Maria Theresa, and Russian expansion awaited the impulsion of Catharine II. It was not surprising that even in England, where monarchy had been in eclipse since the deportation of James II, that institution underwent something of a revival. At a time when France was overshadowed by Versailles and Prussia was epitomized in Potsdam, it was inevitable that a ruler of spirit should reassert the position of St. James's.

George III. The ideal of George III was not a mean one. Bolingbroke's project of a Patriot King commended itself to him by reason of his absolutist education. It involved the complete destruction of the existing system of English party politics and the substitution of an absolute monarchy on the continental model. As the institution of Parliament unfortunately subsisted, its part was altered in the new programme into one of complete acquiescence in every act of the monarch, which was to be expressed by a party of men as patriotic in principle as himself. The Whig party, which had made the Revolution of 1688, had monopolized power since the accession of George I. That king and his successor were excluded from interference by a total ignorance of English language and institutions. Politics had become the preserve of the great houses; 'connexion' was as vicious under Walpole and the Pelhams as 'prerogative' had been a century before; and the Duke of Newcastle had substituted for the government of a king the presidency of a Whig magnate. There was room for

hope that a monarchical revival would cement the cleavage of party, unite the nation in patriotism, and end the unpleasant story of parliamentary corruption. In reality it led merely by a more ignoble road to the fall of Pitt and the creation of the King's Friends.

The sacrifice of Pitt was an incident in the king's attack on the Whig government, and it was an ironical consequence that the minister, whose aim had been to sink party in patriotism, went down before an attack on the party system. Bute, who had educated the king in the principles of Bolingbroke, was inserted in the Cabinet as Secretary of State, and his introduction to Newcastle by George III was significant of the altered situation of the ministry: 'My Lord Bute is your very good friend, and will tell you my thoughts at large.' The Scottish peer who was thus imposed on the Whigs was a man of no conspicuous inability. He had varied his career as the king's tutor with an intimacy with his widowed mother and the amiable accomplishment of amateur acting; he possessed an admirable leg and was fitted, in the words of his first master, 'to be envoy at some small proud German court, where there is nothing to do.' He was directed instead to the improvisation of a patriot government. 1761. Bute.

Newcastle was ejected from office by the persistent rudeness of the king, and Bute became Prime Minister. His chief attraction was enhanced by the ornament of the Garter, and the king was at liberty to choose his ministers. Voting power was organized by the methods of purchase, which both parties had learned from William III, and purity of government faded from the new programme before the frank venality of the King's Friends. The Government conducted without enthusiasm the remainder of a war which it had 1762.

inherited from Pitt; it acquiesced in the victories over Spain, which were rightly regarded as part of the same
1763. legacy, and concluded the Peace of Paris within ten months of its accession to office. Eight weeks later Bute's nerve collapsed before his insuperable unpopularity and the growing violence of English crowds. He was driven from office by suspicion of his friendship with the Princess of Wales and the national dislike of Scotchmen, and his resignation confronted George III with the unattractive prospect of a return of the Whigs.

For an interval of seven years a series of Whig ministers interrupted the Hanoverian experiment in absolutism. From the fall of Bute to the rise of North the development of the king's system was arrested, and in its place the Whig groups maintained a precarious position against the secret attacks of the monarch and
Grenville. the growing dislike of the country. The first ministry was formed by George Grenville, Pitt's brother-in-law and an angular and unsympathetic person. His main idea was retrenchment; he had left Pitt on the question of military expenditure, and a project for relieving the British taxpayer by taxing the American colonies appealed to his unimaginative and parsimonious mind. In home politics his government was chiefly memorable
Wilkes. for the affair of John Wilkes. No. 45 of this man's newspaper, *The North Briton*, criticized the King's Speech, and a general warrant was issued for the arrest of the author and publishers of the libel and the seizure of the paper. The Courts protected Wilkes's privilege of immunity from arrest as a member of the House of Commons, and two years later general warrants were
1764. held to be illegal. Wilkes, whose career was conspicuously disreputable, even for his time, was expelled from the House and successfully charged with a libel

on the king and the authorship of an indecent poem. His litigious career was eagerly followed by the crowd of the London streets; and he became a symbol of the growing turbulence of politics and the increasing unpopularity of George III and his ministers.

Grenville had fortified his government by the easy adhesion of the venal group of Bedford Whigs, but his manners eventually irritated the king into substituting the incorruptible party of the Marquess of Rockingham. Pitt refused to join, and Rockingham took office alone to confront the growing menace of the American problem with no stronger equipment than a blameless reputation. His ministry lasted less than a year, and was followed by the fair promise of a Pitt government. Pitt returned to office in uncertain health; in the Seven Years' War he had been the idol and inspiration of his country, but within three years of its termination his Olympian retirement and the eccentricity of his manners had reduced him to the position of occasional leader to one of the Whig groups. On his acceptance of office the king buried his identity under the title of Earl of Chatham, and the man who ten years earlier had been the master of a nation's resources returned to power under the cloud of an unpopular peerage and the suspicion of an unduly liberal American policy. Chatham's health collapsed before the end of the year, and the Duke of Grafton succeeded him in charge of the ministry. Charles Townshend, who founded upon facility in debate a wholly disproportionate contemporary reputation, manipulated as Chancellor of the Exchequer the problem of colonial taxation until his death. Townshend was followed by Lord North, an excellent dancer, in whom the king saw the natural successor of Lord Bute.

1765. Rockingham.

1766. Chatham.

Grafton.

1767.

1768. The return to politics of Wilkes gave an opportunity for renewed violence in the London streets, which had its counterpart in political journalism in the savage invective of the *Letters of Junius*; and whilst the American dispute was increasing in gravity, public attention was diverted to Wilkes's alternate elections for Middlesex and rejections by the House of Commons. Chatham emerged from a retirement, which Wilkes compared to King Lear's, only to resign office, taking with him Lord Shelburne, his political heir, whose judicious conduct of the problem of rebellious Corsica had averted a war with France. Two years later Grafton fell, and the king resumed the Hanoverian experiment with the installation in office of North.

1770. The ministry which now began lasted for twelve years and represented the complete practice of Bolingbroke's theory.

North. North, an amiable man and a clever debater, acted throughout as the king's clerk. George III examined every division-list and directed every appointment; the control of policy, the assessment of bribes, and the dismissal of officers were all alike part of the king's business; and if the erection in England of a Prussian benevolent despotism was followed by unparalleled disasters, much at least of the blame which has been attached to Lord North should be transferred to his royal master. North himself was content to sleep on the Treasury Bench between his Attorney and Solicitor-General, whilst the American empire of Great Britain fell in ruins.

§ 3. The Colonial Problem. The colonial problem, in the acute form in which it was finally presented for solution, was the product equally of English theories and the course of events.

Factors: i. Old Colonial System. The Old Colonial System, upon which the empire was founded, frankly made colonies in order to exploit

them. Both George III and the vast majority of his subjects agreed profoundly with the language of Bolingbroke, when he wrote that colonies were 'like so many farms of the mother country'. It was a theory which might well bring Englishmen and colonials into conflict.

ii. Self-sufficing Empire.

Through the first half of the century a second imperial theory had come into existence; during the great transition of the colonies from private ownership to Crown control English thought had evolved gradually, but quite definitely, the ideal of a self-sufficing empire. Upon this system colonial goods were forced into the English market, and colonial ports were closed to all but English ships. Twenty-four colonial industries were supported by bounties, and in return the American producer, when he competed with British industry, was ruthlessly suppressed. The Navigation Acts imposed a preference for British shipping, and English restrictions had enabled the French to drive the colonists out of the neutral Spanish markets. Such a policy, which aimed consistently at a self-sufficing empire, was liable to grave misconstruction. British naval supremacy, which was the object of the Navigation Acts, was as essential to Virginia as it was to Kent; but to the colonial temper, which was growing increasingly suspicious of English exploitation, it appeared only to benefit the commerce of the home country. It is the peril of a policy of economic reciprocity that each party will forget the benefits which it may receive, in the sacrifices which it is required to make. In the Old Colonial System it had been the object of British statesmanship to construct a self-sufficing empire; it produced merely a colonial rebellion.

The unfortunate growth of this temper of suspicion was not unassisted by circumstances. At the close of 1763.

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the Seven Years' War Englishmen were confronted with a singularly irritating spectacle of colonial parsimony. A war, whose significance was almost wholly colonial, had imposed upon Great Britain a burden of taxation, whose incidence was entirely domestic. The colonies, which a pamphleteer had urged so early as 1757 to 'pay those who fought their battles', contributed nothing towards the cost of imperial defence, which amounted to £3,000,000 annually. A half-hearted attempt to secure colonial co-operation was made in the form of a request for subsidies; this was rejected by the colonial assemblies, and was shortly followed by the disastrous policy of George Grenville.

iii. Policy of Grenville. 1764.

Grenville's policy was in three parts: a commercial policy of strict enforcement of the trade laws, a military policy of establishing permanently in America a portion of the British army, and a fiscal policy of colonial taxation. The three policies were originally due to the prevalence of smuggling in North America; the colonial taxes were to pay for the British soldiers, and the British soldiers were to suppress the colonial smuggler. It is characteristic of Grenville that he lost the American empire in order to stop a gap in the tariff wall.

In themselves his measures were not unjustified; a fiscal system, under which the Government collected £2,000 at an annual cost of £8,000, was in need of some reconstruction; and although the imposition of new duties and the substitution of unsympathetic sailors for more pliable Customs officials considerably reduced the surreptitious trade which had grown up between North America and the colonies of France and Spain, the reforms represented the return to a consistent policy, and even made an exception in favour of the rice trade of the southern colonies. Grenville's plan for a colonial army

of 10,000 men had been terribly justified in the preceding year, when an Indian raid swept western Pennsylvania and Virginia, and was only rolled back in the following year by Amherst's British troops. His final proposal, embodied in the Stamp Act, was to raise £100,000, one-third of the cost of the new American garrison, by a stamp-duty on colonial documents. The subject of colonial taxation was extremely ill-explored; the only precedent was the treatment of the Channel Islands. An American congress protested against this inclusion of the colonies in imperial taxation, a Boston mob destroyed the Stamp Office, and riots were general throughout the colonies. The Stamp Act had done its work, and it is an ironical reflection that the parsimony of Grenville was possibly due to the lavish expenditure of Chatham.

1765. Stamp Act.

The Rockingham Whigs, who succeeded Grenville in office, accepted the eloquent reasoning of Edmund Burke and repealed the Stamp Act; but a Declaratory Act, which recited the perfect right of the home government to tax the colonies, destroyed whatever conciliatory effects the repeal might have had. Such a declaration formed an essential part of the doctrine of the Old Colonial System; central control was closely involved in the ideal of a self-sufficient empire, and this theory was completely accepted by Chatham, who had created the empire. Consistently with this doctrine his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, imposed on America a series of import duties; these were to be charged on a number of domestic articles, including tea, and were expected to produce £40,000. The Assembly of Massachusetts Bay was dissolved for organizing resistance to the taxes, but changed its name and unlawfully prolonged its life; rioting became

1766. Declaratory Act.

1767. Tea Duty.

1768.

continuous, and almost attained the dignity of rebellion, and the resignations of Chatham and Shelburne at the close of the year removed all hope of a liberal
1769. American policy. A number of the import duties were repealed, but that on tea was retained, and the colonists, acting more and more under the influence of a separatist group of colonial lawyers, formed a league for the exclusion of English goods. A street fight in Boston resulted
1770. in the death of three colonists, and resounded loudly
Boston Massacre. under the dignified name of the Boston Massacre; and English opinion interpreted colonial unrest as the violence of deliberate sedition. George III was supported in this view by the vast majority of his subjects, and it was resolved to retain the tea duty as a demonstration of English rights.

A final attempt at conciliation produced the conflict.
1773. Lord North, in an endeavour to combine an advantage to the East India Company with a concession to the Americans, reduced the duty on tea imported from
The tea-ships. India to America from one shilling to threepence. The East Indiamen which took the tea to Boston were boarded by a mob of colonists disguised as Indians,
1774. and the tea was poured into Boston harbour. The Government replied by closing the port of Boston, revising the democratic constitution of Massachussetts, and prohibiting public meetings; a military governor was sent out to impose the new settlement.

These measures of repression served to unite the
First Congress. Americans, and a Continental Congress, attended by delegates from all the colonies except Georgia, met at Philadelphia. Lord North's attempt to localize the discontent in Massachusetts had completely failed. Congress directed a suspension of trade with England until the question of taxation had been settled, whilst

a colonial militia drilled assiduously throughout America. Early in the following year British infantry, engaged in the police duty of seizing arms, were fired on at Lexington outside Boston; and a few days later the fortresses of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which guarded the road into Canada, were surprised by colonials. The British garrison was increased, and a second assembly, known as 'the Congress of the United Colonies', met at Philadelphia. North's proposals and the counter-proposals of Congress proved unacceptable, and the action of Congress in organizing a colonial army showed how far the chances of reconciliation had receded. The new force was raised under the authority of Congress and placed under the command of George Washington, formerly in the English service.

1775. Lexington. Second Congress.

An attempt by the English garrison to secure a necessary extension of the defences of Boston led to the collision known as the Battle of Bunker's Hill, in which the regular infantry dislodged a colonial force from an entrenched position after a series of frontal attacks. Except for the formal declaration, a state of war now existed, and the total failure of an attempt to invade Canada did not discourage Congress from asserting its liberty. The British evacuation of Boston was followed in fourteen weeks by the Declaration of Independence of the United States.

Bunker's Hill. 1776. Declaration of Independence.

§ 4. The War of Independence.

Great Britain was now confronted with the military problem of reducing the American colonies. A hasty attempt to double the strength of the army, which had stood in 1774 at less than 20,000 men, necessitated the inglorious hire-purchase of Hessian infantry; and the government of Lord North opposed to the American Revolution a small but well-drilled army and the all-important factor of British sea-power.

So long as the navy controlled the North Atlantic, the British commanders in America, operating as they were against a sea-coast, retained complete liberty in their selection of a point of attack and in their power to supplement their forces at any point from Massachusetts to South Carolina. The centre of disaffection lay in the democratic and Puritan colonies of New England; this region was enclosed in a triangle formed by the River Hudson, the River St. Lawrence, and the sea. It was the first requirement of British strategy to isolate New England by the occupation of the line of the Hudson. If once the disaffected colonies were held securely between the loyal territory of Canada, the sea, which was in British control, and a military line along the Hudson, their suppression would be an easy task. With this end in view Howe moved into New York, and the utmost efforts of Washington were only able to recover ground for the colonials in New Jersey, outside the triangle of New England.

The line of the Hudson.

1777.

An elaborate plan was now evolved by the English commanders for the occupation of the line of the Hudson. Clinton moved up the river from the sea to meet Burgoyne, who was marching down-stream from Canada. The junction was never effected, although the two forces got to within a hundred miles of each other. Burgoyne was forced to surrender at Saratoga, and Clinton fell back towards New York. Meanwhile Howe had diverted a part of the British forces from the essential struggle for the Hudson in a showy but unprofitable maritime expedition to Chesapeake Bay, which resulted in a defeat of Washington on the Brandywine and the temporary capture of Philadelphia. To all appearances the British arms were approaching an eventual victory; the town where Congress had sat

Saratoga.

was held for George III, and Washington at Valley Forge maintained with difficulty through the winter a dwindling and disorderly army. In reality the greatest opportunity in the war had gone by; if Howe had secured the line of the Hudson in 1777, New England could have been isolated and the American Revolution might have shrunk to a provincial rising. In the first weeks of the following year the French monarchy openly allied itself with the republican government of the United States, and England was compelled to fight for that control of the sea secure tenure of which was the sole road to the reconquest of America. It was a dramatic coincidence that Chatham, whose efforts had built up the empire, fell in the House of Lords and died. 1778.

The French alliance, by which alone England was prevented from recovering the American colonies, was not a surprising development of French policy. The accession of Louis XVI in 1774 closed a reign whose military record had ended at Rossbach; it was accompanied by a notable revival of national confidence. The event, which substituted for the ignoble domination of Madame du Barry a young court headed by the Austrian Queen, gave to French policy the secure and lasting direction of Vergennes. The single desire of Frenchmen was to efface the humiliation of the Peace of Paris in a war of revenge against England. The American War, which added to the motive of hatred of the national enemy a chivalrous sympathy with the weaker belligerent, coincided admirably with that desire. Simultaneously with the Declaration of Independence French aid was unofficially given to the colonists in the form of arms and supplies. Long before Benjamin Franklin landed in France the *salons* had decided that taxation without representation was a scandalous

The French Alliance.

defiance of Montesquieu, and that the Americans were the noble savages of Rousseau. It became fashionable to volunteer for service in America, and Lafayette took twelve French officers to Charleston. The final impulse came from the English surrender at Saratoga. Before that event Franklin was the popular representative of a romantic people; after it he became a desirable ally of the French Government. The temptation which was offered to French policy by the surrender of 3,000 British regulars, was too strong to be resisted; and fourteen days after the arrival in Europe of the news of Saratoga Vergennes consented to an alliance with the Revolution.

The English position, which was only vulnerable at sea, was now confronted with the addition of the fleets of France to the desultory successes in commerce-destroying of the American privateers. A naval engagement fought in the western mouth of the Channel demonstrated the new menace to England, and the departure of a French squadron under d'Estaing for American waters gravely compromised the position of Howe's army. The British withdrew from Philadelphia, and the victorious phase of the war was at an end.

1779. In the following year Spain, hitherto pardonably shy of encouraging rebellious colonists, followed France into the American alliance, and for a time the control of the English Channel passed into the hands of a Franco-Spanish fleet; the British squadrons were too weak to leave their ports, and an army of invasion stood ready at the mouth of the Seine. At this decisive moment England was saved by the weather and the distraction afforded by Spanish insistence on an attack on Gibraltar. D'Estaing occupied his squadron with the desultory

capture of West Indian islands and finally sailed from American waters to Europe, leaving the position of the British army substantially unchanged.

The military effort of Great Britain now turned towards the southern colonies, and Charleston was besieged and captured, whilst Rodney, who had broken the blockade of Gibraltar, protected the British West Indies from Guichen. A British advance up the Hudson, whose success had seemed assured by the treachery of Benedict Arnold, was arrested by the arrival in Rhode Island of a French division under Rochambeau. Clinton was contained in New York by the Americans and French, and found himself wholly unable to move to the assistance of Cornwallis, who was entering Virginia from the south after a successful campaign in the Carolinas. 1780.

In European waters French diplomacy had erected against Great Britain the menacing edifice of the Armed Neutrality. The Baltic powers, headed by Prussia, united in a protest against England's enforcement of blockades against neutral vessels. The declaration was a deliberate challenge of England's maritime supremacy, and the adhesion of Holland to the league was followed by a declaration of war and a prompt seizure of Dutch colonies. The naval enterprises of the allies produced little result beyond the spectacular privateering of Paul Jones off the Scottish coast; Gibraltar was relieved and England remained uninvaded. 1781.

The decisive year in America had now arrived. Cornwallis, in order to get in touch with his seaward communications, moved into Yorktown at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. De Grasse by sea and Washington and Rochambeau by land converged on the British position; an English squadron appeared, but was too

weak to attack, and Cornwallis surrendered after a respectable siege. English power in the United States was at an end, and the military effort, which had failed in 1777 to secure the Hudson, could not hold
1782. in 1781 a fortified post on the coast of Virginia. Lord North flung up his arms at the news, and five months later his resignation made peace a possibility.

The war continued against the allies of America. Gibraltar held out against its besiegers, Minorca was lost, and the unsuccessful operations of de Grasse against Hood and Rodney preserved England's West Indian possessions. In the East hostilities, which had begun in 1778 with the capture of the French settlements, culminated in the brilliant naval campaign of Suffren. The declaration of war against Holland had permitted the English to seize the Dutch stations in India and Ceylon, and Suffren found himself without a base nearer than the Mauritius and the Dutch East
1783. Indies. A successful campaign against the British squadron of Hughes placed him in a position to attempt the reconstruction of French power on the mainland of India. Hughes was defeated on the eve of the peace, and the oriental reputation of Suffren served to compensate France for the continuous non-success of d'Estaing, Guichen, and de Grasse in American waters.

§ 5. The Peace of Versailles.

The War of Independence was terminated by the Peace of Versailles. This settlement was in England the work of a Whig ministry formed by Lord Shelburne. Parliament had already empowered the king to conclude a peace with the Americans; and although George III, who regarded North's resignation as an act of treachery towards himself, viewed the prospect with profound disgust, he was unable to prevent the private negotiations, which had been begun with Franklin in Paris

under the earlier ministry of Lord Rockingham. A frontier was traced, and the enthusiasm of French support of America was considerably diminished by Rodney's final victory over de Grasse. The outstanding questions had been provisionally settled, when Shelburne's ministry collapsed in the attempt to pass the preliminaries through Parliament; but the Peace was finally concluded by a Coalition ministry of Fox and North.

English concessions:

Apart from the central concession of American independence, the surrenders made by Great Britain were wholly disproportionate to the extreme danger of her recent situation. To the United States she conceded their existence, an extremely generous frontier, and an elastic solution of the problems of pre-separation debts and the treatment of loyalists. To France she granted the right to refortify Dunkirk, surrendered the island of Tobago, and retroceded the captured French possession of Sta. Lucia; the diminutive islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, together with some extremely disputable fishing-rights off Newfoundland, completed the American gains made by France in a four years' war. In other continents France recovered her Indian trading-settlements, and held Goree and Senegal. It was an inadequate prize to have purchased at the price of imminent bankruptcy. To Spain England made the more substantial concessions of the Floridas and Minorca; a surrender to Spain might always be resumed in the first weeks of the next war. From the Dutch she even made the territorial gain of Negapatam; it was the dismal fate of Holland's colonies to be unflinchingly sacrificed by Holland's allies.

1. United States.

2. France.

3. Spain.

4. Holland.

Results of the war.

The War of Independence had achieved few positive results. It created the United States, and in so doing

it reduced the American empire of Great Britain by one half and the subjects of George III by one-seventh; it tested indecisively the durability of British sea-power, and it demonstrated the dependence of British military strength upon continental support. But, unnoticed by those who saw it, the American Revolution had effected one thing which more than any other was to change the face of Europe; it had exhausted the finances of France, and in bringing that state nearer to bankruptcy it brought Europe nearer to the French Revolution.

CHAPTER VI

THE REIGN OF DIPLOMACY

§ 1. The European Monarchies. § 2. The Prussian Monarchy. § 3. The Austrian Monarchy. § 4. The Eastern Question. § 5. The Latin Monarchies. § 6. The Revival of England.

§ 1. The European Monarchies.

EUROPE in the decade which preceded 1789 was governed in an apparently stable equilibrium by a system of absolute and personal monarchies; but two factors served to distinguish them from the cruder tyrannies of an earlier time. There was common to this group of governments a realization of the sovereign's duty to his subjects, which led him in Prussia to work for them, and even in France, where Louis XIV had established the supreme type of European absolutism, to tolerate them. It was the triumph of the characteristic institution of benevolent despotism that it carried a sense of the community as high as the Court.

Benevolent Despotism.

A second feature of these governments was their high level of enlightenment. It constantly resulted from the fashionable study of political science, which emanated from France, that the monarch or his minister was genuinely concerned to apply to the territory which he governed the doctrines of his favourite philosophy and even profoundly interested in the result. Europe was presented with every type of *Roi philosophe*. Voltaire had a disciple on the throne of Prussia, Diderot provided St. Petersburg with ideas, and even in England, so unfriendly to theory, George III modelled on the doctrines of Bolingbroke the Hanoverian experiment in absolutism. Louis XVI permitted his ministers to apply

Philosophy.

to a financial situation, which was beyond repair, the new and curious doctrines of political economy, and in Prussia Frederick the Great, the ideal monarch of his time, gratified a passion for administrative detail in the intervals of playing on the flute and composing Alexandrine verse. The Latin races of the Mediterranean monarchies were startled by the spectacle of reforming ministers, and the English found the even warfare of their party politics distracted by an absolutist revival. The note of monarchy was sustained in Eastern Europe by the facile empiricism of Joseph II and the heroic enlightenment with which Catharine II scandalized a Byzantine Court.

§ 2. The Prussian Monarchy. Frederick the Great.

The most typical of the European monarchies was that of Prussia, which effected under the direction of Frederick the Great that blend of absolutism and enlightenment which was most characteristic of its time. The royal system, which had erected the Prussian State from a North German principality into a European power, was confronted after the Seven Years' War with the problem of restoring to prosperity a shattered country. The population had fallen by half a million, the workers were with the army, and successive invasions had converted agricultural regions into the barest manœuvre-grounds. By a strenuous application of state enterprise Frederick restored the balance; royal funds were placed at the disposal of rural loan-societies, ten thousand farm-buildings were reconstructed with the king's money, and the horses of his gun-teams were set to plough the land. Money was raised by a rigid fiscal system, established under the direction of French officials, and the currency was reorganized. In all this effort the king played a predominant part; he displayed in the supervision of details an almost irritating thorough-

1763.

1. Home policy.

ness, and in the versatility of his occupations he set a lasting precedent for the House of Hohenzollern.

2. Foreign policy.

By this material revival Prussia acquired a diplomatic prestige which was almost commensurate with its military reputation, and the remaining achievements of Frederick the Great, although they were not unaccompanied by military demonstrations, lay almost entirely in the field of diplomacy. By an ingenious manipulation of Austrian policy he was able in the First Partition of Poland to unite Brandenburg with East Prussia and to add 25,000 men to his army. Frederick was now confronted with the ambitious policy of Joseph II, and it became the business of Prussia to maintain the equilibrium of Germany by opposing any increase of Austrian territory or influence. The death of the Elector of Bavaria had given Austria an opportunity of acquiring some Bavarian territory; Frederick, who could have little sympathy with the cause of Bavarian unity or the sanctity of the Imperial constitution, appeared with an army in Bohemia to resist any increase of the Hapsburg possessions at the expense of German states. For three months he halted before an entrenched camp on the Elbe, which was strongly held by the Austrians, and confined his military operations to living assiduously on the enemy's country. The dispute was finally settled by Russian intervention, and in the Peace of Teschen Austria receded temporarily from her aggressive position. Frederick now erected a further defence against the Austrian advance; the League of Princes, which he formed with the Electors of Hanover, Saxony, and Mainz, was intended as a Hohenzollern counterpoise to the connexions of the House of Hapsburg. It was by design an anti-Austrian combination and only by accident a prelude to German unity. Before

1769. Partition of Poland.

1772.

1777. Bavarian Succession

1778.

1779. Peace of Teschen.

1785. *Fürstenbund.*

1786. its political activity had begun, Frederick died, aged seventy-four, and the burden of Prussian diplomacy was inherited by his nephew.

Frederick William II. Frederick William II combined with extreme amiability a mystic adhesion to the Rosicrucians and the less fantastic diversion of bigamy. He relaxed the rigid fiscal system of Frederick II, but maintained the numerical strength of the Prussian army, which was still regarded as the most formidable military machine in

1787. Europe. He was soon able to employ it in a peaceful excursion into Holland, where a Prussian army supported the Stadtholder with British approval against a party

1790. favouring French influence. Three years later a Prussian mobilization in the manner of Frederick the Great checked the Austrian advance against Turkey, and the

Convention of Reichenbach. Emperor consented in the Convention of Reichenbach to sacrifice the Danubian aspirations which he had inherited from Prince Eugène. The remainder of the reign was occupied with the War of the French Revolu-

1792. tion, an enterprise upon which Prussia entered with supreme confidence, and the divergent adventures of the

1793-5. Second and Third Partitions of Poland; and at the king's death his government had concluded a peaceful

1797. and apparently lasting compromise with the most destructive power in Europe. It was an insecure position.

§ 3. The Austrian Monarchy. Joseph II, for fifteen years co-regent with his mother, Maria Theresa, and for ten years sole Emperor, was the most enlightened man of his day. His education had

Joseph II. been a miracle of elaboration, his views were studiously advanced, and he was one of the most travelled men in Europe; he had visited almost all the dominions of his crown. His authority was acknowledged in ten languages by a population of Germans, Magyars, Italians,

Roumanians, and Slavs, and he approached with admirable intentions the problem of governing a group of territories covering 250,000 square miles, united in all cases by loyalty to the House of Hapsburg, in most cases by the Catholic religion, and in some cases by geographical contact.

1. Home policy. 1765.

Joseph on his accession to power was prepared to reconstruct the most complicated political unit in Europe according to the most advanced ideas of the day. An initial attempt to reform the administrative departments shocked Maria Theresa and disgusted Kaunitz, and a group of measures for the reduction of feudalism was misunderstood and produced merely a peasant revolt.

a. Church reforms.

The political system of Josephism comprised a group of Church reforms and a group of administrative reforms. In his attitude to the Church Joseph scandalized devout Catholics by his secularist ideal of duty to the state and his visible preference for a national church on the Gallican model. His Patent of Toleration demonstrated a *fin de siècle* sympathy with heretics, and brought the Pope to Vienna on a journey of protest. The orthodoxy of the Austrian Netherlands was shocked into revolt, a majority of his subjects was convinced that the Emperor was a dangerous man, and it remained for the French Revolution to follow with more success in the footsteps of a Hapsburg Emperor.

1781.
1782.
1788. Belgian Revolution.

b. Administrative reforms.

His administrative reforms were based on a passion for economy. The empire was to be divided into homogeneous governments and 'circles', the cost of justice was to be reduced, and the immense and necessary expense of the Austrian army was to be met by a land-tax on the model, approved by the newest French economists. The result was a rising in Hungary and the profound conviction of his nobles that Joseph was an

Hungarian Revolution.

c. Feudal reforms. 1769. interfering despot. In one reform only did the Emperor achieve some measure of lasting success. The condition of his peasantry attracted his notice on more than one of his journeys, and his abolition of serfdom in the 1790. Slav territory survived that revocation of all reforms which was the end of Joseph's work.

2. Foreign Policy. In foreign policy he was equally active. His ambition was directed towards a concentration of Austrian power by the attainment of a more convenient conformation of the Hapsburg dominions. He endeavoured by means of the Prussian alliance to check the advance of Russia; 1772. First Partition of Poland. and by his participation in the First Partition of Poland he added to his country the *glacis* of the Carpathians, which outweighed in geographical advantage the simul- 1775. taneous acquisition of 2,000,000 insubordinate subjects. Bukovina. The addition of Bukovina completed his contribution to the eastern frontier. Joseph now turned westwards and endeavoured without success, in the War of the Bavarian Succession, to protect Austria with a belt of 1777. Bavarian territory. He was unable to do more than Bavarian Succession. 1778. advance his western frontier to the Inn; and the influence of Russian intervention in the settlement showed how little Austria had succeeded in excluding her new neighbour from Europe. His activity was now directed towards his Belgian possessions; the Barrier fortresses, which controlled the Austrian Netherlands, were partly 1782. garrisoned by Dutch troops. Joseph induced the Bavarian question. Government of the United Provinces to withdraw its contingent and by the suppression of the Barrier abolished the international semblance of the Austrian dominion in Belgium. His modern views next led him Opening of the Scheldt. to consider the question of the Scheldt; it was the constant anxiety of England and the Dutch that this river should be kept closed to commerce. In accordance

with this desire Europe had arrived at a settlement as venerable as the Peace of Westphalia, by which the Scheldt was sacrificed to the Rhine and the Thames, and the development of Antwerp was artificially arrested in the interest of London and Rotterdam. This settlement Joseph proposed to reverse in accordance with an intelligent doctrine of natural rights, but his initiative was unsuccessful, and once more it remained for the French Revolution to execute his programme. 1783. 1784.

Joseph now turned to the judicious policy of the Bavarian Exchange. He proposed to transfer the Elector of Bavaria to Brussels with the title of King of Burgundy, and by the acquisition of Bavaria to extend Austria westward up the Danube. It was a wise strategy to exchange the indefensible outwork of Belgium for the bastion of Bavaria; but the formation of the *Fürstenbund* checked Joseph II, and the last act of Frederick the Great, by imposing on Austria the military burden of the Netherlands, dictated the future course of the War of the French Revolution. Belgo-Bavarian Exchange. 1785. 1786.

Josephism had now had time to work, and the Emperor was soon confronted with two serious revolts. The Belgian clericals, oblivious of what they had gained in the suppression of the Barrier, the correction of the frontier, and the freedom of trade, were shocked into revolution by Joseph's religious policy; and almost simultaneously the Hungarian aristocracy was driven by his administrative reforms to the length of insurrection. The substitution of German for Latin had irritated Magyar sentiment, and the registration of property had alarmed landowners. Every measure of Joseph had been misunderstood by his subjects, and in the most courageous act of a reformer's career he decreed the revocation of his entire work. Austria returned with relief 1788. 1790.

to the conditions of Maria Theresa, and the death of Joseph II ended a reign which had been the most heroic failure of the century.

§ 4. The Eastern Question.

The temper of these monarchies found its most satisfying expression in their diplomacy, and benevolent despotism demonstrated in its conduct of the Eastern Question that its benevolence began strictly at home. The factors of this problem remained constant from an earlier phase of its development; the Russian effort was directed towards expansion at the expense of Turkey and Poland, the Austrian effort aimed at the control of the lower Danube, and the new power of Prussia was divided between a desire to check Austria and a taste for the forbidden fruit of Polish territory.

1. Turkey.

1779.

1780.

1781.

1782.

After the Peace of Teschen it became manifest in Vienna that the attempt to arrest the Russian advance was doomed to failure, and Joseph II cultivated an alliance with Russia as a counterpoise to the growing influence of Prussia. An interview with Catharine II confirmed his resolve, and in the following year an Austro-Russian alliance was concluded. The real basis of the combination was a project, which was elaborated between the two courts, for an Austro-Russian partition of European Turkey. The Russian frontier was to advance to the Dniester, and Russian influence was to predominate in two new states, the kingdom of Dacia (in the quadrilateral enclosed between the Dniester, the Danube, the Carpathians, and the Black Sea) and a revived Greek Empire, which was to be established in Constantinople under a Russian prince. Austria was to be compensated with the Adriatic dominions of Turkey and a return to the south-eastern frontier of 1718, whilst French and Prussian acquiescence was to be purchased in Egypt and Poland.

Russia inaugurated the project with the annexation of 1784.
the Crimea, and the Czarina's grandson, Constantine, was
prepared in an atmosphere of Greek culture for his career
as Emperor of the East. French policy imposed peace on
the Sultan, and Turkey escaped from the war without
any loss more serious than a remote and insubordinate
peninsula. Catharine, under the guidance of Potemkin, 1787.
made a triumphal progress through her new territory;
and Joseph, who accompanied her, was impressed with
the appearance of successful colonization and the
military works of Kherson and Sebastopol. War was
resumed almost immediately; the westward Russian
advance, which took the form of an attack on Ochakoff,
was seconded by an Austrian advance down the Danube,
which took the form of an attack on Belgrade. The
intervention of Sweden, with which French policy 1788.
endeavoured to divert Russia, threatened St. Peters-
burg itself, but the Swedish power was too weak to
make use of its victories, and Russia was soon able to 1790.
conclude a favourable peace. Meanwhile the Austrians
had made considerable progress in their Danubian
advance; the emperor held the fortresses of Belgrade
and Bucharest, when his forward movement was
arrested by a Prussian mobilization in Silesia, and
Joseph's successor consented in the Convention of
Reichenbach to abandon his conquests. Peace was 1791.
made with Turkey at Sistova, and Austria retired from Peace of Sistova.
a long and costly war with a Bosnian valley and a bridge-
head on the Danube. Russia fought on alone, and in
the Peace of Jassy Catharine II secured from Turkey 1792.
all that Joseph II had promised in his project of par- Peace of Jassy.
tition. The Turkish power receded behind the Dniester,
and the new territory of Russia was guarded in spite
of British disapproval by the strong place of Ochakoff.

2. Poland. The movement of reform, which had traversed Europe, did not leave untouched even the decadent and dis-
1788. membered state of Poland. A reforming Diet met in
1791. Warsaw and evolved in three years a practicable Constitution, which abolished the paralysing *liberum veto*, and proposed to establish a real and efficient monarchy. The Poles secured a promise of Prussian protection and prepared for a revival of national life; but such a movement was interpreted in Russia as an act of positive insurrection. It became the object of Catharine's policy to involve Prussia and Austria in the affairs of France; if once those powers could be committed to the enterprise of suppressing the Revolution, Russia would be left free for the more lucrative enterprise of
1792. suppressing the Poles. The manœuvre was successful, an allied army slowly crossed western Germany for the invasion of France, and twelve weeks before it passed the French frontier the Russians entered Poland. The national resistance was broken down, with the familiar instruments of a reactionary Confederation and a Russian army, before the Allies in western Europe reached the Meuse; and Prussian ambitions revived before the stimulating spectacle of a Russian army in control of Poland. The promises of Frederick William II were forgotten, a Prussian force was diverted eastwards,
1793. and the violation by Prussia of Polish territory was
Second Partition. followed by the negotiation between Russia and Prussia of the Second Partition. Prussia received the coveted Baltic port of Danzig, the region of Great Poland enclosing Posen and the course of the Warta, and the middle Vistula, including the commercial city of Thorn; whilst Russia acquired an immense tract of Lithuania, and the Polish State was reduced to an irrational and defenceless oblong.

The acquiescence of Poland, accompanied by every form of pressure and protest, was finally secured in the Diet of Grodno, but the national temper was unequal to the strain which such sacrifices imposed upon it. A rapid and successful rising was organized under Kosciusko, and a popular government, pledged to the Constitution of 1791, was established at Warsaw. Once more the Russians invaded Poland, and Prussia withdrew almost completely from the French war, which was now mainly concerned with the defence of the Austrian Netherlands and Holland, in order to be present at the more profitable affair of Poland. The diversion effected by republican Poland was of some value to republican France, and Kosciusko became a popular name in Paris. Once more the national resistance was overcome, but this time the defeat was final: in the Third Partition, Poland ceased to exist. In 1793 Prussia had negotiated a partition to the exclusion of Austria; in 1795 Austria, disgusted with the course of the French war, turned with relief to the affairs of Eastern Europe and endeavoured to exclude Prussia. The attempt was not successful. In the final settlement Prussia received Warsaw and advanced to the middle Niemen; Austria took Little Poland and Cracow; and Russia moved forward to the line of the Niemen and the Bug, 100 miles in advance of her frontier of 1793, 250 miles in advance of her frontier of 1772, and 350 miles in advance of her frontier of 1763. The advance of Russia was the foremost factor in the destruction of Poland.

1794. 1795. Third Partition.

Politically this settlement represents the *finis Poloniae*. Poland was to survive in insurrections and in the French armies, but the Polish State vanished from Europe. Its destruction was the most shameless and

Results.

barren act of European diplomacy. The partitions brought no accession of strength to the powers which perpetrated them; Russia, Prussia, and Austria each purchased an increase of territory at the price of an intolerable incubus of disloyalty. Posen was never reconciled to Prussia and Cracow was never reconciled to Austria; Russia was not defensible until the invader had passed the Duna, and Austria's, Russia's, or Prussia's need was always to be Poland's opportunity. The policy inaugurated by Frederick the Great imposed upon Prussia the necessity of defending against Russia a frontier of 300 miles and the lasting menace of war on two fronts. It was the most characteristic achievement in diplomacy of the European monarchies.

§ 5. The Latin Monarchies.

1. Italy.

The position of Italy during the eighteenth century was singularly effaced; from its position it became periodically a battlefield between France and Austria, it was occasionally an object of Spanish ambitions, but its division between a dozen governments deprived it of a more general political significance. The temper of the age did not give prominence to the Papacy, which was its most conspicuous institution; but even in Italy the current tendencies of enlightened monarchy were sometimes apparent. The country, outside the Austrian dominion of Lombardy and the Roman theocracy of the States of the Church, was governed by a group of monarchies; and it is significant that, whilst the Republics of Venice and Genoa declined into reaction, certain of the royal governments were pronouncedly progressive. In Piedmont, under Victor Amadeus II, noble and clerical privileges were reduced, the finances were reorganized, and the law was codified. Parma was vigorously reformed by a French minister, and in Tuscany Leopold I instituted equal taxation, which

1720–30.

1748.

he even imposed upon himself; the Tuscans were startled with the abolition of torture, the draining of marshes, and freedom of the corn-trade. The spread of ideas even introduced anti-clericalism into the uncongenial atmosphere of Naples, and the reforms of Joseph II found in Milan an eager and intelligent public. Italians did not as yet aspire to a national cohesion; the Apennines, which separated Rome from Milan, seemed a more formidable barrier than the Alps, which separated Milan from Vienna. Italy as yet did not exist even as an aspiration, but it resulted from the movement of thought in the eighteenth century that there were within the Italian peninsula elements which were to be receptive of the ideas of the French Revolution; and of such ideas not the least was the idea of nationality. 1765–90.

2. Spain.

Enlightenment in the eighteenth century took a longer journey than the road from Paris to St. Petersburg: it passed the Pyrenees. Those mountains, which present a serious obstacle to armies, are still more impervious to ideas, and it was a peculiar triumph of intelligent monarchy that it provided Spain with a series of reforming ministers. The tradition of reform was not lost by the ministers of Philip V after the fall of Alberoni; and under Patiño the national services were reorganized, whilst prosperity was sought for Spanish trade in a reproduction of Colbert's measures of strict protection. Ensenada, under Ferdinand VI, undertook the bolder reform of Spanish relations with the Church; a new Concordat was concluded, the activities of the Inquisition were restricted, and the Spanish crown increased its powers of ecclesiastical appointment. Economy was practised in the departments of State, the revenue was almost doubled, and 1719. 1726–36. 1753.

Ensenada even contemplated the daring novelty of a single tax. Under Charles III progress was still more
1759. rapid; the king, who brought an advanced reputation from Naples, encouraged his Italian ministers to accelerate Spanish development, until it was arrested by a popular protest. Squillace endeavoured to crown an enlightened edifice of ecclesiastical, commercial, and sanitary reforms with a group of sumptuary laws; and
1766. he was driven from office by a populace which could tolerate attacks on the Church, but could not condone an abbreviation of its hat-brims. The note of enlighten-
1776. ment was sustained by Floridablanca, who co-operated in economic reforms with Campomanes. Executions were almost unknown, and imprisonment was substituted for burning as the penalty for heresy; the law was codified, and Spanish trade was assiduously protected against foreign competition. The population was almost
1788. doubled in fifty years, and at the death of Charles III, Spain, busy with public works and rich with reviving trade, was re-entering rapidly the full stream of European development.

3. Portugal. 1750. A similar movement was apparent in Portugal. Pombal, the minister of Joseph I, having assured his power by a lavish exercise of brutality, bullied his country into the path of progress. Papal influence was reduced, the jurisdiction of the Nuncio was restricted, and the Inquisition was relieved of its censorship of books. A system of bounties and a protective tariff stimulated Portuguese industry, and companies were formed for the recovery from England of the colonial trade. Lisbon was restored by public
1755. enterprise after a destructive earthquake, the study of science was introduced into a university, and education was almost secularized. The power of Pombal did not

survive his master, and his work proved as ephemeral as his occupation of office. The reforming monarchies of the eighteenth century worked hastily and without the acquiescence of their subjects. It was only in France that a movement was in preparation whose work was assured of permanence by the co-operation of an entire people. 1777.

§ 6. The Revival of England.

England emerged from the American War in a temper of profound despair. It was felt that the secession of her most developed colonies and the temporary loss of command of the sea marked the end of British history. 1783. Englishmen resigned themselves to a period of European insignificance; but ten years later England confidently directed a continental coalition against the growing predominance of France, and challenged a conflict which quadrupled in twenty years the National Debt. The strength which was to propel this new effort was drawn from the Industrial Revolution. A series of brilliant inventions developed the textile industry of the northern counties, and superseded the period of domestic manufacture with the increased output of industrial production; communications were multiplied by the development of canals, and the elaboration of the steam-engine provided industry with an instrument of unlimited power. It was an incident of this development that the industrial population of England was transferred from the south to the coal-producing districts of the north. Upon this foundation of increasing wealth and multiplying population it was possible to revive the national confidence, to repair the damage of the American War, and to confront Europe with unsuspected reserves of material strength.

The Industrial Revolution.

The second factor in the revival of England was the ministry of William Pitt. The absolutist system of

1780. George III was in reality ended when Dunning carried a resolution that 'the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished'. The resignation of Lord North brought the Whigs back to power, and the Hanoverian experiment was at an end. But the king made a final attempt to impose a minister of his own selection. The Coalition of Fox and North was profoundly unpopular; and its introduction of a scheme of government for the great and growing empire recently amplified by Warren Hastings and controlled by the East India Company provided

1783. George III with an opportunity of dismissing it. A defeat was secured in the House of Lords, and the

William Pitt. king selected as Prime Minister William Pitt, second son of the Earl of Chatham, a barrister of twenty-five, who had led the House of Commons in Shelburne's Government. Pitt was promoted to office as the successor of Lord North, he exercised it as the successor of Lord

1784. Chatham. A general election provided him with a considerable majority, and he faced the king as a popular and parliamentary minister, where he had been intended to act as a mouthpiece.

Pitt's ministry was sharply divided by the declaration of war against France in 1793; before that event he executed a vigorous programme of reform, after it he resisted progress in the character of a war minister. It became his duty to arrest, in the interests of national defence, the logical development of his own earlier work, and his contribution to domestic statesmanship was confined to the decade between 1783 and 1793.

1. Reform. 1782–3. His first anxiety after the solution of Indian problems was the cause of Parliamentary Reform. He had twice supported it by resolution, and his Reform Bill contained a practical proposal for the purchase of seats

from their patrons. It was defeated, and when next 1785.
Reform was debated, Pitt voted against it. France had shown to England the Gorgon's head of the Terror, and the development of Reform was petrified for a quarter of a century.

A more successful attempt was made to reform the 2. Finance.
finances. The American War had raised the Debt from £130,000,000 to £238,000,000; Pitt, by the automatic 1786.
operation of his Sinking Fund, had reduced it by £10,000,000 before the intervention of the French war destroyed his work. The new Fund, unlike Walpole's, was adequately protected against 'raiding'; and, although Pitt's belief in the miraculous power of compound interest was excessive, it formed a valuable contribution to financial security. Another feature of his policy was the reduction of smuggling by the gradual restriction of import duties, whilst the revenue was raised by excise duties of a marvellous range, imposed on racehorses, hats, and candles amongst other articles. But the most striking demonstration of his enlightenment was made in his adoption of Adam Smith's doctrine of Free Trade. A scheme for the 1785.
institution of Free Trade between Great Britain and Ireland was defeated by the ignorance of English opinion, and when reintroduced in a form which gave satisfaction in England, its fate in Ireland was sealed. Greater success attended the application of the policy to foreign trade. Although barely ten years had passed since Smith's theory was published in the *Wealth of* 1776.
Nations, Pitt was able to negotiate a treaty of commerce with France, and to demonstrate to traders on both 1786.
sides of the Channel that a foreign market was a more profitable possession than a tariff-wall. Five years later his financial policy was reduced by the war to the

futile issue of loans and the ingenious elaboration of new taxes.

Ireland. His attention was next engaged by the Irish problem. The organization of the Irish Volunteers during the American War had extracted from England the concession of legislative independence; but Grattan's Parliament, which had no control of the executive, and did not represent Catholic Ireland, formed an unsatisfying solution. Pitt proposed to revive Irish commerce by a grant of free trade with England, and to do justice to Irish Catholics by a measure of Catholic Emancipation. Those measures were defeated, the one by the error of British traders, the other by the Protestant scruples of George III; and it is an unfortunate accident
1801. that Pitt's Irish policy survives only in the Act of Union. That Act was far more an incident in the French war than a solution of the Irish problem, and it was because he was not permitted to amplify it with its logical corollaries that Pitt resigned.

4. India. Pitt's imperial policy was active and intelligent.
1784. A judicious India Bill was substituted for Fox's measure, and the Government assumed a sufficient control of the Company's proceedings. On the demand of the
1786–95. Opposition he permitted the impeachment of Warren Hastings, whose policy was dissected for nine years before he was finally acquitted. Pitt regularly supported Wilberforce in his efforts for the abolition of the slave-trade, but without success.

5. Foreign policy. His foreign policy was vigorous, but controlled by his anxiety for commercial prosperity, which served to incline him to peace. The Dutch question was solved
1787. uneventfully by Prussian intervention, an Anglo-Spanish
1790 incident at Nootka Sound on the Pacific coast of America was satisfactorily explained, and a vigorous protest

against the Russian acquisition of Ochakoff satisfied Pitt's anxieties for the integrity of Turkey. He was not prepared to compromise, for the sake of a Black Sea port or an American fishery, the edifice of domestic reform. Speaking in the House of Commons early in 1792, Pitt expressed his opinion that 'unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country when from the situation of Europe we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace'. Six months later Brunswick's army passed the French frontier, and Europe entered on twenty-three years of war. 1791. 1792.

BOOK II. THE REVOLUTION

CHAPTER VII

THE FRENCH MONARCHY

§ 1. The Revolution. § 2. The Preparation of the Revolution. § 3. The States-General. § 4. The Constituent Assembly at Versailles. § 5. The Constituent Assembly in Paris. § 6. The Legislative Assembly. § 7. Foreign Policy. § 8. The War.

§ 1. The Revolution.

THE French Revolution was a movement which, in the last decade of the eighteenth century, reconstructed the government and society of France. It was an incident of that movement that the greater part of Western Europe was temporarily occupied by French armies, and the distribution of its ideas was effected alike by these provisional governments and by the spectacle of revolutionary France. Such a movement was not violently effected by the spontaneous uprising of an oppressed lower class; it was an effort of the whole population directed by men of the professional class against a discredited system of government and aristocratic privilege. The Revolution in Paris was largely conducted by barristers; the Revolution in Europe was most widely disseminated by the son of a Corsican lawyer. Such men were accessible to the current ideas of their time, and it was from the prevailing philosophy that they drew the principles of 1789.

§ 2. The Preparation of the Revolution. i. Intellectual: a. The English Influence.

The flow of ideas, which directed France towards the Revolution, was composed of two streams: a stream which derived its force from England and a stream which derived its force from America. The spectacle of the English Revolution of 1688 and the political philosophy of John Locke were profoundly influential

in France. The example of Parliamentary England
1694–1778. inspired Voltaire to his damaging attack on absolutist
Voltaire. and privileged France; his *Letters on the English* drew an instructive contrast, and the virulent anti-clericalism of his later writings pointed a way to the execution of one part of his programme. By habituating Frenchmen to the destructive criticism of received institutions Voltaire reduced the shock of the Revolution when
1766. eventually it came. This critical tendency was developed
Encyclopédie. in the *Encyclopédie*, an epitome of advanced and destructive ideas compiled by Diderot and d'Alembert, to which Voltaire and the leading *philosophes* contributed.
1689–1755. A more constructive part was played by Montesquieu,
Montesquieu. who was equally English in his inspiration; an attack
1748. on the system of Louis XIV was followed in the *Esprit des Lois* by an elaborate proposal of constitutional
1712–78. monarchy. A more startling consequence of the English
Rousseau. influence was the philosophy of Rousseau. An idealist temper and a profound admiration of the city-state of
1762. Geneva finally evolved in him the theory of the *Contrat Social*, and provided the Revolution with its fighting creed. From a sympathetic study of Swiss village communities Rousseau arrived at a doctrine of pure democracy, which carried his followers to a belief in liberty within the limits of the General Will, equality before the decisions of the sovereign people, and fraternity in a society constituted according to nature. His teaching, as it was applied by his revolutionary interpreters, amounted to democratic absolutism, the divine right of the people, and the infallibility of its decisions. His writings became the commonplace-book of French politics, and his ideas appeared in every form from the provincial federalism of the Girondins to the absolute democracy of the Mountain.

b. The American Influence.

A second stream of tendency flowed from the American Revolution. When the philanthropic public of the *philosophes* practised its theories by volunteering for service in America, it took a long step towards the attack on French institutions. Lafayette fought to protect the American taxpayer's right to representation; when he recrossed the Atlantic after Yorktown, he discovered the French taxpayer. Sympathy with Washington and Franklin taught Frenchmen two things: that resistance to an illegitimate authority is the most sacred of duties, and that liberty is the object of government. It was a clear consequence that, if their philosophy convinced them that the monarchy was unsupported in its pretensions by a sound political theory, they learned from their American experience to resist its demands and to substitute for it a government whose object was liberty, and whose method was likely to be the direct and single-chamber democracy of the Puritan colonies. It is abundantly true that there was in 1789 no republican party, but the Revolution was not in its beginning a republican movement.

Lafayette.

ii. Economic.

The Revolution was precipitated by the economic factor, and the train which had been laid by philosophy was fired by finance. Here also the development of current theory provided a guide for criticism. The Economists in the full pride of a new science had contributed to the *Encyclopédie*, and intellectual France was attracted by the simple and symmetrical doctrines of the Physiocrats. Mirabeau's father, in the *Ami des Hommes*, indicated agriculture as the source of all wealth, and advocated the suppression of large fortunes. Quesnay, the real leader of the school, proposed to substitute for the elaborate edifice of French finance a single tax on the *produit net* of land.

The Economists.

1756. Marquis de Mirabeau.

1694–1774. Quesnay.

Deficit. The French monarchy, without credit, without a budget, and without an intelligent principle of taxation, attempted in the reign of Louis XVI to confront an increasing deficit. This deficit, which represented the cost to France of the wars and policy of Louis XIV, the costly establishment of Versailles, and the fatal intervention of Louis XV in the Seven Years' War, mounted between 1774 and 1788 from 20,000,000 to 160,000,000 *livres*. It resulted from a system of exemptions that the revenue was raised exclusively from the middle and lower classes, and their financial depression indicated that the sources of that revenue were fatally exhaustible.

Exemptions.

Privilege. It is the importance of the economic factor that it directed against this system of privilege, which protected the Church and the aristocracy, the main effort of the Revolution; its removal was to transform French society. The Church, which Louis XIV had divorced from Rome, had been left in the full enjoyment of its endowments and its immunity from taxation. The position which it occupied was political rather than religious, and it was in no condition to meet the financial criticism of the Economists, when backed by the anti-religious effort of the *philosophes*. The situation of the *noblesse* was still more helpless. In return for its considerable privileges it performed no national function; it retained every passport to unpopularity, the right to command in the army, to tax its tenants, and itself to escape the royal taxes, without a single public duty that justified its privileged existence. Confined by the organization of society to exile in a provincial *château* or a decorative existence at Versailles, it was without influence over the monarchy or authority over the people. The appearance of power ensured its unpopularity, whilst the absence of it paralysed its action.

a. The Church.

b. The *noblesse*.

Taxation.

The discontent of the Revolution was substantially due to the incidence of taxation. The *taille*, from which the privileged orders were exempt, took 53 per cent. of the peasants' income; a further 28 per cent. went to the Church and *noblesse* in tithes and feudal dues; and from the balance the Government drew its copious excise duties and the *gabelle*, with which it enforced the monopoly of salt. It was not a system which could survive a generation of intelligent criticism.

iii. Political.

1774.

The promise of a new reign had provoked in France a mood of universal optimism, and Louis XVI approached without enthusiasm the problem of governing 25,000,000 Frenchmen with the machine of monarchy. Authority reposed in the Royal Council, power was in the hands of thirty provincial *Intendants*, and justice was administered by thirteen *Parlements* and a network of feudal courts; France was a paradise for lawyers, tax-collectors, and customs officials, but its finances lacked logic, its law lacked uniformity, and its administration was as subdivided as a chess-board.

The government of France.

Louis XVI.

The king, who had inherited from his Saxon mother the unimpressive stolidity of a German peasant, displayed intelligence in his ministerial appointments, and it was not yet obvious that he was totally devoid of will.

Turgot.

1775.

Turgot, who had learnt theory as an economist and practice as an *Intendant*, was permitted to reform the finances. He studied a rigid economy, and the suppression of internal fiscal barriers; his grant of free trade in corn encountered in the *Parlements* the resistance of the secondary aristocracy of the law; but he persisted and elaborated a more general scheme of reform. Whilst Malesherbes was reforming the prisons, and Saint-Germain by his organization of the army was preparing the European weapon of the Revolution, Turgot proposed to relieve the

1776.

peasant by the suppression of the *corvée*, and the townsman by the suppression of the guilds. But Versailles was not an advantageous ground for such activities, and the minister fell.

Necker. Necker, a Swiss banker, next enjoyed an immense reputation as minister, and practised a judicious economy. His attitude to the serfs was liberal, but his financial
1777. work was destroyed by the American War; the Treasury became a department for raising loans, and the reforming minister was forced to borrow on the impaired credit of France 530,000,000 of *livres*. His statement in the
1781. *Compte Rendu au Roi* of the national accounts scandalized official reticence, and he was driven from office.
Calonne. Necker was succeeded by Calonne, who interrupted an unintelligent series of loans with the enlightened achievement of the English commercial treaty.

The importance of the financial situation now became political; Necker continued to expound his views through the press, but the people, stimulated by the tactless expenditure of the Court and the questionable appearance of the queen in the affair of the Diamond Necklace, adopted the demand for economy as a convenient form of attack on Versailles. The deficit grew steadily larger, and Calonne, despairing of the attempt to convert the *Parlements* to any reform, called an Assembly of Notables of the Three Estates. It was the
Assembly of Notables. beginning of constitutional monarchy. The Notables
1787. met and did nothing; Calonne fell and was succeeded by Brienne.

The conflict now shifted back to the *Parlements*, where the lawyers, in the novel character of popular heroes, rejected every proposal of the Crown. The *Parlement* of Paris extended its activities from the bare confirmation of decrees to a more active interference

with executive acts; its example was followed by the provincial *Parlements* and Assemblies, and the lawyers defied royal coercion in heroic attitudes. They were soon to be superseded. The *Parlement* of Paris, in unintentional self-effacement, demanded a summons of the States-General for 1792; the king assented dubiously, and the demand was clearly reiterated at Vizille by the progressive Estates of Dauphiné. Brienne fell, and Necker returned to office. Four weeks later he announced the summons of the States-General for 1789, and the prelude to the Revolution was at an end. 1788. Necker.

§ 3. The States-General.

The Assembly of the Three Estates, which was summoned to Versailles, was a neglected but interesting antiquity. Its last meeting had taken place in 1614, and Brienne appealed to the Academy of Inscriptions for information as to its procedure. It consisted, when it met, of 308 clergy, 285 nobles, and 621 deputies of the Third Estate, of whom almost half were lawyers. The election, which had provoked a hurricane of journalism, revived the political consciousness of France, and the constituencies provided each member with a *cahier* defining his mandate. These documents, which reveal the temper of France, consist generally of a respectful enumeration of grievances and a subdued but universal demand for liberty. 1789.

After Necker had indicated the outlines of an anodyne constitution, and the king had urged the deputies to confine themselves strictly to finance, the Third Estate was confronted by a central problem of procedure. It was essential to its deputies that the three orders should sit in a single assembly, because if the voting was in three Houses, the two privileged orders could always outvote the third, whereas divisions held in a single House would give a proper preponderance, in virtue of May 5.

their numbers, to members who represented the taxpayers of France. Invitations were accordingly issued
June 17. to the clergy and the *noblesse* to join, and the Tiers État converted itself into the National Assembly. It was the beginning of the Revolution.

§ 4. The Constituent Assembly at Versailles.

The Government disapproved profoundly of this initiative, and closed the Hall of Assembly whilst it considered its action. The excluded deputies retired into the town of Versailles, and at a meeting held in
June 20. a tennis-court swore to provide France with a constitution. By the oath of the *Jeu de Paume* the National Assembly became the Constituent.

The conflict now became more open; the king talked
June 23. the language of reaction, Government troops were moved into Versailles, and Mirabeau, deputy for the Third Estate of Aix, defied a Court official to expel the members with bayonets. The privileged orders con-
June 27. ceded their position and joined the assembly; and the Constituent prepared for its work of construction and reform. The Revolution had entered upon its parliamentary phase.

Whilst the Constituent in the suburban seclusion of Versailles debated the theoretical basis of the state, a new factor imported into the Revolution a more positive element. Paris in the eighteenth century was a manufacturing town with the resulting proportion of destitute population. Its political life, which had been arrested for a century by the promotion of Versailles, was revived by the privilege of voting directly for its deputies, and it resulted from the renascence of journalism that the Palais Royal had become a centre for the dissemination of pamphlets and the declamation of perorations. Paris in the summer of 1789 returned to the position which was to give to it the control of

the Revolution, and to impose upon Western Europe a Parisian government. The explosion was caused by the dismissal of Necker, which focussed the promiscuous rioting of the preceding weeks. A regiment of German cavalry was tactlessly sent against a harmless crowd, and Paris armed. The Constituent appreciated the gravity of the position and suspended its adjournments. Two days later it was known that a Paris crowd had captured the Bastille; the position was not strongly held, and the people were in possession of some artillery. The victory was celebrated by some murders in the street.

July 11. July 12. July 14.

As the Bastille contained only seven prisoners and had been used for many years as a madhouse, the value of its capture was largely symbolic. It is the real importance of this event that simultaneously the Revolution entered upon a municipal phase. The democracy of Paris, which had elected deputies for the Tiers État, assumed control of the city, confirmed or dismissed its officers, and finally formed an executive Committee; this body, in view of the considerable quantity of troops which the Government had concentrated on Paris, immediately organized a citizen army, and Paris presented to Versailles the threatening spectacle of a city in arms. Bailly became Mayor of Paris and Lafayette commandant of the National Guard. The effect of the municipal revolution was startlingly complete; the troops were withdrawn, Necker was recalled, and the king visited Paris to congratulate the power which had beaten him.

July 17.

The results in France were immediate; through the summer riots in every city were concluded by the formation of a democratic municipality and a National Guard on the Parisian model. But outside the towns

the Revolution assumed a different form; it became the
July 27. rising against feudalism. In the last week of July the whole of rural France was moved by a queer panic to arm itself. It proceeded in the provinces to attack the *châteaux* and to burn the parchments of the landowners, whilst at Versailles the parliamentary effort
August 4. of the Revolution was pursuing the same object. In a single sitting through an August night the Constituent abolished feudalism and interrupted with a singular outburst of enthusiasm its academic discussion of the constitution. It returned with dignity to the
August 20. formulation of the Rights of Man, which were to be the foundation of the new order; and it disposed rapidly in the course of the autumn of the problems of the royal veto and a second chamber. The brilliant improvisation of this concrete and liberal edifice startled the king, and he acquiesced once more in a concentration of troops on Paris. It was perceived by his advisers that the movement of Paris in July had convulsed France, and it was felt that the city might be overawed by a generous display of royal troopers; the foreign regiments in the French service were admirably suited
October 1. to this work, and they were primed at a series of regimental hospitalities with the correct sentiments of
October 5. reaction. The people of Paris replied with the startling manœuvre of marching on Versailles. This expedition, which was in its origin a bread-riot of women, resulted in the appearance at Versailles of Lafayette and the National Guard, the acceptance by the king of the Rights of Man, and the return to Paris of the government of France. The Court, which had wished to suppress the Revolution by force, was transferred to the Tuileries and exposed to the people of Paris; the Assembly, which had legislated with comparative calm

in the detached atmosphere of Versailles, moved into a city in insurrection, where it sat under the controlling eye of a violent electorate; and Paris became the narrowing stage upon which the Revolution was played out.

§ 5. The Constituent Assembly in Paris.

The removal of the monarchy from Versailles to Paris was profoundly significant; the institution which had been able to place ten miles between its subjects and its residence could not now refuse the peremptory invitation of a revolutionary municipality. The Constituent proceeded in its new home with the work of reconstruction; the constitution was completed and received the royal assent. A series of mutinies extended the Revolution to the army, and a decree of the Assembly abolished titles of nobility. This enactment stimulated the emigration of the *noblesse*, which had been inaugurated by the fall of the Bastille; and although it was an advantage that the more violent reactionaries ceased to misguide the Court and transferred their activities from Paris to Coblentz, the emigrations heightened the isolation of the king in the presence of the Revolution.

1790. Feb. 4. June 19.

It was now determined to give to the new era a national inauguration. The Fête of the Federation in the Champ de Mars exhibited a strange blend of religion and democracy; it was attended by representatives of the National Guard, elected from all the districts of France; and after Lafayette, representing the *fédérés*, and the President, representing the Constituent, Louis was permitted to take an oath of loyalty to the new constitution, whilst Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, said mass at a national altar. The isolation of the king now made itself felt in the treatment of the religious problem. The Revolution had derived from its intellectual antecedents a peculiar attitude towards the Church; and Louis acquiesced in the

July 14.

suppression of tithes and the nationalization of ecclesiastical property, which were among the earliest measures of the Assembly. But the Civil Constitution of the clergy, which it voted two days before the Federation, confronted his conscience with a more substantial obstacle; a secularist project, which treated the clergy as state officials, elected bishops like deputies, and favoured the Pope with a bare announcement of their election, might not unreasonably have scandalized a less
August 24. religious man than Louis XVI, and he gave the royal assent with a profound conviction of its unwisdom.
Nov. 27. A further decree insisted upon an oath to be taken by all clergy as a test of fidelity to the new order; 130 bishops and 46,000 priests refused it, and the schism
1791. was complete. The Papacy not unnaturally condemned
March 10. every feature of the scheme, and by withdrawing its sanction from the national Church, which was organized with difficulty, it provided France with the elements of a war of religion. Louis, who had acted for some months under the advice of Mirabeau, was deeply disappointed with the course taken by the Revolution. Life at the Tuileries was marked by a decrease of dignity and an increase of supervision which irritated the queen; it was the error of Marie Antoinette that after twenty
April 11. years' residence in France she confused Paris with Vienna. The death of Mirabeau removed the most intelligent adviser of the Court. The queen's appeals for foreign aid became more insistent as her limited tolerance of the Revolution diminished; and she acquiesced with relief in the picturesque project of a flight to the frontier. It was proposed that the royal family should leave the Tuileries by night, effect a junction in the east of France with the loyal regiments commanded by Bouillé on the frontier, and return to Paris under the

chivalrous swords of the *émigrés* and the sympathetic guns of an Austrian army. The escape from Paris was June 20.
effected, and Bouillé threw out from Metz a line of cavalry posts to meet the royal carriage; the long drive across France passed without incident, until recognition June 21.
by an ex-dragoon and his night-ride through the Argonne arrested the flight. Whilst the royal family was detained for identification in the narrow street of Varennes, the Constituent in Paris proclaimed a provisional Republic. This act, which established the Republic for eleven weeks, was the foremost consequence of the king's flight; and the monarchy, which was carried back in triumph to Paris, was not even June 25.
a constitutional monarchy, because the constitution was no longer monarchical.

The Revolution, which had become in 1789 successively parliamentary, municipal, and agrarian, became by the Federation of 1790 a national movement. The flight to Varennes made it definitely republican. This tendency, which resulted from the discovery made in the king's absence that the monarchy was not indispensable, was expressed clearly in the political clubs of Paris. The Jacobins Club, which had originated in a group of Breton deputies, had opened its debates to the public and elaborated a system of provincial branches, by which it hoped to educate France in democratic orthodoxy. It now petitioned the Constituent to July 15.
abolish royalty; a number of deputies resigned and formed the more moderate Feuillants Club, but the Jacobins remained representative of Paris. Two days later the Cordeliers Club, a more advanced body, demon- July 17.
strated in favour of a new Assembly and encountered military action on the part of the Constituent. The republican movement was vigorously repressed, and Sept. 3.

the Constituent, profoundly unconscious of its own
Sept. 30. supersession, codified the constitution. The royal assent was given, and the Assembly dissolved.

Constitution of 1791. The Constitution of 1791, which was superseded before it was promulgated, was a monarchical document; the king retained considerable powers of appointment, the choice of ministers, and a temporary veto. A distinction of means was drawn between active and passive citizens, which excluded the poor from political life and emphasized the *bourgeois* character of the settlement; the test of property formed a striking deviation from the pure doctrine of the Rights of Man. The settlement of 1791 also contained a system of local government, the uniform division of France into eighty-three Departments, and a complete reform of the judicial system. It was the misfortune of this settlement that it came too late; the Constitution of 1791 met admirably the needs of 1789, but the situation of 1789 had gone by. When the Constituent submitted to the king the revised text of the constitution, it had ceased to represent the Revolution. Its most prominent
Mirabeau. figure was Mirabeau; this Provençal nobleman, who had served in two arms of the French army, passed six years in and out of French prisons, conducted an involved series of love-affairs, and published works on Prussia, *Lettres de cachet*, the Jews, the salt marshes of Franche-Comté, and concerts in Amsterdam, was in 1789 the only well-known member of the Third Estate; his democratic principles made him a leader in the parliamentary phase of the Revolution, but his ambition for authority and his instinct for public order led him to attach himself as an adviser to the Court. The king's action during 1790 was largely determined by Mirabeau's notes to his 'wards', but his adviser's public influence

was diminished by this intimacy, the suspicion of purchase, and the unpleasant flavour of his earlier career. Mirabeau's settlement was a judicious compromise, but the situation of France was not adapted to compromise, and the future lay with men of more absolute views. There were rising into prominence in the clubs a number of men whose names were unfamiliar in the Assembly: Robespierre, Danton, Marat, Brissot, and Hébert. They were the men of the Revolution.

§ 6. The Legislative Assembly.

The Legislative Assembly, which met immediately after the separation of the Constituent, derived its character from two facts: the Constituent had with singular self-denial excluded its own members from seeking re-election, and the primary elections for the Legislative had been held in the week before the flight to Varennes. It resulted that its members were largely inexperienced, and that they did not adequately represent the Republican temper, which, especially in Paris, had grown up since the king's unfortunate excursion. The Right or conservative side of the chamber was controlled by the Feuillants, who adhered to the settlement of 1791, whilst the Left was occupied by a Jacobin group, which evolved gradually into the party of the Girondins. This section had its origin in a group of humanitarian deputies, headed by Brissot and united by a common interest in the colonial problem of slavery; it included Condorcet, Clavière, and Roland, and became a unit for political discussion and social evenings, without as yet separating itself from the main body of Jacobinism.

October 1.

The king selected a Feuillant ministry, which defended the settlement of 1791 by measures against the *émigrés* and the refractory clergy; it was the object of ministers to make monarchy popular, and it became the business

Nov. 9 and 29.

of the Girondins, as an opposition, to devise an alternative policy. They found it in the demand for a war; Brissot stimulated the agitation, and in response to the eloquence of Isnard, Parisian opinion began to feel the need of clearing the frontiers of envious *émigrés* and suspicious foreigners. Robespierre, who disapproved of
1792. this policy, detached the Jacobins and left the Girondins to demand a war alone. A parliamentary success justified their agitation; the Feuillant Government
March 19. fell, and a Girondin ministry was formed by Roland and Dumouriez. Four weeks later war was declared against Austria, and the Girondins were faced with the double problem of inventing a policy and conducting a war. Their party organization was of the loosest kind, the leadership of Brissot was unacknowledged, and the *salon* of Madame Roland supplied the most tangible centre of the group. Its attitude to the monarchy was indeterminate; some of its members were definitely republican, but as a party it took no corporate view of the question, and confined its part to steering a middle course between the Jacobins and the Feuillants. Its sincere adhesion to democracy was undeniable, although its idealistic estimate of popular virtues was to wane with its own popularity.

The strength of this provincial group, which now governed France, lay in a circle of districts remote from the influence of the capital—Provence, Guyenne, Limousin, Brittany, Normandy, and Picardy. It was its weakness that its authority had to be exercised in Paris, where it lacked support. The war opened disastrously, and Roland resigned, but Dumouriez remained in office, and the Girondins retained the control of French policy. The king, encouraged by Lafayette, refused his assent to some progressive proposals and provoked a revolu-

tionary *journée*. A Paris crowd armed itself and visited the Assembly and the Tuileries; the Girondins and Louis were confronted instructively with their real masters. Vergniaud and Isnard protected the king from the crowd, and for a moment the vague principles of the Girondins almost crystallized into constitutional Feuillantism. But a solvent was immediately supplied by the reactionary proposals of Lafayette, and the Girondins abolished the royal veto. From the Jacobins came a steady demand for the abolition of monarchy, but the Girondins went no further than an eloquent denunciation of the crimes of royalty. Whilst the Assembly was endeavouring to devise in the *baiser Lamourette* a constitutional formula, which would unite it, the king defied Paris by dismissing the Mayor, and a second *journée* was only averted by his immediate retreat from an untenable position. The proclamation of *la patrie en danger* provoked an immense outburst of patriotism; and the national demands, as expressed by the *fédérés*, who now began to assemble in Paris for the Fête, included the suspension of the king and a national Convention.

June 20. June 28. July 2. July 7. July 11. July 14.

The republican movement, which was strong in Paris, received its greatest stimulus from beyond the frontier; the publication of Brunswick's menacing proclamation convinced Frenchmen of the anti-national intrigues of the Court, and converted forty-seven out of the forty-eight Sections of Paris to. Republicanism. The result was a *journée*, in which the Tuileries was attacked and captured, and the king was driven to take refuge in the Assembly. It was the end of effective monarchy. The massacre of sixty men of the Swiss Guard was a dramatic episode which distracted attention from the real significance of the day. The revolutionary

July 25. August 10.

municipality of Paris had assumed control of the Revolution; the rising was the direct consequence of a refusal by the Assembly of the Mayor's demand for a Republic, and its success was assured by the organization of Danton, a municipal official. A revolutionary Commune had substituted itself for the municipality, and the government of France became an incident in the political life of Paris.

The immediate consequence was a provisional Republic, and a Girondin government was formed, of which Danton was a member. The Assembly took the opportunity to destroy the *bourgeois* distinction which the Constituent had drawn between the two classes of
August 19. citizens. Nine days later a Prussian army passed the frontier, and France was invaded. In a fortnight it
Sept. 2. was known in Paris that Brunswick had invested Verdun, and that there was not a single fortified position between the Prussians and the capital. Paris was in a high fever of panic; popular suspicion had long pointed to an Austrian Committee at the Tuileries and secret communications between the Court and the *émigrés*; it was now transformed into a more dangerous force. Marat in his paper indicated that the prisons of Paris were full of traitors, whose continued existence paralysed the armies on the frontier; he joined a committee of the Commune and organized a massacre, whose range was to include the imprisoned aristocrats and the Girondin ministers. Danton was divided between a desire to stimulate the people of Paris and the anxiety to divert their energy towards the frontier. The Girondins, who were to attack the September massacres as an afterthought, made no effective pro-
Sept. 2–6. test. For five days the revolutionaries controlled the prisons of Paris, and murdered 1,400 persons with

a meaningless pretence of trial. It was the act of desperate men in a threatened city. Two weeks later the Legislative Assembly was succeeded by the Convention, and after a short debate on the evening of its first sitting the French monarchy ceased to exist. Sept. 21.

§ 7. Foreign Policy.

The European history of the Revolution is composed of two phases: a pacific phase, in which the intellectuals of France exchanged congratulations with the intellectuals of Europe on the birth of an enlightened state, and a militant phase, in which French armies endeavoured to impose upon Europe the settlement of the Revolution and to achieve the traditional objects of French policy. At first it appeared likely that France would be excluded by the absorbing work of national reconstruction from international affairs; the revolutions of England and Holland had produced a similar effect, and it was anticipated in the case of France by Burke and Mirabeau. Such a result was not unwelcome to the powers of Europe. England under the government of Pitt was anxious for the prolongation of peace, and the possibility of war would be reduced alike by the temporary disappearance of France and the substitution of a constitutional for an absolute king; Louis XVI was a more desirable neighbour than Louis XIV. Austrian policy was equally pacific; a government which was already embarrassed with the war against Turkey, the observation of Russian development, and the suppression of revolts in Belgium and Hungary, was not eager to appear as a belligerent in Western Europe. A less favourable element was imported by Russia; it was impossible to gratify an increasing appetite for Polish territory unless the attention of Prussian and Austrian policy could be conveniently distracted. If Catharine II welcomed the Revolution as a *philosophe*, she used it as a diplomatist. 1789.

1790. At first it appeared that the Revolution would remain true to its pacific professions. The Anglo-Spanish dispute of Nootka Sound afforded a test of French policy. Spain and England were on the brink of war, and it remained for France to recognize the *casus foederis* and by a junction with Spain to declare her continued adhesion to Bourbon policy and the Family Compact. Louis XVI prepared for a naval war; the Constituent intervened and in a temper of pacificism discontinued the French armaments. The Revolution had disowned the policy of the Bourbons and proceeded to the elaboration of its own. That policy was expressed in the Girondin agitation for a war and provoked two years later a conflict with the monarchies of Central Europe.

Causes of the war. The dispute of Europe with the Revolution originated in two matters of political detail: the feudal rights retained by Imperial princes in Alsace under the Peace of Westphalia, and the Papal *enclave* of Avignon. The gulf which was opening between France and Europe was indicated by the treatment on either side of these problems. Alsatian feudalism had been logically included in the general abolition of French privileges, but the German princes chose to refuse the French offer of compensation. Avignon was geographically a French unit, and its insurrection undoubtedly entitled it to French consideration, but its annexation by France constituted an unwise reversal of a European settlement; Mirabeau resisted the demand until his death, but the war party had made it a test of patriotic policy. The real cause of the war, which underlay these pretexts, was the new temper of France; Frenchmen, from being the subjects of a dynasty, had become the members of a nation. Whether their motive was a democratic anxiety to carry the new doctrines through Europe or

a patriotic design to impress it with their new strength, it was equally effective in propelling them towards a war, and it resulted from this confusion of motive that a conflict, which began as a war of propaganda, continued as a war of conquest.

The militant temper received its final impulse from the policy of the Court. The queen, whose devotion to Austria was redoubled by her experience of France, never ceased to appeal for foreign aid; her correspondence made no pretence of patriotism, and her hopes lay with the mobilized *émigrés* behind the Rhine. For a time she was unsupported by the king, but the Civil Constitution of the clergy drove Louis into opposition. The flight to Varennes branded him as a willing *émigré*; it became known that he had consented to purchase foreign aid with a partition of France, and it was obvious that he preferred an invasion to the Revolution. The French monarchy appealed to Europe; England refused to join in any policy of intervention, and the Austrian Government devised a dignified retreat in the Declaration of Pillnitz. That document, issued by Austria and Prussia, acquiesced in the British refusal and made European unanimity the sole condition of intervention in France. It should have ensured peace, but it precipitated war. French opinion overlooked the proviso of unanimity and misinterpreted the Declaration as an unconditional threat. It was read both in Paris and Coblentz as an ultimatum, and eight months later war was declared.

1791. August 27. 1792. April 20.

§ 8. The War.

France confronted the military monarchies of Central Europe with an army of 80,000 men. The *corps* of officers had been reduced by the emigrations, and the discipline of the ranks had been impaired by the spread of democracy; but since the volunteers formed as yet

a force of no military significance, France was saved in the first campaign by the army of the monarchy. Its infantry was well drilled, its artillery had been re-armed by Gribeauval, and its military thought was the most advanced in Europe. It was probable that the force, in which Napoleon was receiving his training, was at least equal in its grasp of theory to the Prussian service, which clung convulsively to the tradition of Frederick the Great.

The first engagements were discouraging; an attempt
April 28. to utilize the Belgian Revolution by a raid on the Low Countries resulted only in a series of slight but undignified reverses. It seemed that enlightenment had made the French soldier hysterical, and the Austrian defensive was well maintained. The concentration in western Germany of an army of invasion imposed upon the
July 25. French a defensive attitude, and whilst Brunswick slowly directed a mixed force of Prussians, Austrians, and *émigrés* towards the frontier, two French armies moved into line to meet him, one under Lafayette at Sedan, the other under Luckner at Metz. The news of
August 10. the storm of the Tuileries and the termination of effective monarchy caused the desertion of Lafayette and the supersession of Luckner. Nine days later the Prussians
August 19. entered France from the territory of Luxemburg; a bombardment of forty-eight hours secured the fortress of Longwy. Brunswick passed the Meuse and
Sept. 2. invested Verdun; the system of Vauban had armed no fortresses in second line, and the fall of Verdun opened to the Prussians a direct march upon Paris by the plain of Champagne. There intervened 170 miles of road, the army of Dumouriez, and the hills of the Argonne. Dumouriez, who had withdrawn the northern army from Sedan, held this line as a last defence, and drew

considerable reinforcements from Kellermann's army of Metz. The Prussians passed to the west of him, having turned the line of the Argonne, and stood between the French army and Paris. It now became necessary for Brunswick to clear his communications in rear before he advanced on the capital, and an attack was made upon the French, who were in position at Valmy. It failed, and the Prussian march on Paris was arrested by the existence in their rear of an unbeaten French army. It was impossible for them to remain isolated in the middle of France, an armistice was negotiated, and in four weeks the Prussians were behind the Rhine. The guns of Valmy demonstrated in the hearing of Europe that the Revolution was capable of self-defence; twenty-four hours later it issued to the military monarchies the challenge of the Republic.

Sept. 20.

Sept. 21.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: THE CONVENTION

§ 1. The Republic. § 2. The year 1793. § 3. The Terror. § 4. The Reaction.

§ 1. The Republic.

THE National Convention, which was the third and decisive Parliament of the Revolution, met whilst the Prussian guns were trained on the hill of Valmy. Its revolutionary character was assured by the time of its
1792. meeting and the nature of its composition. It had been elected in the weeks following the Prussian invasion, and it reflected in its membership the desperate temper of that time. It was an assembly of the men of the Revolution. Ex-members of the Constituent and Legislative alike had been admitted as candidates, and Danton, Robespierre, and Marat now sat in the same chamber as the Girondins. The Convention consisted of the democratic Left of the Legislative, the advanced members of the Constituent, who had been excluded from the second Parliament and confined for twelve months to the political clubs of Paris, and the provincial democrats who had risen to prominence under the new system of local government. Paris, which had become increasingly republican since the flight to Varennes and predominantly so since the *journée* of August 10, was represented exclusively by Jacobins; its electors had expressed a clear preference for a Republic, and it was
Sept. 21. not surprising that upon the motion of a deputy for Paris the Convention on the second day of its session abolished monarchy. Twenty-four hours later the new form of

government received its name, with a surprising lack of ceremony, from the proposal of a second Parisian member that documents should be dated from the Year I of the Republic. Sept. 22.

The Republic was the result of two factors, the Prussian invasion, which created the problem of defence, and Parisian Jacobinism, which had assumed control of the Revolution. The government, which was inaugurated within one day of the gun-fire of Valmy, was a government of national defence, and the republican solution, which was imposed by the Convention, was a Parisian solution. The dictatorship of Paris, which now governed France, resulted from the traditional dependence of the country upon its capital, the supreme peril of that capital in the path of the Prussian armies, the disproportionate importance which its clubs had derived as the sole platform from which during the life of the Legislative the leading men of the Revolution had been able to address France, and the initiative of the Paris crowd, which by the storm of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, and the storm of the Tuileries on August 10, 1792, had taken two steps of supreme importance in the Revolution. This dictatorship found its most significant expression in the career of Danton, a provincial barrister who rose to prominence as an official of the Paris municipality. He had organized the *journée* of August 10, and his appreciation of the military position led him to support in the interests of defence the provisional concentration in Paris of all control. The Girondins, from their provincial origin and a democratic distaste for such a dictatorship, were opposed to the Parisian policy; this party, which now contained 165 members, was united by nothing more closely than by its view that the Parisian dictatorship was an

improper usurpation by the Department of the Seine of rights which should be shared with the rest of France; Paris to the Girondins was one Department among eighty-three. It is the issue upon which they were eventually condemned. Of federalism in any constructive sense they were almost entirely innocent; but their attitude to Paris brought them inevitably into hostile contact with the Jacobins, and through them with the Revolution. The future lay always with the Left of the revolutionary chambers; the Girondins had been the Left of the Legislative: they were the Right of the Convention.

The battle of Valmy achieved on the frontier a more positive result than the check given to the Prussian invasion; it provoked in the army and its commanders a temper of confidence, which tempted the Revolution to seek room for expansion at the expense of European monarchies. The French power proceeded to violate the limits which Europe had imposed upon it; in the autumn of 1792 the Revolution broke the dams. The middle Rhine was securely held against it, but to the north and south of that line the armies of the Republic passed the frontier. In the south, whilst Montesquiou occupied Savoy, Anselme projected the raising of Italy for the Revolution; on the Rhine Custine captured
Oct. 21. Mainz and threatened the safe return of the Prussians from Champagne; and in the north-east Dumouriez invaded the Low Countries. The causes of this triple offensive lay in the conquering temper evoked by the battle of Valmy, in the ambitions of the generals, who now entered the Revolution as a new and decisive factor, and in the revolutionary taste for a war of propaganda, which received some slight encouragement from the appeals of Belgian, Rhenish, and Savoyard democrats.

The resistance to it was weakened by the attitude of the military monarchies. Prussia and Austria now discerned a more lucrative theatre of war in Poland; and although the defence of the Netherlands was once more to attract Austrian attention westward, Prussian interest in the war never recovered after the campaign of Valmy. The operations of Custine in western Germany effected no lasting result, but Dumouriez, with a greater command of the national resources, achieved a successful raid on the Low Countries. He dislodged an Austrian army Nov. 6.
from Jemmapes and demonstrated that French troops could capture a position; his victory opened the road into Germany by the line of the Meuse. Liège was occupied, and his advance brought him in the last days of November to the fortress of Maestricht.

In Paris the Convention had not yet found its occupation in the absorbing struggle between the Girondins and the Jacobins; an attempt was made to proscribe provincial federalism in the declaration of the Republic One and Indivisible, but the Girondins expressed their dissatisfaction with the formula in an ineffective attack on Robespierre and the Commune. All parties were now united in an interlude which was irrelevant to the main contest. The position of the king, which had been impossible since August 10, was still further compromised by the discovery of his diplomatic correspondence; and Dec. 3.
a committee was appointed by the Convention to draft an indictment of Louis Capet. Its labours were completed in a week, and a Girondin deputy tabled a set of thirty-three interrogatories. The king appeared at the Dec. 11.
bar of the Convention and defended himself without heat; he was granted the services of counsel and an adjournment for the preparation of his case. On the day after Christmas the trial began.

§ 2. The year 1793.

The year 1793, which is the central date of the Revolution, contained three groups of events, the political history of Paris, the military history of the frontiers, and the civil war. Its history was the result of their interaction. The collapse of the offensive, which had followed Valmy, reduced the French armies to a laborious defence of their own territory. The north-eastern frontier, which was the nearest to Paris, was especially threatened, and it resulted from the alarm of the capital that the Jacobins overturned the Girondins and accentuated the provisional dictatorship of Paris. This domination, which was necessary for the organization of the national resources in face of invasion, was unacknowledged in the Departments remote from the influence of Paris and the path of the invasion; provincial unrest deepened into civil war, and Paris was threatened by Frenchmen from the south and west. The armies of the monarchies advanced steadily in the north; and the Convention, under this double menace, substituted for the government of Danton the more rigid domination of Robespierre and the Great Committee. Under the new government the republican effort, which in Paris expressed itself in the desperate expedient of the Terror, succeeded on the frontier in rolling back the invasion.

The year opened with the interlude of the king's trial;
Jan. 7. the temper of the Convention was manifest at the end of the hearing, and its answer to the questions which were left to it was certain. It was obvious that the king's continued existence at large provided a focus for
Jan. 15. royalist plots and a menace to the Revolution. The question of his guilt was answered unanimously, a reference to the people was refused by a large majority, and the Convention passed sentence of death. Louis XVI
Jan. 21. was guillotined on the Place de la Révolution within

sight of the Tuileries and in the eyes of Europe. Ten days later England entered the war.

The intervention of Great Britain, which affected Feb. 1.
materially the military situation in the Low Countries, was impelled by motives more serious than a romantic sympathy with a cruelly widowed queen or the personal desire of George III to avenge the beheading of a king. British opinion, which had received the storm of the Bastille with satisfaction, had been alarmed by the passionate invective of Burke; with the invasion of the Low Countries it became definitely hostile. When the Revolution expressed a doctrine of natural frontiers in the invasion of Belgium and a doctrine of natural rights in the opening of the Scheldt, it became clear to England that the Republic was concealing under a more modern and impressive terminology the traditional objects of French policy. The ambition of France to control the Low Countries had been defeated in the wars of Louis XIV; it must be defeated once again in the war of the Revolution. The execution of Louis XVI was merely a shock; the opening of the Scheldt was a *casus belli*. It resulted from this intervention that Prussia and Austria received, apart from British military support, the necessary encouragement of British money; a system of subsidies supplemented the dispatch of an expeditionary force, and the Austrian defensive, which had receded before Dumouriez, returned upon him in force. The continued resistance of Maestricht obstructed his effort to extend the area of French control from the valley of the Meuse to the valley of the Rhine; the siege was abandoned, and the French armies withdrew March 1.
towards their own frontier. The retreat was interrupted by reverses at Neerwinden, Louvain, and Ath, and Dumouriez was discouraged into treachery. The supervision

of the Convention was irritating to an officer in responsible command, an attempt to tamper with the republican temper of the army failed completely, and from the camp of Maulde behind the French frontier Dumouriez deserted to the Austrians. The French offensive had exhausted its strength, and the armies of the Republic lay along the northern frontier to meet the invasion.

April 3.

April 5.

It resulted from this campaign that the need for a more stringent organization of the national resources was appreciated in Paris. Twenty-four hours after the treason of Dumouriez the Committee of Public Safety was instituted by decree; it sat under the direction of Danton and contained nine members. It had been preceded by the creation of *Représentants en mission*, through whom the Convention could control military operations, and of a *Tribunal révolutionnaire*, which protected by a summary jurisdiction the life of the Revolution. The Girondins attempted by an exercise of their parliamentary strength to arrest the development; an attack on Marat resulted in his acquittal by the new court and provoked an intervention of the Paris crowd. In two *journées* the pressure of Paris was exercised upon the Convention in the denunciation of provincial deputies and an invasion of the Assembly; and in deference to Paris the Convention voted the arrest of twenty-nine of its own members. It was the fall of the Girondins.

April 6.

April 13.

May 31, June 2.

The effect in the provinces was immediate; Provence, Normandy, and the Vendée rose against Paris. The Gironde demanded a new Convention to sit at Bourges, but the movement in Bordeaux was rapidly repressed. The position in the Rhone valley was more serious; Lyon was in open insurrection, and the federal army of Marseilles controlled the river as far north as Orange.

June 7.

A force was detached from the army which was holding the Alpine frontier against the Sardinians, to reduce Lyon by a formal siege, and a republican division commanded by Carteaux moved down the Rhone to meet the Marseillais. The menace of the military situation, which encircled Paris, was increasing; every man who could be put in line was needed to confront the army of invasion, which was now approaching the fortresses of the northern frontier. Danton, who controlled the Committee, proposed to meet it with a vigorous military policy and a surprising adhesion to traditional French diplomacy; he proposed to isolate Austria, regarded Prussia as a natural ally, and was under a grave delusion as to the friendly intentions of England. It was not a policy by which France could be saved in the summer of 1793. Whilst Coburg besieged Condé and the republican armies with difficulty held the provincial insurrection at arm's length from Paris, the Convention was permitted for two weeks to debate a new constitution.

June 24. Constitution of 1793.

The Constitution of 1793 was a democratic document; it embodied a single chamber, universal suffrage, the direct election of deputies, and direct democratic control of legislation. It was never put into operation; Danton's attempt to reconcile France with Paris was vigorous and well conceived, but the moment of its promulgation, at the height of a civil war, was unfortunate. In addition to the invasion and the southern rebellion, Paris was now confronted with the rising in the Vendée, which presented a graver menace than the suppressed movement in Normandy. It had its origin in Breton attachment to the Church and in agricultural resentment against military service; but a more dangerous phase resulted from the capture of the movement by royalism. A pro-

vincial insurrection became the Catholic and Royal Army, and the lower Loire was held for Louis XVII. A defeat at Châtillon alarmed Paris, and the Convention
July 10. reconstructed the Committee of Public Safety, omitting Danton. Two weeks later Robespierre was elected: it had become the Great Committee.

July 27. The situation inherited by Robespierre and the Jacobins was one of simple gravity; the provisional organization of a Parisian government confronted an invasion by the monarchies of Europe and an insurrection by the provinces of France. The defence of the northern frontier was conducted by a discouraged army, which lay in cantonments behind a group of fortresses; the army of invasion directed its efforts to the reduction of those fortresses by siege. Paris was protected by the quadrilateral of Condé, Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, and Maubeuge; upon the resistance of their garrisons and the deliberation of Coburg's sieges depended the date of his appearance on Montmartre. Condé, the first of the group, had fallen before Danton left office, Valen-
July 28. ciennes fell within twenty-four hours of Robespierre's accession to the Committee. The defences of Paris were now reduced to two fortresses and the Army of the North. The republican response was the inclusion of Carnot in the Committee and the decree of the *levée en masse*. Carnot, an ex-officer of engineers, who had been
Aug. 14. prominent in the military organization of the north, assumed in Paris supreme control of operations, and the
Aug. 23. first draft of conscripts sent 450,000 men to the frontiers; the regimental problems created by their fusion with the existing forces were dealt with in the *Amalgame*, and France confronted the professional armies of monarchical Europe as the first nation in arms. But the real salvation of France came from its invaders; whilst

the Austrians laid siege to le Quesnoy, the Duke of York diverted the Anglo-Hanoverian contingent to the capture of Dunkirk. This intrusion of a British ambition into an international enterprise was fatal to the invaders; the besieging army was defeated at Hondschoote and withdrew from France. Three days later Le Quesnoy surrendered, and Maubeuge alone remained. Carnot left Paris, concentrated a relieving force behind the sole surviving fortress of the quadrilateral, and attacked the Austrians in position at Wattignies. A surprising employment of the bayonet dislodged the besiegers, Maubeuge was relieved, and the northern frontier was saved. Carnot had held the road to Paris.

Sept. 8.

Oct. 16.

Elsewhere in France the military situation was less acute. The eastern frontier, which was threatened without enthusiasm by the Prussians, was protected by a defensive campaign in Alsace; a Spanish army of invasion moved deliberately about Roussillon; and the Rhone valley was gradually recovered from the Federalists. Marseilles was recaptured in the summer, and Lyon yielded to a formal siege and bombardment. A more serious problem was presented by Toulon; the naval fortress proclaimed Louis XVII and placed itself under the protection of an Anglo-Spanish fleet. The English omitted to control the theatre of hills behind the town, and from this commanding but difficult position the republican army began a siege. Its inadequate artillery was commanded by a Captain Bonaparte.

This officer, a Corsican of Italian family, was born in 1769 and only escaped being born a British subject by the accident of Lord Shelburne's foreign policy. His education at Brienne and the École Militaire impressed his teachers with his talent for geometry and inspired one of them to the prediction that he would make an

admirable sailor. He entered the artillery and joined as second-lieutenant in 1785 the Régiment La Fère, stationed at Valence. His military education was conducted in the best-trained arm of the most intelligent service in Europe; the technical advances of Gribeauval combined with the theory of Guibert to provide the French officer with unrivalled opportunities of development. For four years at Valence and Auxonne Bonaparte trained himself in a fever of reading and annotation; he wrote promiscuously on Corsica, Rousseau, human happiness, English history, and love, and even projected a novel named *Lord Essex*. With the outbreak of the Revolution he came in contact at Auxonne with a riot and a mutiny of gunners. Two years later he was promoted first-lieutenant at Valence, and became a prominent local Jacobin; but he soon returned to the confused and fascinating politics of Corsica, where his first *coup d'état* obtained him a commission in the national volunteers. After an interval of five months spent in Paris, in which he witnessed the storm of the Tuileries and was promoted captain, he returned to Corsica. After commanding an expedition against a neighbouring island he was compelled, early in 1793, to withdraw his family to France. He became attached to the republican army of Carteaux in the Rhone valley and commanded two guns and sixteen men at the recapture of Avignon. Acquaintance with a Corsican *Représentant en mission* strengthened his position, and he appeared before Toulon in command of the republican artillery. The fall of Lyon in October liberated a more adequate supply of guns, and the recommendations of Bonaparte were adopted by his superiors. The foreign
Dec. 7. fleets were threatened by the appearance of French batteries on a height commanding the harbour, and the

Anglo-Spanish force evacuated Toulon. Four days later Dec. 19.
the royalists of the Vendée, who had been twice shaken
in the autumn, were decisively defeated for the second Dec. 23.
time at Savenay.

The problem which had confronted the government of Robespierre was mainly external to Paris; it had been solved before the end of the year by the victories of the republican armies. In Paris itself the foremost need was to obtain by firm government a respite from the series of revolutionary *journées*. The suspension of the Constitution of 1793 averted any untimely ebullition of democracy, the *levée en masse* diverted military energy towards the frontiers, and the *Loi du maximum* prevented bread-riots. The hands of the *Tribunal révolutionnaire* were strengthened by the *Loi des suspects*, and its activities satisfied even the exigencies of the Parisians. A problem of minor importance was provided by the prisoners of the Revolution. The Jacobins held in detention the Queen, the Dauphin, and a number of Girondin deputies; such prisoners were unwelcome in a city which already saw itself besieged and starving. The queen was guillotined, whilst the republican infantry moved against Wattignies. Two weeks later the Girondins were sentenced and went singing to the scaffold; these men failed because they had not organized themselves and could not organize France. They were a provincial group in a Parisian assembly, with some natural gifts, many natural virtues, and the parliamentary habit. They saw with a clear vision and expressed with a singular eloquence the high ideals of 1789; but the watchword of one generation may be an ineffective formula to the next. The cause of their failure, as of the Jacobin success, was extremely simple: it was the year 1793.

§ 3. The Terror.

The government of Robespierre coincided with the period of the Terror. This appalling manifestation of panic formed no part of the Jacobin programme of firm government, but was the direct and unpremeditated outcome of the supreme peril of Paris. It was not surprising that in an unfortified city, which the Girondin Isnard had threatened with destruction and three armies of invasion menaced with bombardment, men proceeded to enforce a policy of desperate revenges. The news from the frontiers convinced Paris that it was a military position in extreme danger; by a natural logic it applied to its inhabitants the full rigour of military law. Treachery to the Revolution was regarded and punished as desertion in face of the enemy, and by the *Loi des suspects* the suspicion of such treachery became equivalent to the act. Promiscuous decrees of outlawry, the confiscation of outlaws' property, and the closing of the barriers completed a system which was regarded as a necessary part of the war of national defence. The guillotine on the Place de la Révolution was the complement of the armies on the frontier.

Behind the defensive line of the armies and above the Parisian confusion of the Terror, the government of France was conducted by the two Committees, which received an added predominance from the suppression of all local government. The lesser Committee of General Security dealt with all questions of civil administration and police, whilst the Committee of Public Safety formed in effect a council of ministers. In the Great Committee Carnot, Lindet, and the two Prieurs constituted an informal ministry of war, Barère acted as minister of foreign affairs, and Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois composed a ministry of the interior; Robespierre exercised his acknowledged predominance

as first minister without portfolio, and his wishes were transmitted by Couthon to the home department and by Saint-Just to the ministry of war. It was in some ways the most efficient government in Europe.

A. The frontiers.

The situation on the frontiers became rapidly less acute. In Eastern Europe the problem of Poland was entering on its final and most absorbing phase, and Prussian troops were increasingly withdrawn from the Rhine to a more advantageous activity on the Vistula. In the Low Countries Austria displayed a rapidly declining interest in the defence of a province which had so recently been in rebellion, and Great Britain alone of the allies found in the war against France an enterprise which coincided with its national interests. To Englishmen the control of the Netherlands was a vital matter; the occupation of Toulon and the siege of Dunkirk afforded a tempting prospect, and successful operations against the French and Dutch colonies might qualify the war of 1793 as an attractive resumption of the colonial struggle, which had filled the eighteenth century. On the northern frontier the allied armies were aligned from the North Sea at Nieuport to the gorge of the Meuse at Dinant; the republican army of Pichegru confronted them from Dunkirk to Maubeuge. An offensive movement designed by Carnot brought the armies into contact, and Mack, an Austrian officer, supplied the allies with a *plan de destruction*; it was put into operation against the French forces holding Lille and resulted in the French victory of Tourcoing. This engagement, in which the British contingent was roughly handled, has been attributed variously to the fog, a deliberate cultivation of defeat by the Austrian staff, and the epilepsy of the Archduke Charles, who commanded a division; it resulted, however, from the

1794.

February.

April.

May 18.

new fact that republican troops had become capable of manœuvre. It was followed by a general advance of the French, who entered Belgium by the line of the Sambre;
June 26. the defensive victory of Fleurus secured their position, and the allies retired towards the north-east. The republicans occupied Brussels and the Belgian littoral and continued their advance along the Meuse into Dutch territory;
October. the English fought a vigorous but unsuccessful campaign of rearguard actions, the Dutch fortresses fell in succession, and the allies withdrew from the Meuse to the Waal. The Revolution had entered Europe.

On the eastern frontier the decline of Prussian interest in the war enabled the French to control western
Dec. 27. Germany as far as the Rhine; Mainz was besieged and captured, and the doctrine of natural frontiers received its fullest application from the republican armies. In the south-east a less successful campaign was conducted in the Maritime Alps; its chief importance is that Bonaparte was enabled as military adviser to the *Représentants en mission* to study the ground of his own later operations.

B. Paris. In Paris the government of Robespierre was confronted with two groups of adversaries, the extreme revolutionaries led by Hébert and the *Indulgents* led by Danton. The Hébertists represented in the fullest exaggeration the tendencies of the Revolution; its secular side was magnified into a madness of anti-religion, and its provisional measures were erected into a worship of the Terror. Robespierre's attitude towards Hébert was distinct; his refined deism was shocked by Hébert's reiterated blasphemy, and his academic taste for clemency was revolted by the constant demand for heads. When Hébert's offensiveness deepened into
March 4. insurrection, Robespierre did not hesitate to strike.

Hébert was guillotined because he was too advanced. March 24.
The Revolution had reached its highest point: it was beginning to recede.

Robespierre's attitude towards the *Indulgents* was vaguer; he was inclined towards the policy of mercy and relaxation which Danton advocated, but he was not prepared to see it imposed upon his government by a political competitor. Ten days after the execution of Hébert Danton was arrested; for a moment the March 31.
Convention appeared to resent this supreme exercise of Robespierre's personal dictatorship, but it was bullied into silence; and a week later, on the day of his sentence, Danton went to the guillotine. His eloquence, April 5.
which had saved France from invasion, almost saved his life.

Robespierre was now at liberty to elaborate his Robespierre.
system. The ideas of this elegant and fastidious barrister of Artois resulted from a personal predilection in favour of deism and an almost literal acceptance of the writings of Rousseau; his speeches, which neither expressed nor aroused enthusiasm, were carefully composed and deliberately read; powdered hair and a provincial neatness of dress completed the equipment of this singular dictator. Twenty-four hours after the April 6.
death of Danton, Couthon announced to the Convention the re-establishment of dogmatic religion. In a solemn ceremony, Robespierre introduced to France the deistic June 8.
cult of the Supreme Being: seven weeks later his government had ceased to exist. His personal ascendancy was emphasized in an acceleration of the Terror; by a new law the *Tribunal révolutionnaire* dispensed June 10.
with the tedious formality of evidence. In the thirteen months which preceded this decree there had been 1,220 executions; in the forty-nine days which followed

it there were 1,376. The bloodshed began to appear meaningless, as the circumstances which had created the Terror ceased to exist. The exceptional measures which had been justified when the invasion and the rebellions drew a narrowing circle round Paris, lacked meaning or motive when the insurrections were sup-
June 26. pressed and the armies of the Republic were on the middle Meuse. Paris emerged from its nightmare of panic and saw only the automatic prolongation of the Terror by the government of Robespierre. A Jacobin group organized resistance in the Convention and in the Committee itself, and directed against Robespierre the *journées* of Thermidor. In the first scene he was
July 27. arrested in the tribune of his own Parliament; he was rescued and carried to the Hôtel de Ville. In the second scene he was again arrested, shot through the jaw, at the centre of an insurrection of the Commune; all that night he lay on a table. In the last scene, he was
July 28. guillotined on a summer evening in the Place de la Révolution.

§ 4. The Reaction. The brief and fortuitous work of the two days of Thermidor ended the Terror and began the reaction. The effort had been made by a coalition of two groups, on the Left a body of deserting Jacobins headed by Billaud, Collot, Barère, and Carnot, and on the Right the real Thermidorians grouped round Barras, Tallien, and Fréron. Behind the effort was the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, which steered for the new government a meticulous middle course between the latent royalism of the provinces and the starving violence of the Paris streets. That government was subject in its policy to pressure from three sides; the provinces were frankly royalist, Paris was for some time severely Jacobin, and the Thermidorians themselves displayed a republicanism

which was by no means unimpeachable. These men expressed their influence in a revival of the social life of Paris; the *salon* is not a republican institution. Young men with heavy sticks affected a cult of royalist rowdyism, the Thermidorians adopted a supercilious attitude towards the Republic, and their wives resented the vulgarity of a movement which had paralysed fashion for five years.

In this atmosphere the new government approached the problem of reconstructing the Republic. A solution which satisfied all parties was found in the parliamentary sovereignty of the Convention, and for fourteen months France was governed by this assembly, which had survived so much. The remaining Jacobins were satisfied by a nominal concession, by which the forms of the revolutionary system were preserved. The July 31.
Committee of Public Safety was retained, although its absolute dictatorship was reduced by the new rotation of its members and the restriction of its authority to the departments of war and foreign affairs. A more characteristic enterprise was the destruction of the machinery of the Terror; the law of June 10 was repealed, and the reduction of the *Tribunal* within the normal limits of criminal procedure was emphasized by August 1.
the trial of the Public Prosecutor and fifteen of his collaborators from the bench and the jury-box. The Paris prisons were cleared of republican prisoners; and the provincial Terror was ended by the suppression of the revolutionary committees and the execution of Carrier, who had made the *noyades* of Nantes. It was the most significant contrast of all that the government, Nov. 11.
which closed the Jacobins Club, readmitted to Paris the Girondins.

The elaboration of this parliamentary compromise,

which substituted for the committees the government of the Convention, was not achieved without interruption. Through the autumn which followed the fall of Robespierre the Paris crowd acquiesced in the reconstruction which was proceeding in the Convention and
1795. in society; but in the spring the price of bread revived popular enthusiasm for the late government. The *Loi du maximum* had been hastily repealed, and in its absence Paris was starving: 'Bread and the Constitution of 1793' became a cry, a *journée* was improvised,
April 1. and a crowd shouted at the Convention for four hours; troops were displayed in the streets, and the government became almost royalist in its attitude to the
May. Jacobins. Through the month of May bread rose still higher, and there were deaths through starvation in the Paris streets; in the third week a royalist insurrection involved the south in the White Terror, and the government diverged sharply from the royalism towards which it had been tending. It appeared for a time that the Thermidorians in face of the national peril in Provence contemplated a reconciliation with the
May 21. Jacobins. But a second *journée* reversed the position; the government, which was becoming familiar with the application of troops to popular movements, controlled the Paris streets with the aid of the army and the royalists, and once more the future appeared to lie with royalism. Three weeks later the son of Louis XVI died
June 10. in prison, and the government reverted to a republican solution.

The solution which the Thermidorians imposed upon France was embodied in two groups of documents, the Treaties of Bâle and the Constitution of 1795. In foreign politics their system had been to detach two monarchies from the coalition and to direct them as

allies against the real enemies of France. Prussia was the traditional ally against Austria, and Spain was the traditional ally against England; the diplomatists of Thermidor adhered closely to this tradition, and the successful conduct of the campaign of 1795 enabled them to apply it. The movement into Holland, which had begun late in 1794, was brilliantly continued; French cavalry performed the picturesque capture of Dutch war-ships at a frozen anchorage, and republican troops occupied the Hague and Amsterdam. In the spring Holland and Prussia retired from a war in which they had made nothing but loss; the Prussian settlement confirmed the Republic in its acquisition of the Rhine frontier. It was the first acknowledgement by Europe of the doctrine of natural frontiers. A second natural law was vindicated in the treaty with Holland; the Scheldt was opened, and London was confronted with the competition of Antwerp. The withdrawal of Spain followed in the summer; it was a natural consequence of the Mediterranean rivalry of Spain and England and the pacific policy of Godoy.

Peace of Bâle.

July 22.

Having reduced the area of European conflict, the Thermidorian government produced its settlement of France. The Constitution of 1795 was a *bourgeois* document; its principal features were a Parliament of two chambers and an executive of five Directors. Universal suffrage was abolished, residence and the payment of taxes became necessary qualifications for voters, and deputies were required to possess houses or land. Direct democracy was limited by the prohibition of processions through the Chamber, the restriction of the public galleries, and the new franchise tests. The elections for the new Assembly were proceeding, when it was realized in the Convention that the first results

Constitution of 1795.

were monarchist. To avert the peril of a monarchist
Aug. 22. Legislature, it was immediately proposed to pass two-thirds of the Convention into the new *Corps législatif*; it was a necessary guarantee of the Republic. The
Oct. 4. royalists organized a Parisian *journée*. The Convention turned the army against the crowd, and elevated Barras to an unwelcome eminence of Commander of the Army of the Interior; his chief-of-staff was General Bonaparte. This officer, who was promoted Brigadier-General after the siege of Toulon, had been imprisoned at Antibes in Thermidor as a Jacobin. In 1795 he appeared in Paris as a general of artillery, but was transferred to the infantry and worked in the operations department of the ministry of war at plans for the Army of Italy. In the autumn he was struck off the list of generals, for a refusal to serve in the Vendée, and contemplated accepting a position as instructor to the Turkish artillery. His acquaintance with Barras procured him the practical command of the Army of the Interior in Paris. The government turned a force of 5,000 men against an
Oct. 5. insurrection of 20,000 with complete success. It was the last *journée* of the Revolution. Three weeks later
Oct. 26. the Convention dissolved after a session of three years; it had made the Republic, it had survived the Terror, and it had brought in the Army. The future of the Revolution was prepared, when General Bonaparte demonstrated in Vendémiaire that democracy is incompatible with straight streets and the field-gun.

CHAPTER IX

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: THE DIRECTORY

§ 1. The Government of France. § 2. The Rise of Bonaparte. § 3. The Republic and Europe. § 4. The Egyptian Expedition. § 5. The Fall of the Directory.

§ 1. The Government of France.

THERE intervened between the high effort of the Convention and the military dignity of the Consulate the ignoble episode of the Directory. This government, which was imposed on France by the *bourgeois* reaction in the Constitution of 1795, was conducted by revolutionaries of the second rank. For a time they were content to continue the work of compromise and pacification which had been characteristic of the last year of the Convention; but the royalist results of the elections of 1797 alarmed them for the security of their own tenure of office, and provoked them to the convulsive *coup d'état* of Fructidor. The ex-Jacobins dispensed with the *bourgeoisie* and endeavoured to impose themselves on France: the effort was not successful. It failed for two reasons: the revolutionaries were profoundly unpopular in the country, and the army had become the controlling factor in French politics. The continual employment of troops against crowds taught the generals the lesson of their own importance, and when one of them opposed himself to the government, its fall was automatic. The Directory, which attempted in its later stages to maintain its authority by a series of *coups*, came inevitably to rest its existence upon the army: it was improvident. When that support was

withdrawn from it, the government collapsed. Military support had become the sole guarantee of government; and it was by a natural sequence that a system whose establishment was protected by the guns in Vendémiaire fell in Brumaire before the grenadiers.

1795. In its first phase the Directory appeared as the natural successor of the Convention; all five of the Directors had sat in that assembly, and four of them had voted for the execution of the king, whilst the fifth was absent as a *Représentant en mission.* The state of French opinion was not unfavourable to such a continuation of the *bourgeois* Republic. Of the three parties which occupied the stage, the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, which controlled the government, was the most in sympathy with the general desire of the nation for a period of republican repose; the Jacobins were branded with the reputation of terrorists, and the royalists ran counter to the genuine popularity of the fruits of the Revolution. Acting on a middle line between these two competing groups, the government maintained itself against the Jacobin conspiracy of Babeuf and the royalist con-

1796. spiracy of Brotier. The movement of Babeuf was intended by its organizer to secure a crude form of communism and to add to the political revolution of 1789 a social and economic revolution of 1796; but it was adopted by its Jacobin supporters as a lever against the government, and their direction of this instrument against the Directory resulted in a series of execu-

1797. tions and deportations. The movement of Brotier was a simple and unsuccessful attempt to secure a portion of the republican army for Louis XVIII. Concurrently with these suppressions the government proceeded with the pacification of the Vendée; 40,000 men were withdrawn from the Spanish frontier to western France,

and the successful command of Hoche removed the remaining traces of the last of the provincial insurrections. A number of the leaders were shot, and the royalist rebellion of the Vendée, shrunk to the less imposing proportions of Breton *chouannerie*, became an affair of police.

The second or Jacobin phase of the Directory resulted from the drift of French opinion towards moderate royalism. The elections of 1797 had expressed a clear condemnation of the tradition of the Convention; only eight of its ex-members were re-elected. Paris was captured by the moderates, and the *Corps législatif* confronted the government with a royalist majority. A series of attacks were made on the official policy, and a serious conspiracy was organized under the leadership of Pichegru. The reply of the Jacobin Directors was to call in the army and to protect the Republic with a Jacobin *coup d'état*. The army on the frontiers had always remained sound in its republicanism; the real temper of the Revolution seemed to survive in the camps long after it was extinct in Paris. Barras, who organized the *coup*, diverted a strong body of troops from the north-eastern frontier towards Paris, and Bonaparte sent Augereau from the army of Italy to overawe the streets with his flamboyant uniform. The moderates were expelled from the ministry, and an efficient employment of troops produced the *coup* of Fructidor; the denunciation of a royalist plot was followed by a purge of the Chamber and the forcible dissipation of royalist and moderate groups. Deportation to Guiana was substituted for the *guillotine*, and a number of exiled deputies were sent from Paris to Rochefort in iron cages. The Jacobins had captured the Directory, and the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, which had

made the reaction in Thermidor, was finally effaced before the military republicans; it had too few ambitions and too many scruples, but above all it had no troops.

The Jacobin minority, which had thus established its authority, maintained a precarious supremacy for two years. This government, which was imposed on France with a generous display of revolutionary violence, was widely divorced from the national sympathies; by its vigorous continuation of the anti-clerical tradition it offended the provinces, which were swept at this time by a religious revival; by the prospect of a return to the austerity of the Revolution it alarmed the Parisians, who were celebrating their new liberty with a riot of fantastic costume; and by its taxation and the suspicion of Jacobin associations with Babeuf it alienated the *nouveaux riches*. The later Directory was a period of great fortunes, and it resulted from the alarm of the great speculators and army contractors that the weight of capital was cast against the government. In this state of public opinion the Directory was compelled
1798. to maintain itself by unconstitutional measures: a number of deputies were arbitrarily excluded from the Chamber, and the Directors assumed a dictatorship analogous to that of the Great Committee. Parliamentary pressure upon the Directory continued, and the government was driven to assume a posture that was
1799. almost terrorist. A series of defeats endangered the frontiers, and the Directory had recourse to a *levée en masse*; within France order was maintained by domiciliary visits and a system of hostages, whilst capital was subjected to a forced loan. It was the last effort of Jacobinism; twelve weeks after the reconstitution of the club, Bonaparte landed at Saint-Raphael with a staff of five generals.

§ 2. The Rise of Bonaparte.

The external problem inherited by the Directory had been immensely simplified by the later diplomacy of the Convention. The detachment of Prussia, Holland, and Spain from the European coalition reduced the enemies of the Republic to Austria, Sardinia, and Great Britain, and made possible for its armies a more normal system of operations. The policy of Sieyès, who supplied the government with ideas, aimed at the direction of Prussia and Austria towards Eastern Europe and the reconstruction of western Germany under French supervision; it was an incident of this policy that the Austrian power should be driven from its position of pressure on three French frontiers. The application of such a system imposed on the Republic a war of conquest and accentuated still further the importance of its armies. The French effort was directed against England 1796.
on the sea, against England and Austria on the north-eastern frontier, against Austria alone on the eastern frontier, and against Austria and Sardinia on the south-eastern frontier. In the two last theatres of war an offensive was designed by Carnot, which threatened the Austrian positions with a simultaneous French advance by the valley of the Main and the plain of northern Italy. Public interest was concentrated on the commands of Jourdan and Moreau, which were to operate in western Germany, whilst the Army of Italy was expected to effect a secondary diversion on the Alpine frontier. The influence of Barras secured the March 2.
Italian command for Bonaparte, who was familiar with the practice of mountain warfare on the Mediterranean littoral. It resulted from this appointment, which attracted no attention, that the military forces of the Revolution secured a leader of European significance. When Bonaparte applied to the unique weight of the

French nation in arms the unique impulsion of his genius, he formed a combination which required nineteen years for its final defeat. The military problem of the Revolution was not created by the raising of men, but by the search for generals. It had resulted from the Jacobin expedient of the *levée en masse* that the armies of the Republic confronted with a steady and disconcerting increase the stationary establishments of the professional armies of Europe. But it was significant of French needs that, whilst the ranks trebled between the autumn of 1792 and the spring of 1793 and almost doubled again before the summer of 1794, the government appointed and superseded 593 generals in eighteen months. The Revolution was searching for a victorious commander; it was a search which ended with the campaign of Italy.

Bonaparte remained in Paris for nine days after his
March 9. appointment and married two days before his departure for the south. The Army of Italy, which had been the command of Schérer, was in the normal condition of republican forces; it had conducted mountain warfare for two years upon an exiguous supply of boots and an uninspiring income of depreciated *assignats*; its discipline was uncertain, and the difficulties of the republican commissariat were increased by the poverty of Provence, which compelled the army to draw its provisions by sea from Genoa under the guns of Nelson's cruisers. It was opposed by the combined forces of Austria and Sardinia; the cleavage of interests between the allies was apparent from their positions. The Sardinians covered the road to Turin, the Austrians lay across the road into Lombardy, and the connexion between them was only maintained by a mixed force on the hills behind Savona.
March 27. In the first phase of the campaign Bonaparte, who

controlled the seaward slope of the Alps from Nice to Savona, isolated and crushed the Sardinians. He strengthened his right, moved rapidly up from the coast, and in two days of fighting about Montenotte and Millesimo cut the connexion between the allies. He now wheeled to the left against the Sardinians, leaving the Austrians on his right to bar the road into Lombardy. The French advance on Turin was interrupted by the victory of Mondovi, and five days later, by the Armistice of Cherasco, Sardinia withdrew from the war. It was four weeks and four days since Bonaparte had arrived at Nice.

April 12–13.

April 23.

April 28. Armistice of Cherasco.

In the second phase the Austrian defensive attempted for thirty-two days to hold against Bonaparte a rapidly diminishing area of Lombardy. The lines of the upper Po and of the Ticino were abandoned in succession; and the line of the Adda became untenable after the French victory at Lodi. Five days later the French entered Milan, and the Austrians were forced against the Venetian frontier; their fighting line had receded two hundred miles in sixty days. Bonaparte passed the Mincio and prepared, by the occupation of fortresses, to defend his eastern frontier. Of the strong places of the Venetian quadrilateral, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago were held by the French, whilst Mantua, whose garrison was the sole Austrian force west of the Adige, was besieged. It was eight weeks since Bonaparte had arrived at Nice.

May 11.

May 16.

May 29.

His operations now entered on a defensive phase; it became necessary to protect against Austrian attacks the siege of Mantua and the republican occupation of Lombardy. As each relieving force emerged from the Tyrol moving towards the besieged fortress by Lake Garda or the line of the Adige, it was outmarched and

Aug. 3–5. beaten. In the summer the Austrians were defeated at Lonato and Castiglione; in the autumn Bonaparte followed them into the Tyrol and returned to Lombardy
Sept. 8. in time to defeat a relieving force at Bassano. A more
Nov. 11–12. successful Austrian movement dislodged the French from Caldiero, but was arrested by a supreme effort at
Nov. 15–17. Arcola, and at the end of the year the siege of Mantua, which had been alternately abandoned and resumed as the French field army confronted each return of the Austrian offensive, was successfully continued.

The campaign of 1796 in Italy overshadowed the simultaneous operations of Jourdan and Moreau in western Germany, which ended with a retreat of the French behind the Rhine. Its results were obvious and calculable; the area of French control had been extended from the Var to the Adige, the Revolution had entered Italy on a wave of urban and provincial republics, and Bonaparte had acquired, from the confidence of his troops, a disturbing pre-eminence. An attempt by the government to subordinate his command to Kellermann was completely unsuccessful, and Bonaparte was at liberty to proceed with the expansion of his authority. This development, which was the characteristic tendency of the last phase of the Revolution, was expressed in two forms; a military authority based on the obedience of his troops, and a pro-consular authority based on the revolutionary sympathies of the Italian populations. The first was the germ of the *Grande Armée*, the second of the union of Italy. The municipal republic of Modena became the Cispadane Republic, and Bonaparte projected a system of Italian unity, in which Rome was to be the national capital of the peninsula.

1797. In the new year a final attempt by the Austrians to

relieve Mantua was defeated at Rivoli, and three weeks later the fortress surrendered. Its fall completed the eastern defences of republican Italy. For the campaign of 1797 the government had projected a combined invasion of Austria by the Armies of the Rhine and Italy; operating on a front which extended from the middle Rhine to the head of the Adriatic, the armies of the Republic were to execute a concerted advance and to impose in Vienna a final peace; the main feature of the settlement was to be the abandonment by Austria of the Low Countries and the acquisition by France of the natural frontier of the Rhine. It was a programme which omitted two factors of the situation, the rise of Bonaparte, and the new prominence of Italy. Relegation to the right wing of a republican army was unattractive to a general who had cleared northern Italy in eight weeks, which was unfortunate for a system of operations depending for its success upon an exact co-operation between the commanders; and a settlement which sacrificed Italy to Belgium was unlikely to satisfy the situation of 1797 or the man who had created it. It resulted that Bonaparte conducted his own campaign and imposed his own settlement.

Jan. 14. Feb. 2.

A republican expedition to Rome, executed in pursuance of Bonaparte's Italian programme, reduced the Papacy, and in the Treaty of Tolentino that power withdrew from the war into neutrality, after recognizing the Italian republics and conceding a considerable territory to the new governments. The Adriatic port of Ancona was occupied by the French; it was the first indication of Bonaparte's eastern design. He now entered on the final movement of the war; three weeks after the Papal settlement the republican armies in Italy began a march which was to bring their advance guard

Feb. 19. Treaty of Tolentino.

March 10.

in twenty-eight days within fifty miles of Vienna. Moving
March 16. from the line of the Brenta, Bonaparte passed the Tagliamento, and forced the Austrian position in the eastern Alps. In three weeks he was on the upper Drave at Villach, and controlled Carinthia; ten days
March 28. later he stood at Leoben in western Styria, and Masséna
April 7. was on the Semmering: the republican infantry was
Preliminaries of Leoben. six days' march from Vienna. Bonaparte now substituted diplomacy for his offensive and accepted the Preliminaries of Leoben.

The personal diplomacy of Bonaparte, which had imposed upon the Directory a peace with Sardinia and a system of Italian republics, now confronted his government with the settlement of Campo Formio. In defence of his interruption of the republican march on Vienna he pleaded his ignorance of the course of the Rhine campaign and the insecurity of his own line of retreat; the real cause had been his determination to conduct the diplomacy of France as well as its wars. The emphasis given to his Italian pro-consulate by a period of negotiation conducted in viceregal state at Montebello was an invaluable contribution to his political position in France; and it cannot be said that his settlement involved any betrayal of French interests.
July. During the summer the Cispadane Republic was absorbed in a larger Italian unit named the Cisalpine Republic, and a Ligurian Republic controlled the
Oct. 17. Genoese littoral. In the Peace of Campo Formio, Austria
Peace of Campo Formio. recognized these buffer-states of the Revolution and ceded Belgium to France; compensations were found for the Emperor in the Venetian *terra firma* east of the Adige. This deliberate sacrifice of an inoffensive republic scandalized revolutionary opinion by its frank demonstration that there had been no breach between the

diplomacy of a republican general and the monarchical tradition expressed in the partitions of Poland. By a further provision the Ionian Islands were surrendered to a bewildered Directory, which was wholly innocent of Adriatic ambitions: Bonaparte was preparing the road to the Levant. Such was the first of the Napoleonic settlements.

§ 3. The Republic and Europe.

The enemies of the Republic were now reduced to Great Britain, whose operations had been confined since the retreat from Holland to a maritime and colonial war. In European waters England's command of the sea was never endangered, except for a brief interval of 1797. mutiny among her own sailors; and the French alliance with Holland and Spain only added to the fleets which were exposed to destruction and to the colonies which were open to annexation. Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope were successfully occupied, whilst the Dutch fleet at Camperdown and the Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent were severely defeated; the European blockade from the Texel to Genoa was maintained, and British fleets controlled the North Sea, the English Channel, the eastern Atlantic, and the western Mediterranean. This situation was strikingly unfavourable to projects of invasion; the death of Hoche deprived the expeditionary force of intelligent direction, and a raid on south-western Ireland ended in complete failure, 1798. although it was largely responsible for converting Pitt to the policy of Union. Bonaparte succeeded to Hoche in command of the Army of England; but his imagination had already turned towards Egypt, and an inspection of positions in the Pas-de-Calais only confirmed his distaste for the northern command. Three months later he sailed from Toulon to command in Egypt 'a wing of the Army of England'; the strategy, which

approached England through North Africa or aimed at India by the lower Nile, was tolerably remote in its effect on Western Europe.

Congress of Rastatt.

Whilst the military effort of the Republic was directed to unpromising enterprises against England, its diplomacy was concerned with the more attractive problem of Germany. In the Congress of Rastatt, which had been opened by Bonaparte in the previous year, the monarchies were presented with the first application to Central Europe of the principles of the Revolution. The French design, which was prepared by Sieyès, projected the partition of Germany under French supervision; the Peace of Rastatt was to complete the Peace of Westphalia, and the partition of Germany was to form a symmetrical pendant to the partitions of Poland. This continuity with European traditions was emphasized at the opening of the Congress by an obsolete attempt to divide German Protestants from German Catholics; the diplomats of the Republic were content to imitate the Cardinal-ministers, and the Revolution was returning to the Thirty Years' War. The attempt failed, and the French reverted to the more serviceable basis of revolutionary diplomacy.

January.

The first issue was the advance of France to the natural frontier of the Rhine; it had been prepared by promises of Prussian support in the Peace of Bâle and of Austrian support in the secret articles of the Peace of Campo Formio, but the demand was vigorously resisted. The monarchies of Central Europe prolonged their opposition in order to raise their price; but the detachment of

March.

Prussia inclined the balance towards France, and the left bank of the Rhine passed to the Republic. Europe had accepted the doctrine of natural frontiers. It now became necessary to distribute compensations to the

German princes, and a second revolutionary principle received the distinction of a European debate. Church lands were available as an obvious fund, but secularization was a necessary prelude to their distribution. This revolutionary largesse was not refused, and the republican partition of Germany was on the verge of completion, when the expansion of French power once more alarmed the monarchies into war. April.

The most disturbing feature of French policy was the growth of a continental system of subordinate republics. Whilst France herself appeared satisfied with a generous interpretation of her natural frontiers, these dependencies beyond the Rhine and the Alps gave to the Revolution a most alarming extension. At a time when European confidence was the essential condition of success at Rastatt, the Directory evinced an unfortunate activity in republican enterprise. Rome, Switzerland, and Naples were each provided with a republic, and the government of Holland was reorganized on the French model; Geneva, Montbéliard, and Mulhouse were annexed to France, and Piedmont was occupied by French troops. It resulted that England, the sole remaining belligerent, revived without difficulty the monarchical alliance, and formed the Second Coalition. The directors of Austrian policy, observing the French advance, despaired of achieving by the settlement of Rastatt a final result; Russia, under the erratic diplomacy of Paul I, discovered a miscellaneous series of provocations in the French capture of Malta, an incident in Corfu, and some fears for Poland; and Turkey was already at war with Bonaparte in Syria. December. Second Coalition.

The prelude to the war of the Second Coalition was the murder by Austrian cavalry of the French representatives at Rastatt. French opinion supported the 1799. April 28.

conscription, and the government designed a combined march on Vienna on the model approved in 1797. The Army of the Danube was to move from the Rhine eastward through Bavaria, whilst the Army of Italy forced the eastern Alps, and Masséna in the Alpine salient of Switzerland maintained the connexion between the two forces. This offensive was arrested by the decisive factor of the campaign, the arrival in Western Europe of the Russian armies. During the march across Europe of these 40,000 men no substantial result was achieved; in Italy the Austrians failed to pass the line of the Adige; in Germany the French
May 25. failed to reach the head-waters of the Danube. The arrival of the Russians transformed the situation in each theatre of war; the Army of Italy was reduced to fighting a rearguard action in retreat across Lombardy, whilst the Danubian offensive was abandoned, and the Army of the Danube was amalgamated with the Army of Switzerland in a desperate attempt to hold that territory as a bastion of France. It was felt that a successful defensive, assisted by the conformation of the Swiss salient, would secure France against invasion, because no force could pass the Rhine or the Maritime Alps neglecting the presence on its communications of the Army of Switzerland. This object was secured by the defensive campaign of Masséna round Zürich. The Italian system of the Revolution fell in thirteen months before the Russian advance, the new republics vanished with the withdrawal of the French, and Joubert was
August 15. defeated at Novi within seventy miles of the Maritime Alps. But the maintenance by Masséna of the Swiss positions protected France from invasion, and the three
Sept. 24-26. days' battle of Zürich was the decisive act of the campaign. A diversion was effected by the landing in

northern Holland of an Anglo-Russian force, but its initial successes were not continued, and a defeat by Brune at Castricum arrested its activity and imposed a capitulation. Four days later it was known in Paris that Bonaparte, after forty-nine days on the Mediterranean, had landed in Provence. October 6. October 9.

§ 4. The Egyptian Expedition.

The career of General Bonaparte was interrupted between his Italian command and the *coup d'état* of Brumaire by the adventure of the Egyptian expedition. The disappearance into North Africa of the most successful general of the Republic in the closing stages of a European war was a remarkable circumstance. It was due entirely to his own initiative and was designed to meet his need of special distinction. Bonaparte's Levantine interests, which had been aroused by his study of Raynal and found early expression in his resolve to enter the Turkish service, had been indicated by the importance which he attached to the occupation of Ancona and the Ionian Islands and by the correspondence which he conducted with the Albanian subjects of Turkey. He was vaguely attracted by loose projects of taking Europe in rear by way of Constantinople and by a still more questionable design on British India; but his immediate motive was political. His proposal was not prompted by an unpatriotic design to demonstrate his own indispensability by French defeats in his absence, but the spectacular value of the expedition would provide a tangible political asset; a victorious raid on the East would raise him far out of the crowd of European commanders who surrounded the Republic. The government's acceptance of his suggestion was dictated by more mixed motives. The Directory was not distressed to observe the distinguished exile of a general of disturbing eminence, and acquiesced in his departure 1798.

with obvious relief. But in addition, the expedition to Egypt possessed in the view of Talleyrand a serious military value, which had been appreciated by Vergennes under the monarchy. France in the eighteenth century had lost a colonial empire in India and North America: it might be possible to construct a second in North Africa.

May 19. The Army of Egypt was concentrated at Toulon and left that port for an unknown destination. The discontinuance by the Directory of serious naval operations had left the British in undisputed command of the Mediterranean, but the French transports eluded Nelson's patrol, and a detachment was landed at Malta to
June 13. exclude the English from that valuable naval base. Three weeks later Bonaparte landed at Alexandria and
July 2. marched on Cairo. A spectacular engagement within
July 21. sight of the Pyramids resulted in a defeat of the Mame-
July 22. luke horsemen, and the French entered the capital.
August 1. Nine days later their fleet was found and destroyed by Nelson in the battle of the Nile, and the Army of Egypt was isolated in Africa; its communications with France had ceased to exist and could only be re-established by the unlikely accident of a British naval defeat. This isolation, which is the supreme peril of a transmarine expedition conducted without the command of the sea, failed to interrupt Bonaparte in the execution of his
Sept. 1. fantastic programme. In spite of a declaration of war by Turkey, he occupied himself through the autumn with the organization of Egypt. Whilst the republican army received the picturesque addition of a camel corps, and its commander masqueraded in mosques as 'Ali Bounaberdis', an insurrection in Cairo was vigorously suppressed, and the area of French control was extended as far south as Assouan.

In the following year the Army of Egypt spent its strength in the Syrian expedition. Bonaparte, being isolated in North Africa, invaded Western Asia, and indicated in a letter to Tippoo Sahib a still more extended theatre of operations. A Turkish army was concentrating deliberately in Syria for the reconquest of Egypt; Bonaparte, adopting a rapid offensive, passed the Syrian frontier and surprised the strong place of El Arish. The effort which he now imposed upon his troops entirely exhausted them; their health collapsed in the Syrian summer, and their enthusiasm evaporated in a depressing war of sieges. It had become necessary, in order to isolate the Turks from their maritime allies and to protect the left flank of the French advance, to control the towns of the Syrian coast. Jaffa was captured, but the continued defence of Acre arrested Bonaparte's march, and he was compelled to accord the dignity of a regular siege to this obscure seaport, with fortifications varying between improvisation and antiquity and a garrison commanded by a Turkish Pasha, a French *émigré*, and a British commodore. A relieving force was beaten off at Tabor, and after a siege of seven weeks, the place was unsuccessfully assaulted. A second storm was equally unsuccessful, and four days later Bonaparte admitted his failure and ordered a retreat to Egypt; supplies were exhausted, and it was impossible to advance leaving in rear an uncaptured fortress. Bonaparte, who had received news of the European peril of France, returned rapidly to Cairo after a disastrous summer retreat through Syria, and destroyed at Aboukir a Turkish force, which had been landed from British transports on the Egyptian coast. A month later he transferred the command to Kléber, left his army, and sailed for Europe with a small

1799. Feb. 20. March 7. March 19. April 16. May 8. May 16. May 20. July 25. August 21.

staff in a single ship. The resistance of Acre had confined the Army of Egypt to a precarious defensive on the lower Nile. When Bonaparte's invasion of Asiatic Turkey was arrested by an eccentric and fortuitous defence, the French effort receded from the trenches before Acre: it was the farthest ripple of the Revolution.

§ 5. The Fall of the Directory.

The situation which Bonaparte found on his return to France was composed of two elements: the attitude of Europe to France and the attitude of France to the Directory. The offensive programme of the Second Coalition imposed on France the necessity of a strong government; its attempt at invasion had been decisively arrested by Brune and Masséna, but the attempt might be renewed in a second campaign. Both the resistance to invasion and the settlement of a European peace were operations requiring the hand of a strong government; and the profound unpopularity of the present rulers of France indicated that that government could not be the Directory. The main desire of the country in internal and external politics was for peace; it was an ambition which could not be achieved without a change of government. The temper of France under the Jacobin phase of the Directory was a singular one; the Revolution, as represented by its more valuable measures, was generally popular; the revolutionaries, who administered the system, were profoundly unpopular. The Jacobin Directors, who had placed themselves in power by the *coup* of Fructidor, had succeeded in two years in alienating every class of society. Capital was alarmed by the policy of the forced loan; labour still resented the suppression of Babeuf's conspiracy; the religious temper of the provinces was outraged by a revival of persecution and a rigid enforcement of the *culte révolutionnaire*; and parliamentary republicans and

the Parisian *bourgeois* were scandalized by the violent proceedings of a government which employed military force on the slightest provocation. A government which represented no visible body of opinion was maintained in power by the single circumstance that it controlled the army; military support is the least secure of foundations for a civilian administration. It resulted from this singular contradiction, in which the popularity of the Revolution was combined with the unpopularity of the revolutionaries, that the future lay with the moderate republicans; royalism, except as a fashionable folly, was extinct east of Brittany. This situation was appreciated by Sieyès, who returned in the summer from Berlin. With the assistance of a general he might dislodge the Directory, establish a constitutional Republic, and transfer the fidelity of the army to the new system. His first choice was Joubert, but Joubert's death at Novi created a vacancy in the conspiracy, which was filled, at the suggestion of Talleyrand, by the name of Bonaparte. It was the triumph of Bonaparte's ingenuity that he transferred the general from the second place in Sieyès' design to the first place in the *coup d'état* of Brumaire.

To this situation Bonaparte returned from Egypt; Oct. 9.
his progress from the coast to Paris was triumphal. The news of Aboukir had preceded him, but he was hailed far more as a peacemaker than as a conqueror: the man of Montenotte was also the man of Cherasco, Leoben, and Campo Formio. His arrival in Paris was Oct. 16.
quiet, and with the exception of a visit to the theatre his public appearances were rare. He was soon Nov. 1.
approached by Sieyès, joined his party, and accepted his part in the *coup*, but his performance of it was designed to satisfy no one less than the author. A con-

spiracy of simple design was elaborated in the general's *salon*: the Legislature was to be transferred to St. Cloud, and in that suburban seclusion a provisional government was to be imposed upon it by the exercise of military pressure.

Nov. 9. On the first of the two days of Brumaire the Ancients sitting in the Tuileries were surprised in a morning debate by the proposal of a decree that both Houses should retire to St. Cloud by reason of a Jacobin plot, which made Paris unsafe, and that Bonaparte should assume command of the troops in the capital. It was accepted, whilst the Five Hundred were adjourned by Lucien Bonaparte, their President, in order to prevent discussion, and the general rode across Paris to the Tuileries; a brief speech to the Ancients was followed by an inspection of troops. The Directory was taken completely by surprise; Barras resigned, Gohier and Moulin retired to the Luxembourg, and Sieyès and Ducos were on the side of the *coup d'état*. The government had ceased to exist, and the nearest approach to an established authority was to be found in the new military governor of Paris. Bonaparte arranged his troops and covered Paris with sedative proclamations. It was significant of the financial influence of his supporters that on the first day of the *coup d'état* stocks rose. On

Nov. 10. the next morning Bonaparte drove to St. Cloud, following the troops that were moving out of Paris. The Château, where the Legislature was to sit, was surrounded by soldiers, but when the Five Hundred met at mid-day, the Jacobin element immediately gained control and proposed the heroic expedient of a constitutional oath. This exercise occupied the afternoon, whilst Bonaparte was engaged in delivering an ineffective address to the Ancients. His visit to the Five Hundred was still less

successful; Lucien endeavoured in vain to secure him a hearing, but the Jacobins, intensely suspicious of a military dictatorship, raised the dreaded cry of *Hors la loi*, which had been in the Revolution the prelude of outlawry and execution. The general was hustled by the deputies and only emerged under military protection. Bonaparte now embarrassed his soldiers by a melodramatic appeal; Lucien was extracted from the Assembly by grenadiers and denounced the deputies to the troops. His orders were obeyed, and the Chamber was cleared by infantry. On the same evening the remaining deputies of the two Houses accepted a provisional government; Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos became Consuls of the Republic, and arrangements were made for the drafting of a new constitution. In that night sitting at St. Cloud the Directory found for its successor a strong and personal government: it was to that extent the end of the Revolution.

CHAPTER X

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: THE CONSULATE

§ 1. The Consular Republic. § 2. The Consulate and Central Europe. § 3. The Consulate and France. § 4. The Consulate and England. § 5. The Consular Monarchy.

§ 1. The Consular Republic.

THE accident of a successful *coup d'état* provided France in the late autumn of 1799 with the strongest government that it had known since the death of Louis XIV. The Consulate, which governed France for four years, passed through three phases, and in each of them it was profoundly representative of French opinion. In its first phase it formed for five weeks a provisional government pending the elaboration of a new constitution, and gave clear expression to the national desire to abolish the system of the Directory. In its second phase it conducted for eighteen months a work of political and social reconstruction, which was a complete interpretation of the French temper of its time; the Consulate was now operating as the firm but constitutional executive of a Republic. But as the system which it was erecting increased in popularity, and as it gradually became apparent that the sole guarantee of its continuance was the life of Bonaparte, the Consulate entered its third phase and became a personal government. The *Consulat à vie* was a republican monarchy, less constitutional than the government of England and only less monarchical than the government of Prussia. But its work was an honest and vigorous attempt to secure to France by order and regulation the advantages which it had gained in the

violent effort of the past ten years. The Consulate codified the Revolution; it reduced the ideas of 1789 to a system of law, which it was prepared to impose by a rigid exercise of authority. It marked the end of the Revolution only as a dam marks the end of an area of reclaimed land, to prevent a return of the sea.

The provisional Consulate was well received by its new subjects. Opposition in the provinces was crystallized in the protests of a few local politicians; and in Paris, whilst labour acquiesced without enthusiasm, the *bourgeois* were exultant at the prospect of a return to stable conditions, and the commercial classes expressed their growing confidence in a steady rise of stocks. The repeal of the new taxes and the Jacobin law of local hostages marked the end of the terrorist system of the later Directory, but the breach with the late government was not conspicuous before the promulgation of the new constitution: the provisional Consulate was a Directory of three, from which the personal domination of Bonaparte was excluded by a rigid rotation of the presidency. But a quaint misconception of the political prospect was displayed by the royalists, who regarded the *coup d'état* of Brumaire as the prelude of a monarchical restoration; it was a singular estimate of Bonaparte's disinterestedness, which saw him as a retiring subordinate of the Bourbons. 1799.

The chief work of the provisional Consulate was done in the two committees, which were drafting the Constitution of 1800. Two solutions were exhibited for their choice, the scheme of Sieyès and the scheme of Daunou, and it was the triumph of Bonaparte that, by blending the two, he appropriated to himself the results of the *coup d'état* and deprived Sieyès of the benefit of his own work. The proposal of Sieyès, which was designed to 1800. Constitution of 1800.

perpetuate in power the constitutional Jacobins, was strictly conservative. Executive power was to be exercised in his scheme by two Consuls, whilst elaborate precautions were taken to insulate legislation from democratic influence. Direct election was to be abolished, and in its place a Legislature of two Houses was to be appointed from a constituency of 5,000 notables. Supreme control was given to a third or uppermost House of eighty irresponsible and irremovable members, the *Jury constitutionnaire*; this House was to nominate the members of the Legislature from the *liste nationale de notabilités*, to revise their legislation by its power of annulling all unconstitutional measures, and finally to control the executive by its election of the *Grand Électeur*, by whom the Consuls were nominated. It was a complete scheme to ensure the supremacy of Sieyès and a Jacobin Senate. The proposal of Daunou was more radical; it included an executive of three Consuls and a Legislature of two Houses chosen by popular election. Bonaparte, who had little taste either for democracy or for the system of Sieyès, imposed a composite solution of his own. He was content to exclude popular influence by the retrograde system of *listes de notabilités*, from whom a *Sénat conservateur* nominated the deputies of the *Tribunat* and *Corps législatif*, but his real attention was directed to the organization of the executive. This power was to be exercised by three Consuls with the assistance of the *Conseil d'État*, an official committee of expert administrators. Among the Consuls supreme control was given to the First Consul, who nominated all executive and judicial officers. Power was effectively transferred from Sieyès, the *Grand Électeur*, to Bonaparte, the First Consul: it was a second and more successful *coup d'état*.

It remained to secure for the new system the national sanction of a *plébiscite*. The Constitution of 1800, which was submitted to the French electorate, was more than a form of government; it was a political programme, because by its terms it nominated to the Consulate Bonaparte, Cambacérès, and Le Brun, and by the institution of the *Consulat décennal* it stereotyped this executive for ten years. The provisional Consulate had endeavoured to conciliate every considerable body of opinion; the demand for peace had been met by a period of negotiation with Great Britain and Austria, religious feeling had been satisfied by a repeal of persecuting measures, and royalism had been considered in the pacification of the Vendée. It resulted that the Constitution of 1800 was adopted by a majority of 3,000,000; less than one elector in 2,000 had voted against it. The Consular Republic was definitely established, and it became the business of its administrators to ensure its continued existence. The note of authority, which had been struck in a decimation of the Parisian press, was sustained in a new system of local government; the domination of the central government was reproduced in the provinces by the institution of *Préfets*, whose absolute control was at once a singular reminiscence of the royal *Intendants* and the most significant indication of the temper of the new government. The Consular Republic had received its mandate; it proposed to govern France.

§ 2. The Consulate and Central Europe.

Although European peace formed part of the programme of the Consular Republic, it resulted from the survival of the Second Coalition that the Consulate, in order to impose that peace upon continental Europe, continued the war of the Directory in the campaign of 1800. The military value of the monarchical alliance was

largely reduced by the withdrawal of Russia from active co-operation. The erratic diplomacy of Paul I had been provoked by Bonaparte's Levantine policy into a decisive intervention in 1799; the Czar now removed the immense weight of Russian support, and his motives were variously explained as disappointment at the defeats in Holland and Switzerland, irritation at British exactitude in the payment of subsidies, and annoyance at a lack of Austrian tact at Ancona and of English expedition at Portsmouth.

It resulted from this withdrawal that the continental war confronted France with the familiar problem of defeating Austria. The Austrian design projected an invasion of the Republic along two lines; one army, concentrated behind the upper Rhine, was to pass that river and enter eastern France, whilst a second army forced the Alpine frontier and invaded Provence from northern Italy with the co-operation of a British expedition directed from Minorca against the Mediterranean coast. The French proposed to meet this offensive by an immediate counter-offensive and to strike at Vienna by the familiar routes of the Danube valley and the plain of northern Italy. In fulfilment of this design the command of Moreau was concentrated in southern Alsace, and the command of Masséna maintained its defensive with difficulty in the Maritime Alps. An Army of Reserve was massed at Dijon under Berthier, with the apparent object of intervening in either theatre of war; this force, whose earlier operations attracted little attention, became under the direction of Bonaparte the most prominent factor in the spring campaign and transferred the decision from the valley of the Danube to the valley of the Po; the manœuvre of Marengo was a Napoleonic variation on Carnot's plan. On the

Italian front the first results were strikingly unsatisfactory; the Austrian offensive drove Suchet behind the French frontier, isolated Masséna in Genoa, and reduced the republican dominion in Italy to the besieged garrison of a single seaport. Some compensation was afforded by a French advance on the German front; Moreau passed the Rhine, turned the line of the Black Forest at its southern end, and fought his way towards the head-waters of the Danube. Meanwhile the Army of Reserve moved unobtrusively towards the western passes of the Alps, and the First Consul left Paris for the south-eastern frontier. It was the design of Bonaparte to enter Italy from the north-west and to place himself across the road to Vienna in rear of the Austrians; he calculated that the defence of their own communications would recall them from the French frontier and bring them to action in Lombardy. He joined the army, which passed the Alps in circumstances of some difficulty, and entered Piedmont. Four weeks after his departure from Paris the French marched into Milan; two days later Genoa surrendered, and the Austrians were at liberty to turn eastward and clear the road to Vienna. After a preliminary contact at Montebello they were completely defeated at Marengo in the last stages of a doubtful battle. Twenty-four hours later the Austrians withdrew behind the Mincio by the Armistice of Alessandria; the campaign of 1800 had cleared the plain of northern Italy as effectively as the campaign of 1796. It was the design of the First Consul that Marengo should figure as the decisive engagement; and four weeks later the successful advance of Moreau by the line of the Danube was arrested by the Armistice of Parsdorf.

April 21. April 25. May 6. May 14–22. June 4. June 14. July 15.

The interval which was afforded by the armistice was employed by Bonaparte in the reorganization of Italy.

The Cisalpine Republic had been at once reconstituted in rear of the French fighting line, but the First Consul contemplated the formation of a larger national unit. The organization of Italy was a work consistent with the nationalist temper of the Revolution and attractive to Bonaparte himself; but it was imposed on the directors of French policy primarily as a military measure against Austria. A *Consulta* of Italian notables met on French territory at Lyon and began a series of constitutional debates, which was to end thirteen months later in the proclamation of an Italian Republic under the presidency of Bonaparte. His position in France itself was equally assisted by the campaign of Marengo; he had left Paris as a semi-civilian spectator of Berthier's command, but he returned from Italy with an admitted ascendancy. His official residence had been already transferred to the Tuileries, and his court began to acquire from the returning *émigrés* a more distinguished atmosphere than had been noticeable in the receptions of the earlier Republic. His growing predominance attracted the displeasure of the more austere republicans, and his approach to monarchy was marked by the compliment of an attempt on his life.

In the second phase of the campaign, which was resumed on the expiration of the armistice, the decision was transferred to the valley of the Danube, and operations in Italy were reduced to a position of secondary importance. Murat completed the French dominion in Italy by an uncontested excursion through the southern provinces; whilst Brune, whose ultimate objective was the eastern passes of the Alps, conducted an active campaign among the fortresses of the Venetian quadrilateral, at the close of which the Austrians withdrew behind the Tagliamento. The movements of Moreau were more

decisive; the French advance through eastern Bavaria was uninterrupted, until the ill-conceived offensive of the Archduke John involved the Austrians in complete defeat at Hohenlinden. A rapid movement brought Dec. 3.
Moreau in three weeks within ninety miles of Vienna, and his advance was only arrested halfway on the road from the Bavarian frontier to the capital by the con- Dec. 25.
clusion of the Armistice of Steyer.

The defeat of Austria enabled French diplomacy to 1801.
impose peace upon the continent of Europe. Negotiations were opened in Lorraine between Cobenzl and Joseph Bonaparte; and in the Peace of Lunéville the directors of Austrian policy acquiesced in a blend of the tradition of the Revolution and the personal policy of Feb. 9.
the First Consul. This settlement was in substance Peace of Lunéville.
a re-enactment of the Peace of Campo Formio. The Hapsburg monarchy acquiesced in the French system of subordinate republics; the Consulate judiciously withdrew the unfortunate experiments which had been made in Naples and Rome, and substituted as candidates for European recognition the more creditable governments established in Holland and Switzerland; whilst Tuscany was promoted from a duchy to a kingdom and passed from a Hapsburg to a Spanish Bourbon. In Central Europe the revolutionary principle of secularization was adopted as a means for providing compensations for the German princes; this decision, which led directly to the absorption in larger units of the fragmentary and diminutive territories of the Church, assisted to that extent the possibility of German unity. The simplification of German political geography and the erasure of a mazy network of internal frontiers formed the essential prelude to any project of national organization. So long as Germany was a mosaic, it could never be

a nation. In its results the war of the Second Coalition ended with the triumph of the Republic. It was significant of the French victory that the settlement of Lunéville imposed the French solution of every European problem which was raised in it. In the trace of its frontiers it accepted the doctrine of natural limits and adopted the Rhine frontier for France. In its treatment of Germany it accepted the revolutionary specific of secularization, and preserved Central Europe as an ideal field for French intervention. And in its organization of Italy it sanctioned the national solution within the limits of the Adige frontier, and elevated to the dignity of a European settlement the results of Bonaparte's Italian campaigns. The Second Coalition had ceased to exist, and in its place a position of continental predominance was occupied by the Consular Republic within the limits of its natural frontiers, behind the system of its subordinate governments, and under the direction of its First Consul.

§ 3. The Consulate and France.

The foremost problem which confronted the Consulate in its own country was the reconciliation of the Republic to the Church. The anti-clericalism of the Revolution, although it was inherent in the origins of that movement, had been, by the creation of national divisions, a source of political weakness; it was the ambition of the Consulate to render the results of the Revolution acceptable to all Frenchmen, and from those results it was essential, if France was to be reunited, to erase the provocative religious policy which had been originated in 1791. The Consulate had imposed peace on Europe; it remained to give peace to France. The resolve of 1800. Bonaparte became obvious during the campaign of Marengo; a declaration to the clergy of Milan revealed his conviction that religion was a necessity to the state;

and the condition of France demonstrated that the Revolution must ally itself with the religion of the majority, since it had failed to destroy it. This policy of reconciliation was threatened on two sides by the unyielding temper of the Church and the anti-religious orthodoxy of the mass of republicans; but it survived a period of precarious negotiation and resulted in the 1801. signature and promulgation of the Concordat. In the preamble of this document the Republic conceded that the Catholic religion was that of the Consuls and of the great majority of the French people. In its text the government granted freedom of public worship, within the limits imposed by exigencies of police, and received in return two great concessions: the bishops were to resign for reappointment on the presentation of the Republic, and the land-system of France, which rested on the revolutionary sales of Church property, was fortified by a Papal assurance that the Revolution had made a good title.

It was the mission of the Consulate to make peace, although it was a government imposed by a military *coup* and directed by a successful general. Its European exertions in this direction had produced the Peace of Lunéville, its ecclesiastical diplomacy had concluded the Concordat, and its determination to maintain the repose of France was expressed in its conduct of French politics. The Republic, with the fall of the Directory, had ceased to be parliamentary and had become administrative; the Consulate as an executive had absorbed all the functions of the state. It was significant of this tendency that the supreme work of French legislation, the codification of the law, was undertaken not by a committee of the Legislature but by the nominated *Conseil d'État* sitting under the direction of the First Consul.

Public discussion was regarded as a disturbing and Jacobin practice, and parliamentary politicians were profoundly unpopular in the country. It resulted that the eloquence of the *Tribunat* appeared to be as unprofitable an interference with the executive as the epigrams of Madame de Staël's *salon*; the existence of an opposition was not easy to justify, when the country did not contemplate a change of government. Formal homage had been done to academic republicanism in the state mourning for Washington, but the rapid revival of Parisian life was hardly consistent with the rigid practice of republican austerity. The criticism of official measures was increasingly resented; and when the disturbing reputation of the Jacobins was revived by an attempt on the First Consul's life, the opportunity was seized for a wholesale proscription and deportation of republican politicians and the establishment of provincial courts martial. It was the paradox of the Consular Republic that it was a Republic without republicans, and circumstances were soon to substitute a more logical government.

In the whole course of this successful and authoritative administration the fact of Bonaparte's predominance became increasingly impressed upon the French electorate. It had observed the campaign of Marengo, it had seen the Concordat imposed upon the Republic, and it had indicated by its alarm at the Jacobin plots the value which it set upon Bonaparte's life; gradually it realized that the Consulate was inconceivable without the First Consul, and with the growth of this realization the Consular Republic became a personal government. The ascendancy of Bonaparte was conspicuously indicated by his elevation at Lyon to the Italian presidency, and on his return from the *Consulta* his influence was equal

to a striking violation of French parliamentary government. By an indication, made through the Senate, of the members who were eligible for re-election to the *Corps législatif* he decimated the opposition. The conclusion of the Peace of Amiens added still further to the strength of his position; the reputation of the First Consul had grown too great for the limits imposed upon it by the Constitution of 1800, and it became desirable to convert his authority into a permanent presidency. The Senate declined to do more than extend his term of office for a further ten years, but on the proposal of the official *Conseil d'État* it was resolved to submit the question to the people. A *plébiscite* was taken, which resulted in a majority of nearly three and a half millions in favour of the *Consulat à vie*. By this vote the Consular Republic became a republican monarchy; the change was in no sense a military effort, as the *coup d'état* of Brumaire had been, because the votes of the republican minority were largely the votes of soldiers. The republicanism of the army had survived the Republic, and Bonaparte received his majority from the voting of three groups—from the royalists in acknowledgement of the amnesty, from the clergy in endorsement of the Concordat, and from the bulk of Frenchmen in gratitude for the peace. 1802.

§ 4. The Consulate and England.

The European war was reduced by the Peace of Lunéville to the war of France against England. The conclusion of that peace affected the position of Great Britain only in so far as the detachment of the last of her allies isolated her government and excluded her armies from operations on the Continent. The military effort of the Republic, which had imposed peace upon continental Europe, was far less successful in its treatment of the maritime and transmarine problems of the

war against England; and the English war of the Consulate formed an instructive prelude to the more decisive failure of the Empire. It was a central feature of that war that England exercised without serious interruption her maritime supremacy. By the destruction of all hostile battle-fleets she had secured the command of the sea in the first four years of the war, and that command was now expressed in three forms, the occupation of French colonies, the blockade of French ports,
1801. and the destruction of French commerce. The French reply was an attempted exclusion of British commerce from the continent of Europe; by a system of treaties the Consulate closed the ports of Spain and Italy to English shipping, and in a negotiation with the United States French diplomacy attempted to extend the commercial war to a still wider area. A decisive protest against British enforcement of the rights of blockade and seizure of contraband goods was made by Russia under French direction. The diplomacy of Paul I was deflected by the First Consul towards the French alliance; and the Czar headed an Armed Neutrality of the North to exclude British sea-power from the Baltic in the interests of neutral shipping by the combination of Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. This challenge was immediately accepted by Great Britain; the commercial warfare, in which the Consulate had sought an easy substitute for naval battles, imposed upon England the necessity of blockading the coasts of Europe from Taranto to the Texel, and if that blockade was to be effective, British warships must retain the right to intercept contraband when carried in neutral ships. A fleet proceeded to the Baltic to coerce the neutrals; and their league, which barely survived the murder of Paul I, collapsed nine days later,

after Nelson's bombardment of Copenhagen. It was the most decisive expression that British sea-power had yet received. April 2.

The English were not less successful in the Mediterranean, where British forces were actively engaged in effacing all traces of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. That enterprise had achieved two results: it had captured Malta and it had deposited a French army of occupation on the lower Nile. The presence of French garrisons in Malta and North Africa was regarded as a serious menace to England's control of the Mediterranean, and British energies were directed towards their removal. Malta had been captured from the French after a siege in the previous year; and the English, who appreciated its value as a naval position, remained in occupation of the island. A more serious problem was presented by the Army of Egypt on the Nile. This force, which had been completely isolated from France since the destruction of its communications in the battle of the Nile, illustrated by its position the futility of an overseas expedition undertaken without command of the sea; in the previous year Kléber had offered to evacuate Egypt, but the British insisted on the surrender of his army, hostilities continued, and he was able to maintain a successful defensive against the Turks until his murder. Menou, who succeeded him in the command, masqueraded as an Egyptian, and endeavoured to perpetuate the French occupation, but his position was threatened by a triple offensive. Whilst a Turkish army moved through Syria, and a body of Indian troops was directed towards Egypt by the Red Sea, a British force effected a landing on the northern coast and moved towards Cairo. The city surrendered after a siege, and the area of the French occupation June 27.

was reduced to the position of Menou in Alexandria.
Aug. 30. Four weeks later Alexandria fell, and the French occupation was at an end; the Army of Egypt returned to France in British transports.

With this triumph of British sea-power the war began to lose all meaning; the Republic had little interest in prolonging a duel in which it could bring no effective weapon to bear on England's maritime supremacy, and British enthusiasm was reduced by the fact that without allies England could exercise no pressure upon a continental power. The prospect of peace was increased by the circumstance that Addington had succeeded Pitt in office, after Pitt's Irish policy had encountered the immovable obstacle of the king's conscience; the minister, who had conducted the war for eight years, resigned early in the year, because George III was unable to reconcile his coronation oath with an emancipation of the Irish Catholics. Negotiations were opened between the two powers, and the last phase of the war was merely a manœuvre of French diplomacy. The First Consul endeavoured to raise the price of peace by a spectacular threat of invasion. A considerable army was concentrated at the camp of Boulogne, and a flotilla of transports was gathered in the northern ports; the momentary success of a French fleet in the Mediterranean served to emphasize the menace, and Great
October 1. Britain accepted the Preliminaries of London, embodied six months later in the Peace of Amiens.

1802. The settlement which the First Consul imposed upon England was in appearance strikingly favourable to France. After a war of eight years against the system
March 25. of the Revolution, Great Britain acquiesced in the
Peace of Amiens. establishment of that system on the continent of Europe, and consented to abandon all intervention in the affairs

of Germany, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland. Pitt had made war in 1793 for the exclusion of France from the Low Countries; Addington made peace in 1802 by the exclusion of England from the Low Countries. In a maritime war, in which her fleets had been uniformly successful, England made no colonial gain except Ceylon and Trinidad, and it was significant that even these acquisitions were made at the expense not of the Republic but of its allies. The Consulate, which had fought an unsuccessful naval war, emerged from it without a substantial cession of French territory, and the continental supremacy of France was emphasized by the exclusion of England from Europe. But in one direction French enterprise was checked by the settlement; the Egyptian experiment of Bonaparte was undone by a treaty which imposed the restoration of Egypt to Turkey, and the erection of the Ionian Islands into a republic under Russo-Turkish protection postponed his Levantine ambitions. But even in the Mediterranean, Great Britain was not permitted to follow up her victory with an annexation; the question of Malta, which had been the most delicate problem of the negotiation, was decided against her, and Addington consented to withdraw the British garrison and restore the island to the Knights of St. John. The Peace of Amiens formed a remarkable termination for a war in which England had suffered no substantial reverse. The Consular Republic was predominant on the Continent, and that predominance was properly expressed in the Peace of Lunéville, but there had been nothing in its conduct of the war against England to warrant the terms of the settlement of Amiens. It was the weakness of that settlement, by which an undefeated government was pledged to a policy of non-intervention in Europe without the

compensation of colonial gains, that it represented so little of the reality. The system of Amiens, which appeared so favourable to France, could not be lasting unless it conformed more closely with the facts of the European situation.

§ 5. The Consular Monarchy.

1802.

Constitution of 1802.

The proclamation of peace was followed after a short interval by the establishment of the *Consulat à vie*; the Consular Republic was converted by *plébiscite* into the monarchy of the First Consul, and his advisers perpetuated the change in the Constitution of 1802. This document, which was the first monarchical system since the Constitution of 1791, was dictated by Bonaparte to a secretary. By its terms the First Consul was permitted to nominate his successor; Bonaparte was at liberty to found a dynasty. He was endowed with a privy council and became President of the Senate, whose members he was to nominate. By the reduction in strength of the *Tribunat* the small parliamentary element in the constitution was compressed to vanishing point, and the substitution of a system of qualified election for the *listes de notabilités* formed an exiguous concession to democracy. The tone of the Tuileries became increasingly monarchical, and the First Consul adopted for official use the more dynastic title of Napoleon Bonaparte; his birthday became a national holiday, and his civil list rose from half a million to six million francs. The Consular Republic had produced a monarch; it remained only to provide itself with an order of nobility. This need was met by Bonaparte's institution of the Legion of Honour, and the republican monarchy was complete.

In home policy there was no breach between the *Consulat à vie* and the earlier Consulate. The *Conseil d'État* proceeded with its work of codification, and the

religious settlement was completed by the *Articles organiques*. This document, which was promulgated with the Concordat, was a more Gallican interpretation of the settlement than was acceptable to the Papacy; and the restrictions which it imposed on papal legislation, Church councils, and ecclesiastical appeals drew a protest from the Pope. A second group of *Articles organiques* regulated the position of Protestants under the French State on lines similar to those which were afterwards adopted by the Empire in dealing with the Jews. Bonaparte had no sympathy with the anti-religious bigotry of the Jacobins, but he was not prepared to admit a sovereign Church to the Republic. Any Church was at liberty to enter its territory, but it entered it as the subordinate of its government.

The diplomacy of the Consulate was directed towards fortifying the European system of the Revolution. That system was composed of two elements, the policy of annexation and the policy of subordinate governments, of which only the latter was an innovation. The Revolution had inherited from the tradition of the French monarchy the habit of extending French territory by annexation. The annexations were confined at this stage to regions possessing a strategical value, and the adoption of the new doctrine of natural frontiers sufficed to give a modern air to the proceeding; but they represented the survival in French policy of the method by which the monarchy had constructed the eastern frontier. To this system, which was traditional, the Directory had added a second, which was more characteristic of the Revolution; the addition was made when the directors of French policy began to surround France with a belt of dependencies. The minor republics of Holland and Italy, which received their constitutions

from Paris and followed respectfully in the train of French policy, represented a new element in Europe and contributed in a large degree to the continental predominance of the Republic. The system of subordinate governments received a wide extension from the diplomacy of the First Consul and became the foundation of the European system of the Empire.

It was consistent with this policy that Bonaparte reconstructed the Dutch Republic with a consular constitution and controlled Italy by the governments which he had established in 1796. A more original move was the annexation of Piedmont, which ensured French control of the western passes of the Alps and admitted French troops to the Italian plain without the formality of passing a frontier. Military motives dictated equally the creation of the subordinate Republic of the Valais; this government, which was without political significance, owed its existence to the fact that it held the road between the valleys of the Rhone and the Po, and its establishment, together with the Piedmontese annexation, completed the First Consul's diplomatic preparation for the next Italian campaign. His policy was next directed towards Central Europe. The importance of Switzerland both for offensive and defensive purposes had been indicated by every campaign since 1798, and the control of that territory was a natural object of French ambition. A concentration of French troops on the Swiss frontier was followed by their violation of
1803. Swiss territory; Bonaparte intervened in Swiss politics under the pretext of mediation, and in the resulting settlement French control was ensured. At the same time French diplomacy presided over the reconstruction of Germany; whilst the Diet adopted a system of secularization and became an echo of the Revolution,

the complex of German politics was immensely simplified by the northern preponderance of Prussia and the southern preponderance of Bavaria.

This rapid extension of French influence was gravely alarming to Great Britain, but a second development of Bonaparte's policy was still more disturbing. The Consulate appeared about to rescue the transmarine empire, which Louis XV had lost, and revived with apparent sincerity the Bourbon colonial policy. The acquisition of Louisiana from the Spanish Government had opened to French enterprise the increasing trade of the Mississippi, the island of San Domingo presented an admirable field for the exploitation of negro industry, and an expedition left Brest for Pondicherry with instructions modelled on the achievement of Dupleix. In the result Bonaparte's colonial experiment was completely unsuccessful; Louisiana failed and was sold to the United States, Leclerc led the Army of Egypt to die of fever in San Domingo, and Decaen withdrew from India to the Mauritius. But despite their eventual failure the colonial enterprises of the Consulate were profoundly disturbing to Englishmen, and exercised a serious influence on the course of British policy. Minor provocations resulted from the truculence of the British press and the extension of English hospitality to French political exiles; the exclusion of British trade from the ports of France, Holland, and Italy indicated a resumption of commercial warfare; but the situation, which finally put upon the system of Amiens a decisive strain, resulted from a more familiar cause. The Egyptian expedition, in which Bonaparte had expressed a determination to disturb the Mediterranean *status quo*, had occasioned genuine alarm in England, and as it became apparent from the later developments of his policy that

the First Consul had abandoned none of his Levantine ambitions, the temper of Great Britain became profoundly suspicious, and the government grew less willing to expose Malta to a French attack by withdrawing the British garrison in accordance with the terms of peace. The selection of General Sébastiani for a commercial mission in the eastern Mediterranean did little to reassure English opinion; the investigations of a staff-officer were not likely to be confined to pure economics, and the publication of his report on the ports and strong places of Egypt and Syria hardened the British determination to retain Malta at all costs. The Continent rang with Bonaparte's denunciations of British duplicity, and the ambassador in Paris was treated to a spectacular display of temper. The directors of English policy violated the system of Amiens by a determination to retain Malta and a frank refusal to be bound by the promise of non-intervention in Europe. Six weeks later a British ultimatum demanded the evacuation of Holland, Switzerland, and Piedmont, and the declaration of war terminated the Peace of Amiens. Official hostilities were preceded by a general seizure of French shipping and English travellers, and the two powers entered on a war of eleven years, whose course was to supply the history of the empire with an uninterrupted background.

The internal policy of the Consulate followed a normal course; the personal government of Bonaparte was emphasized by a vigorous display of executive authority. Genuine republicanism was almost extinct outside the army, and in the absence of any parliamentary life opposition was crystallized in a single *salon*. The suppression of a few military conspiracies and the banishment of Madame de Staël left the First Consul at liberty to proceed with the work of reconstruction. The *Code*

civil emerged from the *Conseil d'État* and was rapidly passed through the Legislature; a body of statute law containing more than two thousand articles was adopted in twelve months, and France was provided with the 1804.
orderly edifice of the *Code Napoléon*; it was the most lasting result of the Revolution. During the same months a distraction was provided by a more serious menace to the government than had yet been seen; it was offered by a combination of military republicanism and Breton royalism directed by Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges Cadoudal. The plot was observed and suppressed, but Bonaparte took an almost purposeless revenge on the Bourbons in the arrest and execution of the Duc d'Enghien. This prince, who was resident in Baden, was not implicated in the conspiracy, but a detachment of French cavalry violated the frontier, and he was seized, court-martialled, and shot at Vincennes; it was a lesson to militant royalists.

The conspiracies against the life of the First Consul served to emphasize his pre-eminence, and the development of the Consular monarchy proceeded without interruption. A motion in the *Tribunat* proposed the establishment of the Empire, and the proposal was debated in the Senate. Only one member spoke against it; it was Carnot, who had defended the Republic too often to vote its abolition. The *Conseil d'État* drafted a new constitution, and the decree was promulgated; the Empire had begun. Six months later, in the cathedral of Notre-Dame, and in the presence of the Pope, Napoleon crowned himself Emperor of the French: it was the last and most singular act of the Revolution.

BOOK III. THE EMPIRE.

CHAPTER XI

THE EARLY EMPIRE

§ 1. The Empire. § 2. The Command of the Sea. § 3. The Conquest of Europe. § 4. The Partition of Europe.

§ 1. The Empire.

THE establishment of the French Empire was an event of European importance: it was the last phase of the Revolution. When the exigencies of French politics substituted a military monarchy for a monarchical republic, there was no breach with the history of the past decade; the Revolution was crystallized in the Empire, and the Emperor was a general of the Republic. Napoleon imposed the Revolution upon Europe, and it is the importance of the Empire that under his direction that movement, which with the single exception of its Italian province had made little progress beyond the natural frontiers of France, was extended over the whole Continent. The Empire was not an interruption, but an extension of the Revolution, and the Emperor conducted in his first three campaigns a continuation of the war which Louis XVI had declared in 1792. Until the Peace of Tilsit the monarchies of Europe were united against France by a common hostility to the Revolution; it was not until a later stage, when the Emperor's policy no longer coincided with the purpose of the Revolution, that they were united against France by a common hostility to Napoleon. But although his conquest of Central and South-Western Europe was the expression of a personal ambition, the imperfection of its motive cannot detract from the magnitude of its value. If Italy was to become a nation or Germany a unit, those developments were

arrested in the presence of a feudal society, a mediaeval jurisprudence, and an intricate political geography. There was only one force in Europe, which could destroy the barriers of traditional systems and eliminate the network of internal frontiers, and that force could only enter a foreign country behind the bayonets of French troops. In the temporary national effacement of a French occupation the power of the Revolution did its work of preparing the way for national unity by the inspiration contained in its ideas and the simplification effected by its measures. Administrative unity was the prelude to national unity, intellectual liberty was the prelude to national liberty, and in the logical solutions of the Revolution were found a guide towards the logical solution of nationality. It was the highest form of political education to be a French province, and it is immaterial to Europe that the extension of the French frontiers afforded also a private satisfaction to Napoleon and a national glory to France. The Empire, which was the personal predominance of Napoleon and the military predominance of France, was an incident in the history of the Revolution: it was the Revolution in its European aspect.

This continuity of the Empire with the Consular Republic was emphasized in the institutions of the new system. The name of the Republic was retained in spite of the creation of an Emperor, and the powers of the Emperor were defined by an extension of those of the First Consul. In effect the head of a republican executive became the founder of an imperial dynasty. His brothers became princes, his generals were promoted marshals of France, and his familiar officials composed, with the assistance of a dignified terminology, a Court, as an ornament of which the Emperor was at times worse

than provincial. His powers of appointment were largely extended, his control of foreign policy was absolute, and his administrative supremacy was ensured by a vast power of prerogative legislation. After fifteen years of revolution the legislative centre of France was transferred to the room where Napoleon dictated his decrees: the establishment of personal government was complete.

§ 2. The Command of the Sea.

When the Empire succeeded to the Consulate, it inherited the international situation which had been created by its predecessor, and for the last twelve months of its existence the Republic had conducted a war against England. That war, which lasted as long as the Empire, was a constant factor in Napoleon's calculations, and the variation of its phases changed the direction of his policy. It was possible for the French power to exercise effective pressure upon Great Britain in three ways, by the suppression of British trade, the capture of British colonies, and the invasion of England. Of those ways the first alone was practicable so long as the power of France remained purely continental; it was open to a military power so to control the mainland of Europe that British commerce was excluded from its ports, but since the coasts and colonies of Great Britain were accessible only by sea, it followed that England was immune from invasion or colonial attack until Napoleon could secure a maritime victory in the French favour. If it resulted from such a victory that a French fleet controlled the English Channel for twenty-four hours or French cruisers could keep the North Atlantic for a month, the invasion of England or the occupation of the British West Indies would become a possibility. In the first phase of the war it was the object of Napoleon's effort to secure that victory; and when after an endeavour of two years that effort failed, he was confined

for the remainder of the war to the ineffective exclusion of British commerce from Europe and the desultory destruction of British merchantmen at sea.

1803. When the war opened the French effort developed against Great Britain along each of the three lines of attack. The colonial attack had been begun during the March 6. preceding period of strained relations by the dispatch of a considerable force to Indian waters; the West Indian Islands were threatened by the presence of a strong French fleet; and the Levantine diversion, by which Napoleon threatened Egypt and British India, was effected by his occupation of Brindisi and Taranto and an attempt to secure control of the Adriatic by the seizure of Cattaro. Equally elaborate was the attack on British trade; the importation or sale of British goods May 18. was prohibited throughout France, and by the occupation of Hanover the area of exclusion was still further extended. When the French troops passed the Hanoverian frontier, their mission was more valuable than a mere seizure of the continental territory of the English crown; British commerce was prevented from passing into the neutral markets of Central Europe through the great ports of Hamburg and Bremen; and where British opinion might have regarded with equanimity the sacrifice of an unpopular German electorate, it observed with disgust the closing of the Elbe and the Weser to British trade. But the central object of the French effort was the invasion of England itself. A defended coast-line was created between Cape Gris-Nez and the Somme, five army corps were moved into position behind it, and a flotilla of transports was hastily constructed. This immense war-harbour was flanked by outlying positions on the Dutch coast and at Brest, and the whole was controlled by Napoleon from the principal station of

Boulogne. It has been thought that the concentration in Picardy was a feint, but that he feinted against England for two years with 100,000 men and 1,300 ships is unlikely, if only because it was a feint which covered no real movement elsewhere. In its first phase his design contemplated a passage of the Channel by transports without escort; they were armed with defensive artillery, but their construction rendered them completely unsuitable for manœuvre at sea, and his misconception is only explicable by the fact that he was more familiar with the less exacting conditions of the Mediterranean. The difficulties experienced by the units of the flotilla in proceeding from their ports of construction to the point of concentration, and their complete inability to face the British cruisers without the support of their coast defences, demonstrated the futility of committing them without escort to the English Channel, and the design of invasion entered a second and less precarious phase.

It now became the problem of French strategy to 1804.
provide the transports with a sea-going escort of battleships, and since every unit of the French line was blockaded in harbour by a detachment of the English fleet, it became necessary to break the British blockade. The method of blockade had been adopted by the Admiralty as the most judicious form of maritime defence; Nelson maintained the Mediterranean blockade against Toulon, Cornwallis observed Brest, and a similar watch was kept over the minor ports of the Biscayan and Spanish coasts, with the result that England enjoyed complete security from naval attack.

At this stage, twelve months after the declaration of May 18.
war and on the day that Napoleon became Emperor of the French, Pitt was recalled to office by a national

demand. The southern counties were genuinely alarmed at the prospect of invasion, and, although there was no temper of depression comparable to the despair occasioned by the naval mutinies and financial crisis of 1797, it was felt that the situation required a more adequate minister than Addington. Pitt resumed office with a government of subordinates, and British policy returned at once to the familiar diplomacy of subsidies and coalitions. England for the moment was without an ally on the Continent, whilst France enjoyed the hesitating support of Spanish finance and the valuable hospitality of Spanish harbours. The drift of Russia towards the English alliance, which had begun when the occupation of Hanover damaged a Russian market and the execution of the Duc d'Enghien shocked the Czar, became more pronounced as the occupation of points in the eastern Mediterranean threatened a field of Russian activity. The Czar proposed a basis of settlement, which was rejected by Napoleon, and when the French forces were increased by the Spanish declaration of war, the course of Russian policy made certain the formation of the Third Coalition.

December 12.

1805. The project of invasion now appeared in its final form and was completely unsuccessful. It was proposed that the command of Villeneuve should break out of Toulon, elude its pursuers in the West Indies, double back to Europe, and raise the blockade of Brest; the combined fleets would then control the eastern Channel and provide the requisite escort for the transports. The plan failed for three reasons: its mathematical precision was too soldierly to succeed at sea, it was indifferently executed, and the Emperor was distracted from its object by the development of the European situation.

March 30. In the spring Villeneuve duly broke the blockade and

sailed westward for Gibraltar, whilst Nelson searched for his command in Egyptian waters. The French passed the Straits and picked up a Spanish squadron at Cadiz : April 9. forty-eight hours later an alliance was concluded between Russia and England. Whilst Nelson patrolled the eastern Mediterranean Villeneuve secured a four weeks' start in the race to the West Indies, which was reduced by Nelson's rapid pursuit to an advantage of twenty days. The French on their return voyage were overhauled by a British cruiser, which warned the Admiralty, and when Villeneuve attempted to approach the western mouth of the Channel, he was met and defeated by Calder off Cape Finistère. But the Emperor's attention July 22. was distracted during the summer from the North Atlantic to his eastern frontier by the unfriendly development of Austrian policy. The extension of the French monarchy to Italy by the coronation of Napoleon at Milan was a step which Austria as an Italian power could not afford to ignore; and when this move was followed by a series of annexations in northern Italy, the Austrian tenancy of Venetia became precarious and Austrian diplomacy turned towards the Anglo-Russian Alliance. Whilst Villeneuve moved dubiously from Vigo to Corunna and from Corunna to Cadiz, Austria joined August 9. the Third Coalition; four days later the Emperor dictated an order moving the Army of England into Central Europe, and the movements of his fleet became irrelevant to the main issue. Six days after Villeneuve entered August 26. Cadiz the cavalry left Boulogne, and the invasion of England was abandoned. An epilogue to the failure was provided by his complete defeat at sea; Nelson appeared in Spanish waters and found Villeneuve off Cape Trafalgar. It was the last effort of the Imperial October 21. navy.

§ 3. The Conquest of Europe.

The creation of the Third Coalition had provided France with a less insuperable obstacle than the sea-power of Great Britain, and the Emperor turned with relief to the familiar problem of defeating Austria. When the Army of England left the hills of the Boulonnais, it became the most victorious fighting force that Europe had yet seen; in two years it advanced the frontier of French control from the Rhine to the Niemen, and its commander brought Europe more nearly within an universal empire than it had been for a thousand years. In the march of the French armies from Boulogne to Austerlitz and from Austerlitz to Jena the supreme power of Napoleon found its fullest expression, and by the elimination of frontiers, which followed his victories, he prepared his reconstruction of Europe.

It was desirable before the Grand Army was committed to the march against Austria to ascertain the attitude of Russia, and the Emperor's diplomacy occupied the summer with this inquiry. An offer of Hanover was designed to involve Frederick William III in war with George III; but it was impossible to entice him beyond neutrality, and the Emperor's league against Austria was confined to the minor monarchs of South Germany; Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt were drawn to the French side by the hope of gain, and with this support and the assurance of Prussian neutrality the French armies passed the Rhine. There was opposed to them an Austrian force, which stood in Bavarian territory at Ulm in order to receive the French offensive on the upper Danube as it emerged from the Black Forest and to cover the concentration of the Austro-Russian armies in rear of it. The Emperor passed to the north of it and moved 200,000 men in sixteen days into the angle of the Rhine and the Main between

September 9–25.

Strasbourg and Würzburg. The French armies then wheeled to the south on a front of 120 miles until they lay from Munich to the Danube across the road from Ulm to Vienna. In three engagements the command of Mack attempted to break out of Ulm without success, and forty-two days after they had passed the Bavarian frontier 15,000 Austrian troops surrendered to the French. The destruction of the Third Coalition occupied the Emperor for a further forty-three days. Moving rapidly along the middle Danube he entered Vienna within three weeks of the surrender of Ulm, and turned northwards into Moravia to deal with the combined Austro-Russian armies. His position in occupation of the enemy's capital was dignified but precarious. His armies on the Danube lay between the command of the Czar in Moravia and that of the Archdukes Charles and John in the Eastern Alps on the road from Italy, and an intelligent co-operation might have destroyed him. The Emperor proposed to remove this possibility by annihilating the northern force, whilst the southern was diverted into Hungary. He moved into Moravia, and on a misty morning in winter he stood at Austerlitz to receive the attack of the two Emperors; it was the first anniversary of his coronation. The Russian offensive was as ill-conceived as Napoleon wished; directed vigorously against the French right, it denuded the allied centre of troops, and when the Emperor launched his attack into the gap, the Austro-Russian Army ceased to exist. It was the end of the Third Coalition.

October 8–14.

October 20.

November 11.

December 2.

The defeat of Austria was complete, and it was acknowledged by the terms of the Peace of Pressburg; this treaty, which was negotiated by Talleyrand on the Hungarian frontier, was the first step in the Napoleonic reconstruction of Central Europe. The territory of

December 26. Peace of Pressburg.

Bavaria was doubled by the acquisition of Austria's Alpine dominions in Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, Baden and Würtemberg divided the outlying Austrian possessions of Suabia, Constance, and the Breisgau, and Austria received in return the infinitesimal compensation of Salzburg. France was confirmed in the north Italian annexations of the previous year, and the Kingdom of Italy became the predominant power on the Adriatic by the acquisition of Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia. The Austrian power was reduced within the narrowest limits; in Germany it was confronted with the advancing frontiers of the minor states, in Italy it had ceased to possess a single mile of territory, and in the Balkan Peninsula its expansion was threatened by the presence of French outposts on the Adriatic. France herself received no material gain in this settlement, but in its place she had a prospect of European predominance such as she had never before enjoyed.

The Emperor now turned to Prussia, which had observed the destruction of Austria in a condition of paralysed neutrality. A mobilization of Prussian troops during the campaign of Austerlitz had threatened Napoleon in Moravia and appeared to indicate a termination of the King's indecision. But the ambassador who was sent from Berlin to threaten the Emperor with Prussian intervention was induced to postpone his business till the decisive engagement; and the result of Austerlitz led him to substitute an unheroic message of congratulation for a movement of troops, which might have reversed and would undoubtedly have modified the decision of the campaign. The Emperor, who appreciated the danger in which he had been placed, was indisposed to forgive the government which was responsible for it, and he somewhat unkindly availed himself of the

presence of a Prussian envoy to negotiate a treaty which was singularly unfavourable to Prussia. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn, signed eleven days before the Peace of Pressburg, Prussia was forced into the new system of Napoleonic Germany; she entered it with the surrender of her Rhenish and other minor territories in exchange for the most unwelcome gift of Hanover, which carried with it the certainty of war with England; and it remained to be seen whether Prussian docility would tolerate in North Germany a position similar to that occupied south of the Main by Bavaria. Treaty of Schönbrunn.

Having destroyed the Third Coalition, the Emperor set rapidly about the reconstruction of Europe, whilst Pitt died in the ruins of his last coalition with the conviction that there was nothing left to withstand the French. He was succeeded in office by a government of national defence formed by Charles Fox, who appeared unexpectedly in the Ministry of All the Talents as a liberal and patriotic minister. Since the campaign of Austerlitz had reduced the enemies of France to Great Britain and Russia, the Emperor's reconstruction of the European state-system was directed against those two powers; it became the object of his policy to exclude British trade from the Continent by a complete control of the European coast-line, and to exclude Russia from Western Europe by the erection in Germany of a system subordinate to French policy, which could resist the Russian advance. In his design against British commerce the Emperor dealt first with the Mediterranean trade; whilst the Pope was directed to close his ports to the English flag, a French army had passed the Neapolitan frontier, and the royal family escaped to Palermo seven days before its army evacuated Italy. Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples and dutifully excluded British 1806. January 23. February 13. April 1.

trade from the harbours of southern Italy, whilst the Bourbons were confined to the island of Sicily and there kept open the last ports which remained accessible to British exports west of Corinth. The French control of Italy received a further emphasis from the creation of twenty-one Italian duchies and principalities, which served to decorate the Emperor's generals and ministers. He now turned his attention to the North Sea trade and ensured a more efficient exclusion of British goods from
June 5. Holland by the abolition of the Dutch Republic and the substitution of the kingdom of Louis Bonaparte. At the same time the Rhenish territories of Prussia were converted into the Grand Duchy of Berg, which checked from its position on the middle Rhine the importation of British goods into Central Europe; it was placed under the picturesque direction of Murat, the Emperor's brother-in-law and an admirable commander of cavalry. A re-arrangement of Germany sufficed to erect the opposition to Russia; the Dukes of Würtemberg and Bavaria were made Kings, and the Duke of Baden became a Grand Duke, whilst a series of royal marriages ensured the permanence of the French connection. These states, with thirteen of the minor units of south-western Germany, were formed into a new organization, under French
July 12. patronage, named the Confederation of the Rhine; it was the trans-Rhenane province of the French Empire.
August 6. Twenty-five days later the Holy Roman Empire ceased to exist, and the transformation of Central Europe was complete.

It was an element of the new system, which the Emperor opposed to the Russian effort in Central Europe, that Prussia should retain North Germany within the area of French control by a consistent adhesion to the French alliance. That arrangement was embodied in the

Treaty of Schönbrunn, and when it no longer coincided with the real direction of Prussian policy, war became inevitable; if the Emperor could not control North Germany by diplomacy, he was obliged to control it by conquest. At first it seemed probable that the arrangement would be lasting; Russia negotiated for peace during the spring, and Prussia would be powerless against France without Russian support. But a change of direction in Russian policy coincided with a revolution in the Prussian temper. The war-party under the inspiration of Hardenberg and Queen Louise became predominant in Berlin and the Prussian army was eager to justify its immense reputation by an abandonment of the enforced leisure of neutrality. A secret treaty was concluded with Russia in the summer; and when the directors of Prussian policy learned that Napoleon had expressed his contempt of them by an offer to England of their new possession of Hanover, Prussia was goaded into war. England entered the alliance, and Fox lived long enough to superintend the formation of the Fourth Coalition; his liberalism had been able to direct his country towards the abolition of the British slave-trade, but the European situation confined him inevitably to the traditional diplomacy of Pitt. September 13.

The spring of Prussian policy and the model of Prussian armies were to be found in the tradition of Frederick the Great, and it was of some importance, when they were measured against a more modern force, that it was twenty years since his death and forty years since his last war. The perilous balancing of Prussian neutrality, which reproduced his subtlety without his judgement, had already cost that country a military opportunity, which was unlikely to recur; and it remained to be seen whether its army could put into successful operation the deliberate

movements of the last generation in face of an enemy trained in fourteen years of modern war. The Prussian army was mobilized in the late summer, and it concentrated in the early autumn behind its southern frontier with a design of annihilating the French troops in South
ctober 8. Germany. The Emperor moved rapidly into northern Bavaria on the line of the Main; whilst the Austrian frontier was observed by a Bavarian force and the attention of Prussia was directed towards a French concentra-
October 8–12. tion on the lower Rhine, he moved by his right into Saxony and lay across the left flank of the Prussian army. The French then wheeled westwards on to the line of the Saale and threatened the roads between the Prussians and their capital. The Prussian forces were divided into two groups, and on the same day they endeavoured to break through the French positions. The Emperor at
October 14. Jena and Davout at Auerstädt resisted the attempt and fought, five days after the first contact, the decisive engagements of the campaign. The Prussian armies broke and ran for the Baltic, whilst the king withdrew to Königsberg on the Russian frontier. The retreat became unheroic, and French cavalry received the capitulations of Prussian fortresses, whilst Prussian troops sur-
October 27. rendered along the northern roads. When the Emperor rode into Berlin, the French controlled all Prussia west of the Oder; in a campaign of seven weeks he had reduced the Hohenzollern from a European monarchy to a Baltic principality.

The conquest of Prussia was the most complete but in a sense the most unpremeditated of Napoleon's achievements; it had formed no part of his design, until the Prussian temper of independence imposed it upon him in order to retain for France the control of North Germany. The establishment of French military autho-

rity followed as an immediate consequence, and the Emperor availed himself of the extended area of control to provide an *ex post facto* justification of his enterprise by the perfection against Great Britain of the Continental System. The method of exclusion had already been practised in the ports of France, Italy, and Holland; earlier in the year the Emperor had imposed it upon Prussia itself and had drawn upon that country a British declaration of war, an embargo on Prussian shipping, and the proclamation of a blockade of the North Sea coast of Germany. He now reduced the system to a legal code in the Berlin Decree, which professed to vindicate the rights of neutrals against the blockades and search of the British; in reality it was an endeavour to turn his European predominance against England, and to make the commerce of the Continent manœuvre like an army against the wealth of Great Britain. The British coast was proclaimed to be in a state of blockade by a government whose warships could not venture outside their harbours, British cargoes were declared lawful prize, and all intercourse with Great Britain was prohibited. The retort came in the following year, when the British Government by Order in Council prohibited all trade between ports from which the English flag was excluded. The Emperor replied from Warsaw by ordering the confiscation of all British goods in German harbours; the British then proclaimed a blockade of all ports practising the system of exclusion, and the Emperor completed his code in the Milan Decrees by forbidding any ship trading with the Empire to touch at an English harbour. The Continental System was in reality far less rigid than appeared from the uncompromising language of its paper blockades; trade was carried on under a system of exceptions and licences,

November 21.

and the economic life of Europe was not arrested by the terms of proclamations. But the result in Great Britain was the creation of considerable distress, and on the Continent the war of custom-houses contributed far more to the unpopularity of the Empire than the march of its armies.

But whilst the Fourth Coalition was in existence, the conquest of Europe was incomplete, and the result of Jena had produced no effect on the resistance of Russia. The Russian armies, which might have saved Prussia, were moving slowly through Poland, and the Emperor turned eastwards to meet them. A Polish campaign in winter was an uninviting enterprise, but the Emperor felt the necessity of arresting the Russian armies before they had effected their concentration, and he proposed to facilitate his operations in three ways: a profession of sympathy with Polish nationalism would secure him the advantage of a friendly country, a Persian alliance would threaten Russia in the Caucasus, and the diplomacy of Sébastiani at Constantinople drew Turkey into a declaration of war, which detained a Russian army on the lower Danube. The servility of Turkish policy, which in spite of the Balkan complication of a Servian rising became involved in a war with Russia for the convenience of France, entailed no consequences beyond the appearance of a British fleet before Constantinople and an unsuccessful English expedition to Egypt. In Poland the Emperor pressed the French offensive from the Oder to the Vistula. But although the Russians were forced back at Pultusk and Golymin, it was impossible to reproduce in the conditions of a Polish winter the precision and rapidity of normal European warfare; and at the end of the year the French armies were stationary round Warsaw, whilst their active efforts were confined

to the siege of Danzig, and Königsberg, which had been the objective of their movement, remained in possession of the Russo-Prussian forces.

Operations were renewed before the winter was over by a Russian attack on the French positions; it was arrested, and the Emperor endeavoured to destroy the Russians on their retreat. At Eylau he fought an inconclusive battle under severe conditions, in which his command was in considerable difficulties owing to the quality of the weather and the Russian troops. The result of this engagement encouraged the Czar and the King of Prussia to renew their alliance during the armistice which followed, and the Emperor realized acutely the difficulties of his situation; it was almost impossible to fight successfully against Russia at the end of 800 miles of communications, and by this impossibility the Emperor was driven to consider a Russian alliance, which was the sole alternative to a French conquest. When the war was resumed in the spring, Danzig had fallen, and the Russians again endeavoured to close the road to Königsberg by a vigorous offensive. It was unsuccessful, and on the anniversary of Marengo the Emperor was completely victorious at Friedland. The Russian army was shattered, and its commander advised the Czar to negotiate in order to cover its reorganization. Five days later the French cavalry reached the Niemen; the elimination of Prussia was completed by the occupation of Königsberg, and the Czar concluded an armistice with the French without consulting his ally. It had become possible for the two Emperors to dispose absolutely of the peace of the Continent, and at Tilsit they negotiated the partition of Europe.

1807. February 8. April 25. June 14. June 21.

§ 4. The Partition of Europe.

The meeting of Napoleon and Alexander took place with picturesque courtesy on a temporary house-boat

June 26. moored in mid-stream of the river Niemen; the setting was characteristic of the Emperor's spectacular diplomacy. The conversations were then transferred to the town of Tilsit on the south bank of the river, where they proceeded cordially with an accompaniment of international hospitality, resulting in less than a fortnight in the Peace of Tilsit. This settlement was contained in three documents—two treaties of peace between France, Russia, and Prussia, which effected the liquidation of the Fourth Coalition, and a secret treaty of alliance between France and Russia, which effected the partition of Europe. It resulted principally from the drift of Russian policy, which transferred Russia from the English to the French side in the European conflict. The co-operation of Great Britain in the war of the Fourth Coalition had been profoundly unsatisfactory to Russia; there had been a lack of generosity in the distribution of British subsidies and a complete failure to supply the Russian armies with adequate military support. The British Government had confined itself to an unsuccessful effort in the Levant, an expedition to South America, the dispatch of isolated detachments to Swedish Pomerania, and the belated contribution to Russia of a consignment of small-arms, when vigorous naval action in the Baltic and the presence of a British force in maritime Prussia might have created a serious embarrassment to the Emperor's operations in Poland. From this omission and the unheroic hesitations of Austrian diplomacy it resulted that Alexander was not unwilling to change sides, and the powerful fascination with which Napoleon advocated the French alliance was hardly required in order to complete his conversion.

Peace of Tilsit.

July 7, 9.

July 7.

It was the object of the European settlement to complete at the expense of Prussia the Napoleonic reconstruction of Germany, and although the King of Prussia

was present at Tilsit, his participation was purely passive, and the interests of his country were sacrificed at every point; the treaties of Tilsit were the diplomatic expression of the result of Jena. It had become an object of French policy to retain the control of North Germany; and since it was impossible to retain it through a Prussian alliance, it was necessary to modify the state-system by the elimination of Prussia. The Confederation of the Rhine had been created as an instrument of French policy, and its territory was now increased at the expense of Prussia; a new unit was formed out of the Prussian lands lying west of the Elbe, and placed under the government of Jérôme Bonaparte as the Kingdom of Westphalia, and a portion of southern Brandenburg was transferred to Saxony, whose Elector was made a King and entered the Confederation. In addition to these losses the Polish provinces of Prussia became the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw and passed to the new King of Saxony under the supervision of a French resident. It resulted from these changes that the Prussian kingdom lost all political significance; its area and population were reduced by almost one-half, and it returned to the fragmentary structure of its earlier history. By its new conformation it continued in occupation of its Baltic coast-line, but behind that coast-line its provinces of Brandenburg and Silesia lay precariously wedged between two areas of French control, separating them at some points by a distance as narrow as forty miles. Prussia became in effect a minor power of the Baltic coast, and was threatened on each of its three frontiers by the growing states of Napoleonic Germany. To that menace there was added a war-indemnity upon terms which prolonged the French military occupation until payment, and the customary burden of the Continental System.

The consent of Russia to the aggrandizement of Napoleonic Germany was secured upon easy terms, of which the foremost was the sacrifice of Poland. Napoleon had utilized Polish nationalism during his occupation of Warsaw, but he was content to neglect its claims as the price of a Russian alliance; the name of Poland was omitted from the settlement, and the Polish demand was met by the anodyne institution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In return for this and an insignificant transfer of Prussian-Polish territory Alexander acquiesced in the Emperor's reconstruction of Europe, and even contributed Cattaro and the Ionian Islands to his Adriatic positions.

But the real price of Russian co-operation was to be found in the larger provisions of the secret treaty and the still more generous language of the conversations which preceded it. The Emperor indicated to Alexander interminable avenues of conquest, down which the French and Russian armies moved to the subjugation of the East, whilst in Europe the two Empires met along a frontier of the Vistula. But when the Czar insisted upon the survival of Prussia and the Emperor declined to instal the Russians in Constantinople, the objects of the alliance became less remote, and the Emperors reverted to more practical proposals. It was their design to direct the offensive strength of the new combination against two powers, the western power of England and the eastern power of Turkey. The effort against England was to be directed upon familiar lines against British commerce by the extension to Russia of the Continental System and the closing of the Baltic; the second measure would necessitate the coercion of the minor Baltic states, in the course of which Russia would be at liberty to absorb the Swedish territory of Finland. The

fate of Turkey was less precisely foreshadowed, since the Emperor's absolute refusal to consider a Russian conquest of Constantinople precluded a definitive partition of the Turkish Empire. This was postponed for subsequent discussion, whilst for the present it was found sufficient to indicate an increase of Russian territory on the lower Danube and an extension of French predominance on the Adriatic. Upon these terms the two Empires united to impose upon Europe an irresistible military combination. Whilst Russia was content with an illimitable prospect of conquest, France secured the more concrete substance of absolute control in Central Europe, and by the terms of a document approaching more nearly than anything else in diplomatic history to those singular partitions of the civilized world, which marked the end of the Roman Republic, the Empire, which had been the government of France, became through the wars and policy of Napoleon the government of Europe.

CHAPTER XII

THE MIDDLE EMPIRE

§ 1. The Reconstruction of Europe. § 2. The System of Tilsit. § 3. The Spanish Experiment. § 4. The Suppression of Central Europe. § 5. The Imperial Peace.

§ 1. The Reconstruction of Europe.

THE military effort which accompanied the Revolution had resulted under the direction of Napoleon in the conquest of Europe; but he did not confine its effects to an ordinary increase of French territory. By a system of alliances and the creation of a group of subordinate governments the Emperor of the French became the effective sovereign of all Europe west of the Russian and Austrian frontiers; the Continent from Paris to Warsaw was governed by a single executive, the coasts of Europe from Memel to Ragusa were controlled by a single fiscal system, and its populations were mobilized as the contingents of a single army. The system of subordinate governments had been derived from the Italian policy of the Directory, but in the extension given to that system and in its employment for the establishment of a European Empire it became the characteristic expression of Napoleonic policy. His generals became regents, his brothers became kings, and his national government became a continental dominion. That Empire which lay behind a land frontier from the Baltic to the head of the Adriatic and governed Europe for five years, resulted from the Emperor's reconstruction of the European state-system; it was imposed upon Europe by the military predominance of France and it was unable to survive that predominance by a week. But although

its political existence was short, it was able to modify the course of European history by a single circumstance: it brought Europe into contact with the Revolution, and the results of that contact were active long after the centralized symmetry of the Emperor's government had ceased to exist.

The European Empire of Napoleon stretched without interruption across the Continent from sea to sea. It looked on the Atlantic through the ports of western France and the allied harbours of Spain, on the North Sea through the Dutch ports and the Hanse towns, on the Baltic through the towns of maritime Prussia, on the Mediterranean through the coasts of France and Italy, and on the Adriatic through the ports of eastern Italy and the Illyrian coast. But since it was the creation of the French armies, its principal aspect was territorial, and on this side it consisted of two salient positions held in advance of the eastern frontier of France, a German system connected with France by the kingdom of Holland and extended further to the east by the territory of Poland, and an Italian system connected with France by the Republic of Switzerland and extended east of the Adriatic by the Illyrian provinces. It had been the object of the French monarchy to round off the eastern frontier, it was the achievement of the Revolution to advance that frontier to the Rhine, and it was the error of the Empire that it substituted for a defensible military line an indefensible complex of subordinate governments: that complex was the Napoleonic state-system.

a. The Italian System.

The Italian system, which was the least precarious of these erections, consisted of three units, the Kingdom of Italy, the Italian provinces of France, and the Kingdom of Naples. It was derived from the subordinate

i. Kingdom of Italy. 1805.

republics of the Directory, and when the Kingdom of Italy succeeded to the Italian Republic, some progress had been made towards the organization of an efficient government and the creation of a national temper. It had been possible for the Republic to produce an appearance of autonomy; in spite of the presence of a French army of occupation, Italian finances returned almost to stability, and a national force garrisoned Milan. The constitution of the new monarchy emphasized Italian unity by the centralization of Italian administration, and the regency and marriage of Eugène de Beauharnais indicated the

1806.

prospect of a national dynasty; but after the annexation of Venetia the emperor arrested the extension of the Italian kingdom and treated it as only one among

ii. French Italy.

several Italian units. By a steady policy of annexation the government of France itself was encroaching rapidly upon the territory of Italy; Piedmont was already in

1805.

French hands, and the annexation of Genoa extended the Mediterranean coast of France. By a further series of

1807.

annexations the Kingdom of Etruria lost its identity in a group of French departments and the destruction of

1808.

the Duchy of Parma extended French control in the valley of the Po. Finally the Papal States were annexed to France, and Rome became the chief town of a French

1809.

department. In the annexed provinces the Imperial Government provided a generous supply of public works as a harmless substitute for political activity, and material prosperity took the place of the penurious patriotism of the Italian towns. Southern Italy was placed under the more genial supervision of the Kingdom

iii. Kingdom of Naples. 1806.

of Naples. Joseph Bonaparte, the first king, was genuinely interested in reform, but a reign of twenty-three months was an inadequate period for the removal of the abuses of three centuries; and when Joseph was

transferred to Madrid, Murat, his successor, was indisposed to interfere with conditions as picturesque as himself. Apart from his interest in the Neapolitan army and a rigorous enforcement of the conscription, the reign of Murat was mildly spectacular and uneventful; when the king was not commanding cavalry in Central Europe he found in Naples a complete and enjoyable repose. The Napoleonic system imposed on Italy a condition of honourable servitude with an accompaniment of material prosperity; there was an inevitable loss of liberty under each of the three governments, but the foundations of Italian nationalism were laid by the centralization of Italian administration. Local separatism was effaced by the institution of the Italian army, individualism vanished before the *Code civil*, and Italy emerged from the long night of the Empire with the discovery of a national ideal. 1808.

The Italian system was extended beyond the Adriatic by the military outpost of the Illyrian provinces. The occupation of Ragusa and Cattaro was an indication of the Emperor's designs on the East, and the French government of the Adriatic *hinterland* was purely military. A succession of generals occupied the residency at Laibach; and although they professed a generous sympathy with Slovene and Albanian nationalism, the Illyrian territories were never more than the advanced base for a Balkan campaign, which was never fought. iv. Illyrian Provinces. 1806–13.

The connection between the Italian and German systems was made by the French control of Switzerland, which had been completely subordinate to French policy since the mediation of the First Consul. Napoleon himself was the first *Landammann*, and although Swiss territory underwent various modifications by French annexations, no survival of Swiss nationalism endangered *b.* The German System. i. Switzerland. 1803.

during the Empire the French control of the Alpine roads.

ii. Confederation of the Rhine.

The Imperial system in Central Europe was founded upon the Confederation of the Rhine. This organization, which was formed originally as a counterpoise to the Austrian power, became in its fullest form the Napoleonic substitute for the Holy Roman Empire. It was a traditional object of French policy to provide, by alliance with the states of western Germany, a safeguard for the Rhine frontier, and in its first phase the Con-

1806. federation achieved this object; it included the governments of Berg, Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria, and it ensured by its conformation the French control of

1807. the middle Rhine and the upper Danube. In its second phase it received an increased importance from the creation of Westphalia and the inclusion of every government in Central Europe except Prussia and Austria. The Elbe became its north-eastern frontier, and it even protruded in advance of the line of that river the salients of Saxony and Mecklenburg, which threatened upon two flanks the precarious and encircled position of Prussia. Its policy was completely subordinated to the direction of French diplomacy, and its army was always at the disposal of the emperor.

The states which composed the Confederation of the Rhine were divided into two classes, those which the emperor had created and those which he had merely enlarged. The earliest of the territorial creations was

a. Grand Duchy of of Berg. 1806.

the Grand Duchy of Berg; this unit, which was originally formed in order to close the Rhine to British trade and to observe the western frontier of Prussia, was placed under the nominal government of Murat. It received a considerable increase at the expense of Prussia, and

1809. three years after its creation, when Murat was promoted

King of Naples, the Grand Duchy passed under a regency in the name of Napoleon-Louis, son of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland. The Kingdom of Westphalia was a more considerable state; Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, and the western territories of Prussia were thrown into a single unit for the benefit of Jérôme Bonaparte. The conformation of this state, which was designed to threaten Prussia and to control the Elbe, the Ems, and the Weser, was as irrational as the political geography of the old Polish republic. Jérôme was completely incapable, and his government was confined by the Continental System to the unfriendly functions of the tax-collector.

b. Kingdom of Westphalia 1807.

The remainder of Germany was controlled by the allies of France. In the centre the Kingdom of Saxony received a vast increase of territory and approached nearer than it had yet advanced to its ambition of displacing Prussia; whilst in the south the three states which the Emperor had extended remained firm in the French alliance. In the new Kingdom of Bavaria contact with the Revolution resulted in the creation of an organized administration and the practice of a vigorous anti-clericalism. Würtemberg was violently reformed by its new king; his destruction of Knights and Estates was thorough and well intentioned; but although the feudal foundations of German society were threatened by the importation of French principles and a revolutionary taste for liberty, they were able to survive by half a century their first contact with the Revolution, and the people of Baden were content to enjoy the new dignity of their Grand Duchy without hazarding their comfort in the precarious business of reform. The Napoleonic reconstruction of South Germany was less drastic than the measures simultaneously applied in

c. Kingdom of Saxony. 1807.

d. Kingdom of Bavaria. 1806.

e. Kingdom of Würtemberg. 1806.

f. Grand Duchy of Baden. 1806.

North Germany, but its effects were more lasting, and it resulted from its political education that the future revolutions of Germany began south of the Main.

iii. Kingdom of Holland.

1806.

In rear of Napoleonic Germany the Emperor connected his positions in Central Europe with French territory by the subject Kingdom of Holland. This unit was placed under the government of Louis Bonaparte, an intelligent but depressing man, whom the Emperor had married to his step-daughter Hortense de Beauharnais. His exercise of authority was mild and enlightened, but when he so far identified himself with the commercial interests of his subjects as to qualify his loyalty to the Continental System, the Emperor sacrificed his brother to his fiscal policy, deposed the king, and annexed the territory of Holland to France.

1810.

iv. Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

1807.

The reconstruction of Germany ensured to the Emperor the control of Central Europe; by the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw he completed that control, and occupied in advance of his German frontier a salient position in Eastern Europe. The Grand Duchy, which was attached to the Kingdom of Saxony, formed an inadequate expression of Polish nationalism, but by its control of the middle Vistula it fulfilled admirably the requirements of French strategy. With its western frontier it completed the ring which the Emperor had drawn round Prussia, and from its eastern frontier it observed Russia beyond the Niemen. The Grand Duchy was the earliest expression of French distrust of Russia. The cession to Alexander at Tilsit of a fraction of Prussian Poland had been designed to embitter the relations of Russia and Prussia; the creation of the Grand Duchy, where French officers could observe the Russian frontier and enlist the patriots of Poland, definitely contemplated the breakdown of the Franco-

Russian alliance. So long as that system survived, the French government in Warsaw was a picturesque and superfluous concession to national sentiment, but if it ceased to exist, the Grand Duchy would provide in Eastern Europe the nucleus of a military frontier; it was the Polish March of the Empire.

§ 2. The System of Tilsit.

By the Peace of Tilsit the European war was reduced to the war against England, and since British sea-power rendered England impervious to all attacks except that on her trade, the Emperor proposed to perfect in the hands of the Franco-Russian alliance the Continental System. It was his design to close the Baltic to British shipping, and it became necessary to bring Denmark and Sweden within the area of French control. He entrusted to Russia the business of coercing Sweden with the prospect of absorbing the Swedish territory of Finland, and he directed French policy towards the intimidation of Denmark. The British Government appreciated that the Danish alliance carried with it the control of the Sound, and by a rapid decision, based almost certainly upon an effective secret service, it anticipated the Emperor. Nine days after the two Emperors at Tilsit had resolved on the coercion of Denmark Canning adopted their policy, and prepared to impose upon the Danes an English alliance. The entrances to the Baltic by the Great Belt, the Little Belt, and the Sound were commanded by the coasts of Denmark; and if it was desirable for British strategy to maintain the communications between the North Sea and the unconquered government of Sweden, it was essential for British shipping to have access to the Baltic and for British sea-power to prevent the addition of the Danish fleet to the French forces. The Emperor prepared an invasion of Holstein, but the British blow fell first. Eighty-eight ships were moved

1807.

July 16.

rapidly into Danish waters, and the Prince Regent of Denmark in his port of Kiel was offered the British alliance on condition of the surrender of his fleet and of the coast defences, which commanded the Sound. He refused, and a British expeditionary force was landed in Zealand; the British alliance was once more rejected, and the sea-front of Copenhagen was bombarded for five days by Gambier's warships. The town surrendered, and the Danish fleet and stores were removed to the coast of Norfolk. The bombardment of Copenhagen was an effective and brilliant exercise of sea-power; this violation of international law shocked Napoleon into a paroxysm of protest and alarmed the directors of Russian policy into a declaration of war against England. Although the Russian aristocracy was an unwilling collaborator with the representative of the Revolution, and the Russian people observed with regret the loss of its English markets, the personal policy of Alexander, which had diverged sharply from England in the negotiations preceding the Peace of Tilsit, imposed upon Russia the French solution and stifled with the annexation of Finland and the occupation of the Principalities the growing suspicion that Napoleon intended to remain in permanent occupation of Silesia.

September 1.

§ 3. The Spanish Experiment.

The Emperor now turned for the completion of the Continental System towards Southern Europe and prepared to stop the largest gap in the European tariff-wall. Beyond the Pyrenees there still remained an opening for British trade, which resulted from the laxity of the Spanish administration and the obstinacy of Portuguese policy. Portugal had refused resolutely to enter the French fiscal system, and since the Emperor was determined to exclude British shipping from the Tagus, he was left with no alternative to the abolition of Portugal.

October 27.

By a remarkable treaty of partition he proposed to transfer Algarve to Godoy, the Spanish minister, and northern Portugal to the Queen of Etruria, whilst the remaining provinces were to be annexed to Spain after a French occupation. Charles IV, who was perhaps the most unintelligent monarch in Europe, was fascinated with the prospect of a territorial increase and the impressive title of Emperor of the Indies, and acquiesced in the passage of French troops through Spain on the road to Portugal. Junot crossed Leon and passed the Portuguese frontier in execution of the project of partition; within eight days the royal family of Portugal sailed for Brazil, and three days later the command of Junot marched into Lisbon.

Treaty of Fontainebleau.

November 19.

November 27.

But the Emperor's Spanish policy contained more than the apparent simplicity of the destruction of Portugal. It was unlikely that Napoleon proposed to invade Portugal in the interest of Spain without retaining some benefit for France; that benefit was the inclusion of Spain itself within the area of French control. Spanish policy, which was directed by Godoy, had attracted the Emperor's suspicion by a premature demonstration of independence during the campaign of Jena; the Bourbon monarchy was in an unromantic decadence, and it might be possible by directing the French armies against the ill-organized resources of Spain to bring a thousand miles of European coast-line within the efficient administration of the Continental System. The settlement of Tilsit appeared to leave the Emperor leisure for this trivial enterprise; and whilst he conducted with Alexander a correspondence which was designed to complete the partition of the world, he developed his movement towards the more immediate object of his Spanish policy. The government of Spain was conducted by an ex-soldier,

1808.

whose sole claim to eminence was his intimacy with the unattractive queen of Charles IV; the king divided his interminable leisure between the pursuit of game and the irritation of his son, Ferdinand, whose ambition had inspired him to apply for a Bonaparte princess in the hope of replacing his father on the Spanish throne. Whilst the command of Junot occupied Portugal, two French armies unobtrusively passed the Pyrenees and subjected Spain to a policy of peaceful penetration. French troops appeared unaccountably in command of the fortresses of northern Spain, and the Emperor prepared by diplomacy the development of the
February. French offensive. He repudiated the partition-treaty of Fontainebleau, and his attitude towards Charles IV hardened into an impossible demand for the concession of a military road between France and Portugal or the line of the Ebro as the French frontier. Godoy prepared to imitate the royal family of Portugal and to withdraw with the Court to Majorca or Teneriffe, but his prudent course was interrupted by a riot in the interest of Fer-
March dinand. In the *journées* of Aranjuez Godoy went from
18-19. office into hiding and arrest, and Charles IV abdicated in favour of Ferdinand; four days later Murat appeared in Madrid as the representative of Napoleon. Ferdinand
April 20. was persuaded to visit Napoleon on French territory, and it was finally arranged that the Emperor should arbitrate on the whole dispute at Bayonne. Whilst the Spanish monarchy pleaded its cause with Napoleon beyond the Pyrenees, the French were in informal occupation of Madrid, and their presence provoked
May 2. the nationalist riot of the *Dos Mayo*. Within eight days Charles and Ferdinand in succession had abdicated
June 6. the Spanish throne, and five weeks later Joseph Bonaparte was proclaimed King of Spain. It was a

challenge which Spanish nationalism could not fail to accept.

The objects of French policy, which had coincided hitherto with the European interests of France, were now extended to include the Spanish experiment of Napoleon. It was the Emperor's design to impose upon Spain a French king, and he exhibited in that design a total ignorance of the Spanish temper. Whilst Joseph at Bayonne presided over the hasty construction of a modern constitution, six provinces proclaimed provisional governments and three appealed to England. Spaniards were indifferent to the benefits of the Revolution, but they were alive to the advantages of independence, and the new king found himself with an entire kingdom in armed revolt. Joseph passed the Bidassoa and entered Madrid after a march of twelve days; the military opposition was not serious, and his escort of French troops ensured a demonstration of Spanish complaisance in the capital. Three days later a French force of 17,000 men, which had been operating against the insurrection in Andalusia, surrendered at Baylen; it was a mixed force of French reserves, Swiss infantry, and marines, and was not a command of any distinction, but the capture of Imperial troops by a Spanish *commando* was of immense importance. When Reding and Castaños encircled Dupont at Baylen, their action demonstrated the futility of the Spanish experiment and even reacted on the politics of Central Europe. Within three days of Baylen Joseph left Madrid, and the Napoleonic Kingdom of Spain was reduced to the ground occupied by its armies. Forty-eight hours later a British force landed on the Portuguese coast, and the Peninsular War had commenced.

July 7.

July 20.

July 23.

July 30.

The destruction of Portugal exposed the French effort

to an exercise of British sea-power; it was possible for an expeditionary force based on the coast to operate in security against the French. The sea offered to the British in Portugal a line of communication and a line of retreat; their supplies passed in from overseas without interruption, and their transports could withdraw them from the board, if at any time the game went against them.

August 1. In pursuit of this plan the command of Wellesley, an Irish officer with an Indian reputation, landed at Mondego Bay and moved southward on Lisbon. A French offen-

August 21. sive failed completely at Vimiero, and Junot, by the terms of the Convention of Cintra, withdrew his force to

August 30. France in British transports. Portugal ceased to be a French province and became a British base. It was the end of the Portuguese experiment.

At this point the Emperor was distracted towards the situation of Central Europe. He had conducted with Alexander in the early months of the year a correspondence which was intended to complete the agreement of Tilsit. Although French opinion was alarmed by the Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities, and Russia was disturbed by the French attitude in Silesia, the two Emperors projected on the lines of romance a Franco-Russian invasion of the East, having for its object the capture of British India. The first step was to be the movement against Constantinople by a Russian army from the Caucasus and a French army from the Adriatic; Napoleon even translated the project into practice by strengthening the French forces in Dalmatia. But the allies could not agree upon the fate of Constantinople, and their dreams were interrupted by the difficulties encountered in Spain. Napoleon reduced the focus of his plans, and it became his object to entrust to Russia the control of Central Europe, whilst he directed the full

weight of French arms against the resistance of Spain. He met Alexander at Erfurt, and in the ensuing conversations the Czar consented to postpone once more the partition of Turkey, and in return for the Principalities to impose peace upon Austria; by the Convention of Erfurt Russia agreed to paralyse by a mobilization the threatened action of Austria, and to direct the Franco-Russian alliance against the Austrian power, in order that France might have leisure to reduce Spain. September 27. October 12. Convention of Erfurt.

Relieved from his apprehensions in Central Europe, the Emperor returned to Bayonne in the late autumn and concentrated the French armies in the western Pyrenees. The King of Spain was behind the Ebro, and his kingdom was in revolt; the French conducted a friendly invasion to restore him to his capital, and dealt adequately in a series of one-sided engagements with the ill-concerted efforts of the national resistance. In a march of four weeks the Emperor moved rapidly on Madrid, and when he entered the city the French controlled northern Spain outside the walls of Saragossa, where Palafox maintained against Lannes a desperate defensive. His brief occupation of the capital was spent in measures of progress, which scandalized Spanish opinion; in less than three weeks he had abolished the Inquisition, feudal dues, and the system of provincial fiscal barriers, when his residence in Madrid was interrupted by the diversion of Sir John Moore. That commander was operating from Portugal against the French right, and it was his design to draw the Emperor into north-western Spain in order to give time for the organization of Spanish resistance in the south. Moving northwards from Salamanca, he threatened the French communications between Burgos and Valladolid. The Emperor responded at once and swept north to destroy him. December 5. December 21.

Whilst Moore was operating in Leon against Soult, Napoleon moved out of Madrid, passed the Guadarrama, and pursued the English in mid-winter through a mountainous country. Contact was maintained in a series of rear-guard actions, but before the decisive engagement the Emperor left the army; whilst Moore withdrew through the mountains of Galicia to the sea, Napoleon went from Astorga towards Paris to direct his policy against Austria. The English reached their transports two marches ahead of the French and maintained at Corunna a successful defensive after a diversion which had drawn the French armies on a march of three hundred miles into the angle of Galicia; the Spanish insurrection had been given its opportunity.

1809.

January 1.

January 12.

§ 4. The Suppression of Central Europe.

The Emperor left Spain in order to maintain in Central Europe the system of Tilsit and Erfurt; it was threatened from two directions, by the policy of Austria and the new temper of nationalism. The Austrian power, which was excluded from Central Europe by the reconstruction of Germany and from Eastern Europe by the combination of France and Russia, realized in the years following Austerlitz the supreme danger of its position, and had undertaken in face of Napoleon a work of national reconstruction. By the effort of the Archduke Charles the army was reorganized, and the creation of the *Landwehr* provided it with a national reserve. Austrian policy, which received from Stadion a more intelligent direction, endeavoured to detach Russia from France by the mission of Schwarzenberg to St. Petersburg, and its militant tendencies received every encouragement from Great Britain. It appeared not unlikely from the condition of German opinion that an Austrian effort would be supported elsewhere in Central Europe. The creation of German patriotism was a consequence of the French

domination, and the resistance of Spain stimulated nationalists throughout Europe. The *Tugendbund* was a patriotic organization of unknown extent, and the reconstruction of Prussia by Stein, Scharnhorst, and Bülow provided a focus for North German sentiment. To these circumstances there was added the fact that Austrian finances could not support for many more months the expense of an army on a war-footing, and it was not surprising that the directors of Austrian policy with the example of Spanish militancy, the expectation of a German rising, and the hope of Russian neutrality joined England in the Fifth Coalition.

It appeared at first that the direction of the campaign would be oriental; the condition of Turkey had occasioned the Emperor's return from Spain, and he issued January 23. orders for the concentration at Toulon of a Turkish expeditionary force. In this event it was the Austrian design to cut his communications with the East by a movement in the Adriatic; but it is possible that his Turkish project was only intended to ensure the co-operation of Russia in the war in Central Europe. In reply to the Austrian armaments the Empire mobilized; the forces of France and the Confederation of the Rhine were put on a war-footing, and the gap caused by the absence of troops in Spain was filled by calling up the conscription of 1810. The monarchy had anticipated its revenue of money, the Empire anticipated its revenue of men, and bankruptcy was the result in both cases. The French army was concentrating in Bavaria under the command of Berthier, when the Austrians without a declaration of war passed the Bavarian frontier. Berthier, April 10. who was unaccustomed to responsible command, was unequal to the situation, and the Archduke Charles was at liberty to destroy the French in the absence of

April 17. Napoleon. With the arrival of the Emperor his opportunity ended, and the campaign became serious. In a
April 19–23. manœuvre of five days he drove the Austrians off the middle Danube into Bohemia; the daily victories of Leugen, Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon opened the road to Vienna by the line of the Danube, and within three weeks of the Emperor's arrival in
May 10. Bavaria the French marched into the capital. The Archduke Charles had taken position outside the city on the northern bank of the Danube, and the first attempt
May 21–2. to dislodge him failed completely in the battle of Aspern-Essling. The French army withdrew into the island of Lobau between the Archduke and the capital.

Meanwhile the national rising had completely collapsed; the Tyrolese under Andreas Hofer struggled without success against the forces of France and Bavaria, Katt failed to raid Magdeburg, and the national effort of Germany was reduced to the ineffectual forays of Dörnfeld, Schill, and the Duke of Brunswick-Oels. The French reverse at Baylen gave the Germans confidence, but it could not give them strength. A more significant enterprise was the Russian campaign in Austrian Poland; it had been Napoleon's design that the Russian troops should co-operate with a Polish insurrection directed by Poniatowski against the Austrians, but the Russian commander failed completely to translate the Franco-Russian alliance into effective military action. It resulted from Galitzin's qualified enthusiasm for his French allies and his marked distaste for Polish rebels that his operations against the Archduke Ferdinand were conducted on singularly sympathetic lines; seven casualties were sustained by the Austrians in the sole engagement of the campaign, and the Russians marched into Cracow almost without firing a shot. The Regent Eugène conducted

a respectable campaign in Italy, in which he was eventually able to sweep the Austrians through the eastern Alps, and by the battle of Raab to direct their retreat towards Hungary. June 14.

In a period of six weeks the Emperor had quadrupled his forces in Lobau, whilst he himself resided at Schönbrunn and the Archduke Charles waited to receive the French offensive on the Marchfeld. On a summer night the French forces executed a brilliant passage of the Danube and turned the Austrian left; and the Archduke withdrew from the position of Aspern-Essling to the position of Wagram, where his army enclosed in an angle the plain of the Marchfeld. The Emperor accepted this central position, and on the following morning he developed the French attack. The French infantry, massed in the close formations, which its decline in quality had made necessary, was incompletely successful, but a charge of twelve regiments of cavalry broke the Austrian line, and it was possible six days later to impose the armistice of Znaim. July 5. July 6.

The suppression of the Austrian effort was completed by the Peace of Schönbrunn. The government which had attempted it was punished by a heavy indemnity, an insulting reduction of its armed forces, and the loss of its Polish, Alpine, and Adriatic provinces. Austrian Poland was distributed between Russia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; Tyrol and the neighbouring districts passed to Bavaria, and the French Empire annexed to its Illyrian provinces Villach, Carniola, and the Adriatic littoral; Fiume and Trieste became French ports, and the conquest of the Adriatic, which had begun twelve years before with Bonaparte's occupation of Ancona, was completed. The result of the war between France and Austria was due to the action of their respective October 14. Peace of Schönbrunn.

allies; if Russia had intervened seriously in Galicia, the French success might have been greater, and if England had made an effective diversion at Antwerp, the Austrian failure might have been less. It resulted from British inactivity, which sent an expedition to the Scheldt in the late summer and permitted it to waste time at Flushing and strength at Walcheren, that Austria confronted France without serious support. National sentiment, which in 1813 swept the French out of Central Europe, proved in 1809 an inadequate substitute for organized strength.

July 28–September 23.

§ 5. The Imperial Peace.

When the Emperor returned from the campaign of Wagram, the Empire entered upon a period of peace. With the exception of the Spanish war it was at peace for two years, and during that time it enjoyed in apparent security the benefits of firm government. The political life of France, which had virtually ceased to exist, approached most nearly to activity in the urgency of the Church question. The First Consul had come in collision with the Papacy by the *Articles organiques*, but the breach was apparently healed when Pius VII travelled to Paris for his coronation. It was impossible, however, for the secular government of France to remain at peace with the Pope. The occupation of Rome provoked the excommunication of the Emperor, and the Emperor replied with the arrest of the Pope; Pius was removed from Rome to Savona, and declined pardonably to sanction the Emperor's nominations to French sees. The Pope, who was the prisoner of the *Préfet* of Montenotte, endeavoured to suspend the ecclesiastical life of France, and the Emperor in return vigorously persecuted the bishops who supported their superior. The whole struggle, which resulted eventually in the removal of the Pope to Fontainebleau and the conclusion of the

i. The Church.

second Concordat, was a reproduction of the hostility between the Revolution and the Church, and demonstrated in the eyes of Europe that there had been no real breach with the tradition of 1790; the Emperor was the heir of the Revolution.

ii. The Annexations.

During the same period he completed the organization of Europe by a series of annexations, which left France with an eastern frontier from Spezzia to Lübeck. It appeared that the Continental System could only be administered efficiently by the Government of France itself, and independent units were accordingly absorbed in French territory. The Kingdom of Holland was suppressed because its fiscal orthodoxy was questionable and it had not dealt adequately with the British expedition to the Scheldt; its territory was merged in a group of French departments, and the French coast was extended still further by the North German annexations, which brought France up to the Danish frontier. The Hanseatic littoral between the Ems and the Elbe was absorbed, in order that French custom-houses might be established in Bremen and Hamburg, and the addition of Lübeck even gave to France a port on the Baltic.

1810.

1811.

iii. The Divorce.

Whilst the Emperor extended the French frontier beyond all previous limits, he established by his divorce and re-marriage the prospects of his dynasty. The Empress Josephine filled admirably the brilliant position which was imposed on her by her successive promotions from *Générale* to *Présidente* of the Consular Republic and from *Présidente* to Empress of the French; but she had no child by her second husband, and when experience demonstrated the disloyalty or incapacity of his brothers, an heir in the direct line became necessary. The Emperor, who said at St. Helena, 'She was the best woman in France,' approached the separation with grave

1809. regret, but his family relations were subordinated to his policy, and Josephine acquiesced in the divorce at a
1810. council of the Bonapartes. The marriage was dissolved by the Senate, and the Emperor's view of the invalidity of the religious ceremony was accepted by the Episcopal tribunal of Paris. Having obtained a divorce, Napoleon entered the European marriage-market; a negotiation for the Russian Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna was unsuccessful, and the Emperor resolved to ensure his control of Central Europe by an Austrian marriage. After an interval of diplomacy the Archduchess Marie Louise, daughter of Francis II, was married to Napoleon in Vienna, St. Cloud, and the Louvre; his proxy at the Austrian ceremony was the Archduke Charles, and the marriage appeared to efface the memory of Wagram and
1811. to ensure the permanent alliance of France and Austria. A son was born to the new Empress, and the boy began, as King of Rome, the ineffectual career which was to close twenty-one years later in a suburb of Vienna. The Emperor had exiled the Bourbons and humiliated the Hohenzollerns: he married a Hapsburg.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LATE EMPIRE

§ 1. The Decline of the Empire. § 2. The Peninsular War. § 3. The Russian Expedition. § 4. The Rising of Central Europe. § 5. The Fall of the Empire. § 6. The Peace of Vienna.

§ 1. The Decline of the Empire.

THE French Empire entered upon its last phase at the moment of its greatest magnificence. The Emperor was the acknowledged master of the Continent, Paris was the capital of Europe, and Rome was the second city of the Empire; the Pope was an insubordinate ecclesiastic upon French territory, the Holy Roman Empire had ceased to exist, and the state-system of Europe dated from the French conquest. The ideal of universal empire had been often entertained, but it was never more completely realized; Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Croats, and Poles marched in the same armies and lived by the same laws, and the continent of Europe was subjected to the will of a single man. But the decadence of the Empire, when it came, was sudden and complete, and it resulted from two causes, the prolonged resistance of England and the growing hostility of Russia. The defeat of England was the outstanding object of Imperial policy, and so long as that object was unattained, the Empire was exposed to grave dangers; universal peace was the essential prelude of universal empire, and the English war imposed upon Europe the discontent resulting from the Continental System and the nationalism resulting from the Spanish resistance. The Empire was affected still more vitally by the drift of Russian policy. The Emperor had made the Franco-Russian alliance the

foundation of his system, and its preservation was essential to an Empire which possessed no defensible frontier in eastern Europe. The commercial warfare against England, which put Germans to the pains of importing coffee into Hamburg in hearses and buying sugar by way of Salonika and Belgrade, was an irritation to Central Europe; but that irritation might well deepen into rebellion if the example of Russia was added to the example of Spain.

§ 2. The Peninsular War.

The Spanish enterprise of Napoleon had provided England with a means of exercising upon the Empire effective military pressure. British armies had rarely enjoyed upon the Continent a more convenient theatre of war than the territory of Spain and Portugal. The national rebellion provided them with the benefits of a friendly country, and the command of the sea ensured to them liberty of manœuvre, continuity of supply, and the certainty of a safe retreat; the course of operations was to demonstrate to the full the advantage of a peninsular war to the land forces of a maritime power.

1809. When the French armies recovered from the dislocation consequent upon the diversion of Sir John Moore, they prepared to suppress the Spanish rebellion, whilst Soult moved into Portugal in order to arrest a further British offensive by an occupation of the Atlantic ports. He succeeded in reaching the Douro and seized Oporto, but the landing of Wellesley at Lisbon with an expeditionary force of 26,000 men was unopposed. The British moved northwards from the Tagus, and the French were completely outmanœuvred; Wellesley effected a brilliant

May 12. passage of the Douro above Oporto, and in a campaign of nine days Soult was driven into Galicia with the loss of 4,000 men and all his artillery. Having cleared Portugal, which became the British base, Wellesley

directed his offensive towards Spain. Jourdan, who was in supreme command of the armies of King Joseph, prepared to defend the capital by a defensive on the middle Tagus. The British moved into Spain by the line of that river, and effected a junction with a Spanish force in Estremadura. The allies were attacked in July 27.
position at Talavera, and the Spanish troops were severely shaken by French cavalry in a pistol skirmish. On the following day the French attack was seriously July 28.
developed without success, and it appeared possible for Wellesley and Cuesta to march on Madrid; but their advance was arrested by the operations of Soult against their communications. He had moved southwards from Salamanca towards the Tagus, brushed aside a Portuguese force, and destroyed the British base at Plasencia. Wellesley observed the menace to his line of retreat and hastily withdrew, in order to escape isolation in the centre of Spain; the British raced for the bridge of Almaraz and fell back from the Tagus to the Guadiana between Elvas and Badajoz. The national forces of Spain were equally unsuccessful, and the French had small difficulty during the year in winning the victories of Medellin, Ocaña, and Alba de Tormes.

The irruption of Wellesley into Spain, although it was 1810.
unsuccessful in its immediate results, had convinced the Emperor of the danger created by the presence of the British in the Peninsula, and in the following year he made a serious effort to drive them into the sea. Seven provinces of Spain were detached from Joseph's kingdom and converted into French military governments; it was intended by this measure to ensure a more complete control of the northern roads and to found the French effort upon a more solid foundation than the precarious monarchy of an intrusive king. The termination of

the campaign against Austria liberated the *Grande Armée* for service in Spain, and in the summer Masséna passed the Pyrenees with a command far superior in quality to the French troops already in the field. The Catalonian rebels were defeated at Valls, and Soult conducted a military excursion through Andalusia, where Cadiz alone held out as the seat of a national *Junta*. It resulted that the whole of Spain, with the exception of Galicia in the north-west, Valencia in the south-east, and the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Cadiz, was controlled by a French field army of 270,000 men. But the real direction of the French effort was against the British; Wellington was disinclined to oppose the French on the Portuguese frontier, and permitted Masséna to besiege and capture the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, whilst he prepared a more elaborate defensive in the neighbourhood of Lisbon. Masséna moved down the Mondego and attacked the British at Busaco without success; Wellington, however, was not tempted to abandon his defensive, and withdrew to the Lines of Torres Vedras. This position lay across a peninsula formed between the Tagus and the sea, and its natural strength had been emphasized by elaborate fortification. The works were well connected and heavily armed, lying in three successive lines; the position was in complete communication with the sea, where British warships and transports ensured the safe supply and retreat of Wellington's army. But a more serious obstacle had been raised in the path of the French offensive by the systematic removal of all supplies from the vicinity of the lines, and it was this *glacis* of starvation which finally arrested Masséna. The French commander appreciated the strength of the English position and declined to attack it before the

February 25.

September 27.

October 10.

arrival of reinforcements; for a period of five weeks he endeavoured to support his army on the country, until he was compelled by the problem of supply to withdraw from Torres Vedras to Santarem. But the system which enabled French armies to live on the fertile and populous regions of Central Europe was inapplicable to Portugal, and in the new year Masséna was compelled to continue his retreat towards the Spanish frontier. In spite of the activity of the British at Cadiz, which resulted in the successful *sortie* of Barrosa, the command of Soult moved northwards out of Andalusia to join Masséna, who was fighting a series of rearguard actions in eastern Portugal. The Lines of Torres Vedras had effectually checked the *Grande Armée*, and Wellington was in undisputed control of Portugal.

November 15. 1811. March 7.

In its next phase the war became a struggle for the fortresses of the Spanish frontier; the British were prepared to break out of Portugal, and it became necessary for them to hold the strong places which controlled the eastward roads. Whilst Wellington moved against Almeida, Beresford blockaded Badajoz, and the French endeavoured to relieve both fortresses. Co-operation between the marshals was indifferent, and the Army of Portugal was disinclined to any serious effort after its experiences before Torres Vedras. Masséna failed at Fuentes d'Onoro to relieve Almeida, and Marmont superseded him, whilst the fortress itself fell. Soult attacked Beresford at Albuera in an attempt to relieve Badajoz, which eventually succeeded after his junction with Marmont. In the remainder of the year Wellington made an unsuccessful attack on Ciudad Rodrigo, whilst the French armies conducted a campaign of complete but unsatisfying victories over the Spanish armies; the rebellion was ubiquitous, and the national

May 5. May 16.

forces, although their operations were rarely successful, were singularly intangible.

1812. Wellington now seriously developed the British offensive. The French were distracted by the effort of the Russian expedition, and their strength was reduced by the drain of men towards eastern Europe. The English entered Spain and returned successfully to the

January 8–January 19. war of sieges; Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz fell in succession, and Wellington was at liberty to threaten

March 25–April 6. the northern roads, which joined Madrid to the French frontier. Marmont conducted a skilful campaign in Leon, until he was betrayed into the false manœuvre of

July 22. Salamanca, which enabled the British to encourage Madrid by a momentary occupation. The French abandoned the siege of Cadiz and withdrew from Andalusia to central Spain; the successful operations of Suchet against the Catalans formed almost the sole exception to the French failure.

1813. The British advance now imposed upon the French their last defensive; in the following year Joseph withdrew from Madrid to the line of the Ebro, and the Bonaparte monarchy in Spain ceased to be a government and became an army in retreat: it was the end of the Spanish experiment. Whilst Jourdan endeavoured to escort the retreating Court towards the western Pyrenees, Wellington threatened by a rapid movement his road

June 21. towards France; at Vittoria he defeated Joseph severely, and two weeks later the King of Spain was behind the Bidassoa. The British, whose base was the nearest port, transferred their operations to the north-western provinces and threatened the French frontier. Wellington moved towards the western Pyrenees, and San

August 31. Sebastian was captured. In the autumn he passed into

Nov. 10–12. France and engaged Soult on the line of the Nivelle in

a struggle for Bayonne: the Peninsular War had deepened into the invasion of France, and that invasion was the prelude to the fall of the Empire.

The Peninsular War, which resulted from the Spanish experiment of Napoleon, was a disastrous incident of the late Empire; whilst it afforded on the Continent an example of national rebellion and an opportunity for English activity, it distracted the French administration with a steady drain of valuable, if secondary, troops. The facile miscalculation, which had induced the Emperor to repeat in Spain the humiliating methods applicable to the more docile populations of central Europe was never retrieved, and the Peninsula became the grave of French military reputations. The series of errors, which began when French policy threatened with partition and conquest the most intractable nation in Europe, was continued in the conduct of the war. In 1809 the Emperor returned to France before the Spanish rebellion was completely suppressed; in 1810 the French armies proceeded with the conquest of Andalusia before Wellington was expelled from the Peninsula; in 1811 Masséna was inadequately supported with reinforcements before Torres Vedras; and in 1813 French strategy persisted in the futile effort to hold Spain with armies which, if transferred to central Europe, might have saved the Empire. It resulted that England conducted a successful continental war, and Spanish nationalism became an example of European significance. Wellington won a reputation and expelled the French from Spain, but the Spanish armies provoked a temper which expelled the Empire from Europe; Mina, Mendizabal, and El Empecinado showed the way to Stein and Scharnhorst, and the Spanish *guerillerro* was the precursor of the Prussian conscript.

§ 3. The Russian Expedition.

The collapse of the French Empire was preceded by the breakdown of the Franco-Russian alliance. The bankruptcy of the system of Tilsit had been demonstrated by the unenthusiastic co-operation of Russia in the campaign of 1809, and it was emphasized by every development of French policy. The objections which were raised by the Russian Court to the marriage of Napoleon and the Grand Duchess Anna resulted in the
1810. Austrian marriage and a transfer of French interest from St. Petersburg to Vienna. Russian enthusiasm for the French alliance was steadily diminished by the intolerable pressure of the Continental System on a country whose natural market was Great Britain. When Napoleon strengthened that system by the Trianon Decree and directed Russia to exclude neutral carriers of British merchandise, Alexander replied with a tariff discriminating against the products of France. Meanwhile the prizes with which Russian concurrence had been purchased at Tilsit were shown to be largely illusory; the war against Turkey degenerated into an unsatisfying campaign among the strong places of the lower Danube, and the annexation of Finland was a disappointing compensation. It even appeared from the advance of French policy in the affairs of Sweden that Napoleon had adopted a definitely hostile attitude towards the Baltic ambitions of Russia; Bernadotte, a French general and Prince of the Empire, was adopted as the Napoleonic candidate for the Swedish throne; his election alienated Alexander and indicated the creation in Sweden of a second Poland, where French influence might support Scandinavian nationalism against
1811. Russian expansion. The annexations by which the French Empire was extended in Europe were a source of grave alarm in St. Petersburg, and when the suppres-

sion of Oldenburg dispossessed the Czar's brother-in-law, it was obvious that Napoleon had ceased to cultivate Alexander's friendship. The advance of French power in the Baltic indicated the cleavage of national interests, and Alexander was at liberty to develop his personal policy towards the Empire. The Czar's attitude was based mainly on his view of the Polish problem; he had regarded with profound suspicion the foundation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; and when its power was extended by the territory acquired from Austria in 1809, he resolved to re-establish the Russian control of Poland. An offer of support to Polish nationalists was followed by the concentration of Russian troops on the Polish frontier. Napoleon was surprised by the Russian initiative, but he was able to relieve the pressure by a rapid movement of troops into northern Germany, and Alexander withdrew from his position. It now appeared that it was an object of Russian policy to suppress the Polish state, and Napoleon, as the heir of the Revolution, was incapable of such a surrender. In an effective scene with the Russian ambassador he challenged the Russians to encamp on the hill of Montmartre, and the rift between the two powers was complete.

April. May. August.

The Russian ultimatum demanded permission to trade with neutrals, a reduction of the garrison of Danzig, and the evacuation of Prussia and Swedish Pomerania; the Emperor declined to withdraw from the position imposed upon him by the Continental System, and replied with the diplomatic preparations for a war and the mobilization of western Europe. The French alliance was imposed upon Prussia and Austria, and whilst those powers explained in St. Petersburg the helplessness of their position, they consented in Paris to contribute

1812. April 27.

contingents to the *Grande Armée*. Russian diplomacy prepared for the war by an alliance with the French King of Sweden, a coalition in the traditional form with
May 3. Great Britain, and the conclusion with Turkey of the Treaty of Bucharest, which liberated the Russian forces in the Danube valley for a campaign in western Russia. The Russian armies were aligned to receive the French offensive in Lithuania, whilst the armed forces of France moved slowly across Europe. In the early summer of 1812, when the French Empire contained 130 departments and French suzerainty controlled seven kingdoms and thirty principalities, the Emperor Napoleon directed the greatest movement of troops that Europe had yet seen; 600,000 men marched on the Russian
May 9. frontier, and Napoleon drove out of Paris to command an army containing every continental nationality west of the Balkans: it was an invasion of Russia by Europe.
May 17. The Emperor passed into central Europe and held at Dresden a final Court of his subject kingdoms; from
May 30. Saxony he moved into Poland and entered Posen. He had no time in the course of a military operation to consider Polish susceptibilities, and the Polish regiments were scattered among the divisions of his army; nationalism was stimulated by the Revolution, but the Empire had become an international institution, and its government was that of an army in the field. In the third week of June war was declared by proclamation,
June 23–6. and in four days 400,000 men passed the Russian frontier by bridges across the Niemen.

The invasion of Russia was rendered almost unnaturally easy by the passive defensive adopted by the Russian commanders; Moscow, which was the Emperor's objective, lay more than five hundred miles behind the frontier, but the French armies passed across western

Russia in a march of twelve weeks, and encountered serious opposition only twice on their journey. In reality Russia opposed to Napoleon not the defence of manœuvre, but the defence of distance; an army advancing in a hostile country is compelled, apart from its natural shrinkage by desertion and disease, to diminish its striking force by the detachments which protect the increasing line of its communications. It resulted that when the *Grande Armée* fought at Smolensk its first serious engagement it had already lost 150,000 men. The Russians resumed their retreat, and in the late summer Napoleon followed them into central Russia; the problem of supply had already driven the French troops to pillage, and they suffered considerably from the heat of the Russian plain. Five hundred miles behind the frontier the Russian defensive prepared once more to arrest the invasion before the position of Borodino. The French attack was successful after a reckless sacrifice of men, and eight days later the Emperor rode into Moscow: it was quite deserted. Napoleon realised that the occupation of Moscow was not the conquest of Russia, and its value was diminished still further by the fires which broke out on the day of his arrival. For four days the city burned, whilst the French army endeavoured to save the capital from Russian incendiaries. It was obvious that an army which could not reach and destroy its enemy was powerless to conquer a country and impose peace on its Government, and the Emperor endeavoured to negotiate with Alexander. The negotiation failed, and after an occupation of four weeks the French turned westwards out of Moscow; the retreat had begun.

August 17–18.

September 7.

September 15.

September 15–19.

October 19.

The invasion had surmounted the Russian summer; the retreat was confronted with the Russian winter.

The European effort of Napoleon had moved 100,000 men into Moscow; it remained for him to withdraw them to the Polish frontier in face of the Russian armies.

October 24. An attempt to strike for the southern roads was arrested at Malo-Jaroslavetz, twenty-four hours after the French rearguard blew up the Kremlin, and the army was driven back upon its original route, where it had exhausted all supplies between Moscow and the magazines of Smolensk.

November Two weeks later, whilst the French were still beyond the Dnieper, the first snow fell, and death by cold was added to death by starvation in the prospect of the retreat. The troops from southern Europe suffered terribly, and the Russian cavalry followed every movement of the retreating army, of which only 40,000 men were fit to be put in line. At this time the Emperor had news of a republican plot in Paris, which ended in the execution of a madman named Malet, but emphasized the danger of his isolation in the interior of Russia. Three months after the *Grande Armée* had first entered

November 9–13. Smolensk an effective force of 34,000 men straggled into the town and found the magazines empty. The retreat was resumed, but a serious interruption was caused by

November 16–18. Russian attacks at Krasnoi. Eight days later the army reached the Beresina, and its passage of the river,

November 26–9. which was threatened by two Russian armies, was effected with the sacrifice of its trailing rearguard. Six

December 5. days later the Emperor left the army at Smorgoni and drove westwards without an escort; and within a week

December 12. 20,000 men, preserved from the Cossacks by the precarious rearguard actions of Ney, passed behind the Niemen.

The *Grande Armée*, which had attempted the invasion of Russia, had ceased to exist; in a campaign of six months it had marched 1,000 miles and had entered

the enemy's capital, but since it had failed to destroy the armed forces of Russia, its operations were without military significance. Its losses numbered 250,000 dead and 130,000 captured, but its failure meant more than the failure of a single enterprise or the loss of a single army. The *Grande Armée* had embodied the military power of the French Empire, and when that army ceased to exist the Napoleonic system ceased with it; the loss of the Polish regiments brought with it the loss of Poland, the loss of the German regiments was the end of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the retreat of the French army from Moscow was a retreat which could not end east of Paris.

§ 4. The Rising of Central Europe.

In its second phase the collapse of the French Empire took the form of a desperate defensive in central Europe. The French armies had failed to penetrate successfully beyond the Niemen, and their effort was now directed towards maintaining the integrity of Napoleonic Germany. The decisive factor at this stage was the attitude of Prussia, and that attitude was defined before the year ended, when the commander of the Prussian *corps* negotiated an armistice of two months with the Russians. The French were isolated in north-eastern Germany, and Eugène, who had succeeded Murat in the command, was compelled to evacuate Prussia in face of the Russian advance. Whilst the Russians occupied Silesia, the French withdrew to the Elbe and only held in advance of that line the fortresses of Danzig and the middle Oder. But even in Saxony the French position was insecure, since it was threatened on two flanks by the defection of the Emperor's allies; Prussian neutrality was ominous for the security of the French left, and a graver menace to their right was indicated by the drift of Austrian policy, which had induced Schwarzen-

December 30. Convention of Tauroggen.

1813.

berg to remove the Austrian force from the theatre of war.

French resources had not been exhausted by the destruction of the *Grande Armée*, and the Emperor created a new army of 500,000 men. The conscription of 1813 had been anticipated, but the conscription of 1814 produced an admirable class of young soldiers; troops were withdrawn from Spain, 30,000 marines were drafted from the war-harbours into Germany, and a territorial infantry was created. It resulted that Napoleon opposed to Russia in central Europe a substantial fighting force. The Russians, who were officially without allies west of the Vistula, had passed into Germany without confidence, and it was uncertain from the fluctuations of Prussian diplomacy whether Frederick William III would exchange the alliance of Napoleon for that of Alexander. Yorck, who had been responsible for the Convention of Tauroggen, was dismissed from his command and passed into East Prussia, where a patriotic insurrection was in progress, and for some weeks the King of Prussia was incapable of a choice between the two Emperors; his inclinations carried him towards a policy of neutrality, and it was only an explosion of Prussian patriotism that imposed upon him a definite hostility to the Empire.

The Prussian temper, which now operated as the decisive factor in central Europe, was the result of six years of French control. It had sprung without official encouragement from the humiliation which followed Jena, when national sentiment was outraged by a military occupation and material interests suffered from the confiscations of Daru and the pressure of the Continental System. The collapse of Prussia had been followed almost immediately by patriotic reaction and a literary return to Germanic traditions; but the

writings of Fichte and the subterranean operations of the *Tugendbund* were an ineffective expression of nationalism, and the exile of Stein in 1808 appeared to postpone indefinitely the work of national reorganization. But his administrative reforms had increased the efficiency of the Prussian government, and the more valuable work of Scharnhorst multiplied the value of the Prussian army. That force had been limited by Napoleon to a strength of 42,000 men, but Scharnhorst and his collaborators contrived by a system of short service to provide Prussia with a vastly greater supply of trained men. The patriotic cause suffered a severe loss by the death of Queen Louise in 1810, but the work of reform was continued by Hardenberg, and the Prussian state was modernized by the gradual suppression of feudal privileges and the centralization of its government. Intellectual liberty found expression in the new University of Berlin, where the Prussian professor studiously avoided the cosmopolitanism of the French intellectuals; and a more practical form of education was developed by the formation of a Staff College where Clausewitz lectured on the art of war.

It resulted from the growth of this temper that Prussian patriotism was indisposed to acquiesce in the vacillations of its king between the French and Russian alliances, and it was significant of its antecedents that upon the same day the naturalist Steffens made a patriotic appeal to his pupils and the Prussian government called for volunteers. The king was at Breslau in his customary indecision, but the course of the national movement cut short his hesitations. All exemptions from military service were cancelled, and within three weeks a treaty of alliance was signed with Russia. Alexander joined Frederick William at Breslau, and two days later

February 8

February 28. Treaty of Kalisch.

the King of Prussia issued by proclamation the appeal
March 17. 'To my people'. On the same day the *Landwehr* was created, and the decoration of the Iron Cross, which was a week old, was offered as the uniform reward of patriotic achievement. The treaty of alliance was
March 19. elaborated in the Convention of Breslau, and the Russo-Prussian combination was complete.

The first military results of the alliance were singularly successful. The allies overran northern Germany, and whilst Berlin was recovered from the French, the line of the Elbe, which was the position adopted by the French defensive, was violated in two places; an insur-
March 17. rection in Hamburg was successfully supported by
March 20. Russian cavalry and a Prussian force seized Dresden. The Emperor left France and prepared to restore the French control of Saxony; it was essential to the success of his campaign that he should operate without fear of an Austrian attack, and his diplomacy was directed to the captivation of Metternich. That minister declined to subordinate Austrian policy to Napoleon, but he had little sympathy with the national movement of Prussia, and finally adopted an unheroic and stationary position under the name of Armed Mediation. It resulted that the Emperor was completely successful in the spring
May 2. campaign; the Prussians were defeated at Lützen by the French conscripts, and Dresden was recovered. The French continued their advance towards Silesia and won
May 20. a second victory at Bautzen. The Emperor's rapid offensive brought his army to the line of the Oder, and
June 4. Armistice of Plesswitz. when an armistice was concluded, western Germany was in French hands.

For a period of ten weeks the campaign was interrupted by an interval of diplomacy. The Emperor was confronted in Europe by the Sixth Coalition, and it was

necessary for him to prevent the adhesion of Austria to that combination. The Austrian demands had been put before him by Metternich in a negotiation at Dresden and included the abolition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the withdrawal of French influence from the Confederation of the Rhine, and the surrender of Illyria. The Emperor declined to abandon his Adriatic province and prepared for war with Austria, which he endeavoured to isolate by an offer of Poland to the Czar; but Alexander was loyal to Metternich, and Napoleon was driven to conduct a second unsuccessful negotiation at Dresden, in which the decisive interview took place too late, twenty-four hours after Austria had drawn nearer to the allies in the Treaty of Reichenbach. . On the expiration of the armistice the Emperor, who appreciated the strength of the combination opposed to him, acquiesced in Metternich's proposal of a congress, which met at Prague without gain to either side. When European diplomacy withdrew in the late summer, the Sixth Coalition was completed by the adhesion of Austria. The motives of the powers composing it exhibited the traditional divergences, but its military value in central Europe was undiminished by the diversity of their objects; the Russians fought for Poland, the Prussians fought for Saxony, and the Swedes fought for the ambitions of Bernadotte, but their effort was directed equally against Napoleon. The English were distracted by a war with the United States, which had broken out in the previous year upon the question of neutral shipping, and their military energy was directed towards Spain, but they supported by every effort of diplomacy and finance the last and most successful of the Coalitions.

Treaty of Reichenbach. July 28.

When the autumn campaign opened, the French positions in Saxony were threatened by the Prussians in

Silesia and the Austrians in Bohemia; it was the design of the allies to envelop the Emperor in a ring of armies, which withdrew wherever he appeared and advanced
August 21. wherever he did not. His advance into Silesia was arrested by a movement of the Austrians into Saxony;
August 26–27. he returned and was completely victorious at Dresden, but his subordinates were almost uniformly unsuccessful.
August 23–September 6. Oudinot at Grossbeeren, Vandamme at Kulm, Macdonald on the Katzbach, and Ney at Dennewitz achieved a series of reverses, which restricted the Emperor's movements and permitted the gradual concentration of the allies in central Saxony. The Treaty of Teplitz
September 9. regulated the reorganization of Germany, whilst the allied armies operated a concentric march on Leipzig, which placed them in the third week of September upon
October 16. three sides of the city. On the first day of the engagement the Emperor conducted a vigorous defensive on the southern front, whilst his generals were engaged upon the other sectors of the position. The effort of 130,000 men against 300,000 was inevitably unsuccessful.
October 18. Two days later he resumed without success the defence of a more restricted circle, and in the night the French marched westwards out of Leipzig: it was the retreat from Germany. The Emperor moved by the line of the
October 30. Main towards the French frontier, and the allies failed at Hanau to intercept his retreat. Five days later his army reached French territory at Mainz, and within seven weeks of the decisive battle of Leipzig the French were behind the Rhine after a campaign in which the Napoleonic state-system in central Europe had ceased to exist. Westphalia, which had lost its entire army in Russia, collapsed before a raid of Russian cavalry, Holland and the Hanseatic Departments outside the walls of Hamburg were held by the allies, and Bavaria

affirmed its desertion of the Empire by the employment of its troops against the French at Hanau; the loyalty of Saxony was reduced to the personal adherence of its king. It resulted from the support given by Russia and Austria to the Prussian national effort that the Imperial system in Germany was reduced to the besieged garrisons of a few fortresses. France, the first nation in arms, had conquered Europe; Prussia, the second nation in arms, defeated France.

§ 5. The Fall of the Empire.

In its final phase the collapse of the French Empire took the form of an invasion of France. The area of French control had been reduced by the operations of the last year within the limits of French territory. Almost everywhere the French forces had receded behind its frontier; the armies which had imposed the Empire upon central Europe were behind the Rhine; the armies which had imposed the Bonaparte monarchy on Spain were behind the Pyrenees; and only in Italy the command of Eugène conducted in advance of the French frontier a precarious defensive in the valley of the Po, threatened by an Austrian army and the treachery of Murat. The alliance of the military monarchies, which had attempted an invasion in 1792, was reconstituted, but the Empire was less capable than the Revolution of defending its territory. An army of 80,000 men held the line of the Rhine, but the country behind them was almost completely exhausted; its finances had been crippled by the overwhelming weight of taxation, and its active population had been steadily reduced by the drain of the conscriptions. The conscripts of 1815 were called up, and by an incredible effort France provided a new army of 300,000 men and a territorial force of 50,000. Confiscations and the Emperor's treasure filled the financial gap, and the Empire prepared for its last effort.

There intervened between the retreat from Germany and the decisive operations of the invasion a period of diplomacy. A negotiation was conducted at Frankfort, in which France was offered the natural frontiers of 1795. It was the design of the allies that the Emperor should refuse these terms and that the refusal should justify the invasion; instead he replied ambiguously and demanded a congress. The allies proclaimed his answer as a refusal and declared war; twenty-four hours later the Emperor accepted the offer. His diplomacy had moved too slowly, and in a fortnight the invasion began. The French commanders made no attempt to hold the fortresses of the eastern frontier and withdrew before the allies. The Emperor, having appointed Marie Louise Regent and Joseph Lieutenant-General, left Paris and assumed the command. He fell back from the Marne at Saint-Dizier and endeavoured to hold the line of the Aube against the combined armies of Blücher and Schwarzenberg. He was unsuccessful in the two engagements of Brienne and la Rothière and retreated behind the angle of the Seine. European diplomacy made once more an insincere appearance upon the scene at the Congress of Châtillon, when the allies offered terms for the Emperor to refuse and the Emperor negotiated for the benefit of French opinion. Meanwhile he conducted, among the river-valleys which lead westwards upon Paris, the most brilliant defensive campaign of his career. An injudicious movement of Blücher upon Paris by the line of the Marne exposed the Prussians, and in a manœuvre of five days the Emperor drove them back in confusion at Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, and Vauchamps. Four days later he resumed his operations against the southern army of invasion with success at Montereau. But the alliance was undisturbed, and upon

November 13.

December 1.

December 13.

1814.

January 27.

February 1.

January 29–February 1.

February 4–March 19.

February 10–14.

February 18.

the initiative of Castlereagh, England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria agreed to continue the war until the French power was expelled from Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Spain, and reduced within the limits of its former frontiers. March 1. Treaty of Chaumont.

The Emperor now transferred his ubiquitous defensive northwards and defended at Craonne and Laon the line of the Aisne; in his absence the allies forced the line of the Aube and resumed the steady movement of the invasion. The Emperor hurried southwards from Reims and resumed the bewildering pattern of his movements between the Aube and the Marne; but it was gradually becoming obvious that brilliance of manœuvre could not prolong indefinitely the resistance of 30,000 men to 300,000. The allies had effected an overwhelming concentration on the Marne and were now between the Emperor and Paris; he conducted a final manœuvre in rear of them on the upper Seine and passed out of the theatre of war to Fontainebleau. The allies arrived before the northern suburbs of the capital and encountered considerable resistance from the command of Marmont and Mortier; but twenty-four hours later the armies of the military monarchies marched into Paris. March 7–10. March 20–24. March 30. March 31.

The Empire survived by a week the defeat of its armed forces. The Emperor at Fontainebleau contemplated a prolongation of the campaign behind the Loire, but the formation in Paris of a Provisional Government deprived his personal initiative of importance. The allies were without any clear design for the future government of France; the Czar was disposed to negotiate with representatives of the French people and to approve whatever system they selected, and the Emperor of Austria would have been content with the regency of his daughter, Marie Louise. But two factors combined to terminate

the Empire and to restore the monarchy: Talleyrand, under whose presidency the first conversations were held, had developed a royalist bias after an unrivalled experience, and Metternich was convinced that it would be impossible to confine France within its former frontiers without a restoration of its former monarchy. This view was accepted by the allies, and the disappearance of the Empire became the essential preliminary of peace. The Legislature voted, under the direction of Talleyrand, in favour of a change of government, but the Emperor, who retained control of a considerable army to the south of Paris, was indisposed to acquiesce in his elimination. His commanders pressed him to surrender, but it was not until Marmont had compromised his military position by a treacherous movement of his troops that Napoleon consented to abdicate and resigned at Fontainebleau the thrones of France and Italy. On the same day Louis XVIII was proclaimed King of France.

April 2–3.

April 5.

April 6.

The settlement which was imposed on France by the allied armies and the Provisional Government was contained in three documents and constituted a triple abdication. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau the Emperor of the French abandoned his European position in exchange for the ludicrous principality of Elba: it was the abdication of Napoleon. By the Convention of Calais the Comte d'Artois, on behalf of his brother, Louis XVIII, surrendered to the monarchies fifty-three fortresses, which were still held by French troops in advance of the French frontier: it was the abdication of the Revolution in its European aspect. By the Treaty of Paris the French monarchy accepted from the powers of Europe the frontier of November 1, 1792: it was the abdication of France. It had been the design of the

April 10. Treaty of Fontainebleau.

April 23. Convention of Calais.

May 30. Treaty of Paris.

monarchies to confine the French power within its original limits, and they were completely successful. The French government acquiesced in its exclusion from Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland in return for a modification of its south-eastern frontier, and the Bourbon monarchy was restored to France at the price of ignoring twenty years of French conquest. The powers which had imposed this settlement were not disinterested in their activities; but with a single exception the distribution of their rewards was postponed until the meeting of a European congress. Great Britain alone, whose armies were conducting a successful campaign on the northern slope of the Pyrenees, was at liberty to receive its colonial gains without European debate. Within seven weeks of Wellington's victory at Toulouse, Malta, Tobago, Sta. Lucia, and the Mauritius became British territory; but the most substantial acquisitions were made at the expense of Holland by the annexation of Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Dutch positions in western Guiana. It resulted that, when the European debate began at the opening of the Congress of Vienna, British policy was satisfied with its acquisitions and disposed to discourage the dangerous activity by which Prussia sought to accelerate its annexation of Saxony. The British position was completed by the signature of peace with the United States, and the diplomatists at Vienna proceeded with the partition of Europe. Whilst Alexander and Nesselrode strove to perpetuate the Russian occupation of Poland, and Frederick William and Hardenberg endeavoured to secure Saxony, Talleyrand succeeded in obtaining for France a place in the European session, and directed English and Austrian policy against the acquisitive powers of north-eastern Europe. The demands of

October 29. Congress of Vienna.

December 24. Peace of Ghent.

1815.

Russia and Prussia were modified by this combination, and the debate was proceeding placidly after a settlement of the Polish and Saxon questions, when it was interrupted by the return of Napoleon from Elba.

The second reign of Napoleon, which lasted one hundred days, was an episode of the Restoration; it was less a return of the Empire to political reality than a military adventure. The French people had observed the return of the Bourbon monarchy without enthusiasm, but it had seen the departure of Napoleon with relief. Louis XVIII was an uninspiring figure, and his adherents formed an unenlightened and irritating caste, but his presence in Paris was a guarantee of peace. A constitution had been embodied in the *Charte*, and there was a genuine revival of political life. The army alone remembered the Empire with any feeling approaching loyalty, and even in the army the higher officers had been content to accept office from Louis XVIII. But the Emperor's flotilla succeeded in eluding the French and
March 1. English patrol and landed a force of 1,100 men between Cannes and Antibes. This diminutive army of invasion marched on Paris by way of Grenoble and Lyon and encountered no serious resistance; the population varied between apathy and local enthusiasm, and it was ridiculous to expect French troops to fire on Napoleon.
March 20. Nineteen days later the Emperor reached Fontainebleau, and on the same evening he was in Paris; the action of the government had been paralysed by a military conspiracy in the northern command, and Louis XVIII withdrew to Ghent.

The Emperor knew that it was only as the representative of the Revolution that he could hope to exclude the Bourbons from France, and he endeavoured to improvise a liberal Empire. Carnot became Minister

of the Interior, and Benjamin Constant assumed as constitutional adviser the work of modernizing the Empire. By the *Acte additionnel* it received a Legislature of two Houses, liberty of the press, and a mild degree of ministerial responsibility; the Empire had endeavoured without conspicuous success to outbid the *Charte* of the monarchy. The new constitution was ratified by an unenthusiastic *plébiscite* and accepted by the Emperor in the elaborate ritual of the *Champ de Mai*. The new June 1.
Chamber was strongly opposed to the executive absolutism of the former Empire, and Napoleon was confronted with the unaccustomed obstacle of a constitutional opposition.

But the real problem of the restored Empire was military: the monarchies had renewed the European coalition, and the French effort was again confronted with the armed forces of Europe. Whilst the armies of Russia and Austria moved slowly across central Europe, England and Prussia had placed on Belgian territory, in proximity to the northern frontier of France, a force amounting with local troops to 250,000 men. The Emperor formed the Army of the North of 124,000 men, directed its concentration between the strong places of Maubeuge and Philippeville, and drove out of Paris to take command. The allied armies lay in two June 12.
groups behind the Sambre, the British, whose communications ran westwards to the sea, covering Brussels, and the Prussians, whose communications ran eastwards to the Rhine, holding the line of the Meuse. It was the design of the Emperor to separate them by this division of interest and to defeat them in turn; the attempt was made in a campaign of four days, and it did not succeed. The French passed the Sambre by four bridges in the neighbourhood of Charleroi and wheeled June 15
to the right against the Prussians. On the following day June 16.

the command of Blücher was attacked in position at Ligny; the French offensive was vigorous and successful, in spite of the unnecessary absence of d'Erlon's corps, and at sunset the Prussians withdrew. During the same hours the command of Ney had made an unsatisfactory
June 17. attack on the English at Quatre-Bras. On the next day the Emperor transferred the weight of his offensive from right to left and advanced against Wellington; the English withdrew to the position of Mont St. Jean across the Brussels road, and prepared to receive the French attack upon an inconspicuous ridge. Meanwhile the Prussians were in retreat from Ligny, moving northwards upon Wavre; the French cavalry failed to keep in touch with them and its direction by Grouchy contributed to the Emperor's impression that Blücher had retreated
June 18. eastwards upon Namur. Late in the morning of the fourth day of the campaign the decisive engagement began near Waterloo. The British, Dutch, and Belgian command of Wellington was of inferior quality, but it resisted for six hours a series of French attacks. In the afternoon the appearance of the Prussians from the east first accelerated and then arrested the French offensive. The Army of the North was destroyed and ran for the French frontier: it was the last army of the Empire.

The second reign of Napoleon ended with the destruction of his field army. Murat's attempt to raise Italy had ended with his flight to France, and the invading armies of Europe had passed the Rhine, the Alps, and the
June 21. gap of Belfort. The Emperor left the army and returned to Paris, which was controlled by the Legislature. He
June 22. was persuaded to abdicate and withdrew to Malmaison. For four days he remained in retirement, and once by a singular return upon his career he offered to the Provisional Government the services of General Bona-

parte. The offer was refused, and he formed the design of retiring to America. At Rochefort he went on board a British cruiser and became the prisoner of the allied governments: he was transported to St. Helena. July 15.

The adventure of the Hundred Days, which afforded to the allies the luxury of a second entry into Paris, achieved no serious result. Napoleon was transferred from an island in the Mediterranean to an island in the Atlantic, the Bourbon monarchy returned in a more vindictive temper than it had exhibited at its first restoration, and the French frontier was drawn by the second Treaty of Paris in a less favourable line than the frontier of 1814. It had been the Prussian design to avenge the Emperor's escapade by a partition of France; but England and Russia confined the punishment to a rectification of the frontier, which deprived France of the fortresses of Philippeville, Saarbrück, and Landau, and exposed its territory to invasion by the lines of the Oise and the Saar. November 20. Treaty of Paris.

With the removal of the Empire the kings returned to their kingdoms; Russia, Prussia, and Austria resumed their normal territories, and the note of restoration, which was characteristic of the Peace of Vienna, was sustained in the return of Ferdinand VII to Spain and of Louis XVIII to France; and the effort of the European monarchies was expressed in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. It was the first object of that settlement, which effaced the Napoleonic reconstruction of Europe, to confine the French power within the limits of its new frontier, and to confront the French armies, wherever they violated it, with a strong defensive. On the northern frontier the territory of Belgium was united with Holland in the single Kingdom of the Netherlands; on the eastern frontier the military § 6. The Peace of Vienna.

power of Prussia was brought in contact with France by the acquisition of the Rhenish provinces, and the German defence of the Rhine frontier was consolidated by the organization of the Germanic Confederation; and on the Alpine frontier the resistance of Piedmont was supported by the presence in North Italy of the Austrian power. France was deprived of every bridge-head which the Revolution had established beyond the Rhine, and its armies were excluded from central Europe and the Italian plain by the secure establishment of Prussia and Austria.

But the crusade against Napoleon had not been undertaken without hope of reward, and it was the second object of the monarchies to distribute Europe in a manner favourable to themselves. It had been the object of Russia to absorb the whole territory of Poland, and the Czar had repeatedly insisted upon the purest doctrine of nationalism in opposition to a partition; but he was compelled to restore a large part of the Polish possessions of Prussia, and to endeavour by the formation of the Holy Alliance to supersede the settlement of Vienna. The reward of Prussia was more substantial; the restoration of its former territory, the absorption of an area of Saxony, and the acquisition of the Rhenish provinces, increased the European importance of the kingdom, although its geographical conformation remained irrational and disjointed. The control of central Europe was vested in the Germanic Confederation under the presidency of Austria, but it was significant that the expansion of Austria took a direction that led it away from Germany. Lombardy and Venetia became Austrian territory, whilst the Napoleonic reductions of Austrian territory in the eastern Alps and on the Adriatic were annulled; the Hapsburgs, who divided the control of central Europe with the Hohenzollerns, had become

an Italian power. Italy was redistributed amongst its princes, and Sweden alone of the minor powers owed to the influence of Bernadotte a substantial increase of territory by the union with Norway.

There was one state in Europe which made gains by the Peace of Vienna both within and beyond the Continent: it was profoundly advantageous to Great Britain that French expansion should be checked and that the coast-line from Nieuport to the West Frisian Islands should be controlled by an independent government. England had made war in 1792 in order to exclude France from the Low Countries, and it made peace in 1815 with that object firmly secured. The territorial increase of Hanover was a compliment to its king, and the acquisition of Malta and Heligoland was an assistance to its sea-power. But its greatest gains were made outside Europe. England obtained by the settlement of Vienna an extension of her colonial empire, which continued the transmarine development of the eighteenth century; and she was prepared to utilize that empire in an industrial and commercial effort which no power in Europe could rival. England had fought with the Revolution and Empire a war of twenty-two years, but she emerged from that war with her territory uninvaded and her sea-power unimpaired. Of all the enemies of France Great Britain was the strongest upon sea and the richest upon land, and it was fitting that, when Napoleon sailed from Europe, he sailed in an English ship. The Empire had attempted by the military effort of a decade to impose upon Europe the Revolution, which required a century for its acceptance. The monarchies rejected it, and that rejection was expressed in the Peace of Vienna and in the order which sent Napoleon on a warship into the Atlantic. It was the end of an age.

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

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
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Philip V
1700–1746
Elizabeth Farnese of Parma
Louis
1724–1775
Ferdinand VI
1746–1759
Charles III
1759–1788
Philip, Duke of Parma
Charles IV
1788–1808
Louisa Maria
Ferdinand VII
1814–1833


James I
1603–1625
Charles I
1625–1649
Elizabeth = Frederick V, Elector Palatine
Charles II
1660–1685
James II
1685–1688
Sophia = Ernest Augustus, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg
William III = Mary
1689–1702
Anne
1702–1714
Sophia Dorothea of Brunswick-Lüneburg = George I
1714–1727
Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach = George II
1727–1760
Frederick, Prince of Wales
Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz = George III
1760–1820
George IV
1820–1830
Frederick, Duke of York
William IV
1830–1837

4. AUSTRIA AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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